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ABSTRACT 
This thesis attempts to address perennial concerns, mostly raised in some quarters in Africa, 
pertaining to the development of the complementarity regime established by the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court. It grapples with a very important question, 
whether the principle of complementarity, embodied in article 17 of the Rome Statute, was 
formulated and is being applied by the ICC in a manner that upholds the ideals and theories 
upon which the regime was founded. The principle of complementarity is designed to 
mediate the imperatives of State sovereignty and a legitimate international criminal justice 
system. Essentially, complementarity gives States latitude to try genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and aggression nationally, with the ICC only intervening where States 
are either unable or unwilling to prosecute genuinely. Africa constitutes the biggest regional 
block of membership to the Rome Statute, however, over the years; support for the ICC on 
the African continent has waned. It has been argued in some quarters that the ICC is anti-
African and that it has interpreted and applied complementarity in a manner that diminishes 
State sovereignty. The thesis argues that this tension may also be due to textual deficiencies 
inherent within the Rome Statute, in the provisions that embody this principle. It therefore 
examines complementarity from a theoretical perspective to provide a comprehensive 
account of the system contemplated by the drafters of the Rome Statute. In this regard, the 
thesis argues for expansion of States’ ability at the national level to deal with international 
crimes without compromising international criminal justice processes or threatening State 
sovereignty. This is suggested as a way of relieving the tension that has characterised the 
relationship between African States and the ICC. The thesis further sketches out some of the 
complexities inherent in the modalities through which the Court may exercise its 
complementary jurisdiction, particularly within the African continent, given that legal 
systems in most African countries are particularly weak. It thus dissects the provisions that 
outline the principle of complementarity in tandem with the Court’s interpretation and 
application of complementarity in practice. Furthermore, through an exploratory survey of 
the referral of the Situation in Uganda, and the ICC Prosecutor’s proprio motu investigation 
of the Situation in Kenya, the thesis illustrates how a positive approach to complementarity 
can help establish a healthy cooperative synergy between the ICC and States, thereby 
promoting a functional expeditious criminal justice system. This will go a long way towards 
assuaging State’s fears that the ICC merely pays lip service to complementarity and 
arbitrarily supersedes national jurisdiction. 
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 Chapter One 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Introduction 
The basic understanding of the principle of complementarity1 is that the International 
Criminal Court (hereinafter “the ICC”) is supplementary to national jurisdiction in 
prosecuting core international crimes set out in article 5 of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court ( the “Rome Statute”).2 The legal framework that embodies this 
principle is in Article 17 of the Rome Statute. The regime established by article 17 is 
commonly referred to as the complementarity regime. Article 17 provides rules governing the 
admissibility of cases before the Court. The principle requires that the ICC defer to national 
judiciaries when crimes against humanity, genocide, aggression and war crimes have been 
committed and a Member State has asserted its criminal jurisdiction over those crimes.3 
Significantly, article 17 links the admissibility criteria to the complementarity regime by 
laying down conditions under which the ICC may defer jurisdiction to national courts. 4   
Pursuant to article 17, the ICC may deem a case inadmissible before it when it has been or is 
being investigated or prosecuted in a State with territorial or nationality jurisdiction; or where 
such a State has investigated the matter and has decided not to prosecute.5 “Unwillingness” 
and “inability” to prosecute genuinely are trigger mechanisms through which the ICC may 
exercise its complementary jurisdiction.6 Therefore, the core of the admissibility criteria is 
whether the State that has jurisdiction shows “unwillingness” or “inability” to genuinely 
1  The principle of complementarity is enshrined in the 10th preambular paragraph of the Rome Statute in 
which States Parties to the Rome Statute were “emphasizing that the international criminal court established 
under this statute shall be complementary to national jurisdictions.” Article 1 also provides: “An 
international criminal court (the Court) is hereby established...and shall be complementary to national 
criminal jurisdictions.” [Emphasis added]. The principle is also embodied in article 17 (rules of 
admissibility) which refers to article 1 and para10 of the preamble of the Rome Statute and gives States 
primary jurisdiction.  See The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, 
entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
2  The crimes listed under article 5 of the Rome Statute are aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity 
and the crime of genocide. Article 17 of the Rome Statute essentially gives States latitude to try these crimes 
nationally. See JT Holmes “Complementarity: National Courts Versus the International Criminal Court” in 
A Cassese, P Gaeta and J Jones (eds.) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Complex 
Interplay (2002) 667; L Yang “On the Principle of Complementarity of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court” (2005) 4 Chinese Journal of International Law 121 at 122.  
3  See article 17 of the Rome Statute. 
4  Article 17 deliberately refers to article 1 and paragraph 10 of the preamble of the Statute, which introduces 
the principle, thereby creating a link between the admissibility criteria and the ICC’s exercise of its 
complementary jurisdiction. 
5  See article17 (1) of the Rome Statute. 
6  See M Politi and F Gioia “The Criminal Procedure Before the International Criminal Court: Main Features” 
(2006) 5 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 106. 
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 investigate and/or prosecute the Rome Statute crimes.7 In addition, a case is inadmissible 
before the ICC where the suspect has been tried for the conduct which is the subject of the 
complaint before the Court (ne bis in idem).8 The Court may also not entertain a case if it is 
not of sufficient gravity to warrant further action, given the fact that the ICC has the mandate 
to try only perpetrators of the most serious crimes.9 Since the ICC became operational, it has 
opened cases against individuals from eight African countries.10 However, some African 
countries, under the aegis of the African Union (hereinafter the “AU”), have voiced concerns 
about the Court’s fairness. The interpretation and application of the principle of 
complementarity by the ICC in these cases has, largely contributed to the tension that has 
built up between the Court and the AU and this issue merits examination.11 
1.2. Description and Context of the Research 
The principle of complementarity is a unique and pivotal concept of international law, which 
delineates prosecutorial prerogatives between national courts and international judicial 
institutions. With the evolution and development of the principle, authors of the worst 
atrocities can no longer hide behind the veil of State sovereignty. However, as 
complementarity was set in motion, voices of concern over the Court’s independence and its 
prioritization of African were heard across the continent.12 This has strained the relationship 
between the Court and some African States and as a result, the formidable support that 
7  See Article 17 of the Rome Statute. 
8  See article 20(3) of the Rome Statute. This rule is sometimes referred to as the double jeopardy rule, if a 
person has already been tried for conduct that is the subject of a complaint before a court of law, he cannot 
be tried for the same conduct again if he was convicted or acquitted. 
9  The Rome Statute requires that the Court only hear cases that meet the gravity threshold – heinous crimes 
which are systematic and large scale as opposed to crimes of a lesser magnitude, which could be dealt with 
municipally. 
10  The ICC docket comprises of cases from African countries. The Court is currently investigating cases 
against individuals from Uganda, The DRC, The Central African Republic, Sudan, Kenya, Ivory Coast, 
Libya and Mali.  
11  See M du Plessis The International Criminal Court that Africa Wants (2010) 13. From a healthy relationship 
of support for the ICC to declarations of non-cooperation, the ICC-AU relationship remains strained after the 
ICC indicted of sitting heads of African States. An arrest warrant was issued against the Sudanese President 
Omar Hassan al Bashir in 2009 for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur. The Kenyan President 
Uhuru Kenyatta and his Vice-President William Ruto are due to stand trial in 2014 for crimes against 
humanity and war crimes which are alleged to have been committed during the 2007 post-election violence. 
12  It has been argued that the ICC is a post-colonial conspiracy tool used by the Western Powers against weak 
African States. Also, that the Security Council has ignored African States’ plea for peace over justice in its 
resolution of conflicts within the Continent. Moreover, that the ICC’s indictment of a sitting head of a non-
member State to the Rome Statute is an affront to that State (Sudan’s) sovereignty. See “Rwanda’s Kagame 
Says ICC Targeting Poor, African Countries” AFP 31 July 2008. See also C Murungu and J Biegon (eds) 
Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa (2011) 155. See M du Plessis The International Criminal Court 
that Africa Wants (2010) 13-14 for a general discussion.  
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 African States once showed for the ICC has waned.13 To voice their displeasure, African 
States, under the aegis of the African Union, have adopted a declaration of non-cooperation 
with the ICC.14 Instead of cooperating with the ICC, the AU has decided to vest the African 
Court of Justice and Human Rights (hereinafter “the African Court”)15  with complementary 
jurisdiction to try the crimes, among others, listed under article 5 of the Rome Statute.16 This 
move by the AU raises interesting questions: whether the Complementarity regime envisages 
a situation where regional quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals have a complementary role within 
the international criminal justice system. Another issue is whether their involvement will not 
undermine the Court’s quest for accountability or its relevance in Africa. For instance, most 
recently, the Kenyan government has been lobbying for withdrawal from the ICC after 
unsuccessful attempts to challenge the Court’s jurisdiction over the cases against six high-
ranking Kenyan officials.17  
 
Although there seems to be a general concern that the ICC is targeting African heads of State, 
the chaotic and dangerous aspirations of African governments, and the consequent suffering 
of their citizenry show that there is a need for the ICC’s intervention.  
13  Africa has been known for its support for the ICC since the negotiations for the establishment of the Court, 
and African States form the largest regional block of membership to the Rome Statute. As a matter of fact, 
the first State Party to sign the Rome Statute, Senegal is from Africa. See du Plessis The International 
Criminal Court that Africa Wants (2010) 13. 
14  See Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XIII) Assembly/AU/Dec.245 (XIII) Rev.1 (adopted at Sirte Libya on 3 
July 2009). Page 2 para 10 provides: “… in view of the fact that the request by the African Union has never 
been acted upon, the AU Member States shall not cooperate pursuant to the provisions of Article 98 of the 
Rome Statute of the ICC relating to immunities, for the arrest and surrender of President Omar El Bashir of 
The Sudan” adopted at Sirte Libya on 3 July 2009. 
15  The African Court was established by the Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of 
the African Court of Justice and Human Rights Exp/Min/IV/Rev.7 which merges the African Human and 
Peoples Rights Court with the African Court of Justice. 
16  The Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights which establishes the International Criminal Section of the African Court was adopted at a Meeting 
of Government Experts and Ministers of Justice/Attorneys General on Legal Matters on 7 to 11 and 14 to 15 
May 2012 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Exp/Min/IV/Rev.7 Original: English. 
17  See “Kenya’s Threat to Withdraw from the ICC: What Will SA Do?” Daily Maverick 29 November 2013. 
Available at http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2013-10-08-kenyas-threat-to-withdraw-from-the-icc-
what-will-sa-do/#.Uphni9IW1FU (accessed 29 November 2013). Subsequent to Kenya’s passage of a 
motion in parliament to withdraw membership to the Rome Statute, the AU held the 15th Extraordinary 
Session of the Assembly of the African Union included among others, Decision on Africa’s Relations with 
the ICC. See Decision on Africa’s Relations with the International Criminal Court Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1-
2 (Oct.2013). The AU adopted a decision to call for deferment or postponement of the cases against the 
Kenyan vice-president and President Uhuru Kenyatta. See “Africa to Request Deferment of Indictments 
against Kenyan President and Vice President” Press Release No 177/2013 Addis Ababa (12 October 2013).  
The ICC finally postponed the case against Kenyatta to February 2014. See “ICC Postpones Kenya President 
Kenyatta’s Trial Date” 13th Forum Ecomonique International Sur L’Afrique 29 November 2013. Available 
at http://www.panapress.com/iCC-postpones-Kenya-President-Kenyatta-s-trial-date--15-885721-32-lang2-
index.html (accessed 29 July 2013). 
3 
 
                                                            
 This thesis therefore sets out to investigate whether the ICC interpretes and applies 
complementarity in a manner that upholds the ideals and theories upon which the regime 
established by article 17 was founded. The thesis will therefore advance theoretical constructs 
underpinning complementarity and use these as the framework upon which it will critically 
analyse the interplay between the ICC and national judiciaries. Moreover, while the African 
audience is not oblivious to the need for ICC intervention, the mixed legal, political and social 
nature of the concerns raised against the ICC, necessitates a holistic assessment of the 
complementary regime. Three major points are therefore noteworthy. Firstly, that 
complementarity is only invoked where national justice systems are incompetent or 
inoperative (unavailable). Secondly, legal systems in most African countries are particularly 
weak and “African solutions to African problems” avenues have, in the past, failed to resolve 
disputes in conflict torn societies in Africa. Lastly, although African States perceive the ICC 
as a threat to their sovereignty, they have a lot to gain from the regime of complementarity, its 
flaws notwithstanding. 
 
1.2.1 Complementarity and Modern Notions of State Sovereignty 
African States have shown formidable support for the ICC since the idea to establish such a 
court was first formulated. The relationship between African States and the ICC however, 
worsened soon after the indictment of an incumbent head of State, President Omar al-Bashir 
of Sudan in 2009. Some of the concerns that African States have raised are that the ICC 
undermines State sovereignty and is a mechanism of neo-colonial policy used by the West 
against free and weak countries;18 and that it takes advantage of African countries because 
national legal systems in Africa are particularly weak.19 The Court’s involvement in on-going 
18  This was the argument advanced by the Arab League’s Foreign Ministers at their meeting in Cairo on July 
19, 2008 in response to ICC’s involvement in Sudan. They called the ICC’s move a dangerous precedent 
which undermines Sudan’s sovereignty. The 22 Member States made a joint resolution declaring “solidarity 
with the President of Sudan in confronting schemes that undermine its sovereignty, unity and stability and 
their non-acceptance of the unbalanced, not objective position of the Prosecutor of the ICC”. See K Aning S 
Atuobi “Responsibility to Protect Africa: An Analysis of the African Union’s Peace and Security 
Architecture” Global Responsibility to Protect (2009) 274 in this regard. See also A Alexis et al 
“International Criminal Court Cases in Africa: Status and Policy Issues” (2009) Congressional Research 
Service 13. Available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/128346.pdf (Accessed 22 March 2012). 
19  See Alexis et al “International Criminal Court Cases in Africa: Status and Policy Issues” Congressional 
Research Service 27. See also P Mckeon “An International Criminal Court: Balancing the Principle of 
Sovereignty Against the Demands of International Justice (2009) 12 St. John’s Journal of Legal 
Commentary 535 at 555. See also S Odero “Politics of International Criminal Justice, the International 
Criminal Court’s Arrest Warrant for Al Bashir and the African Union’s Neo-colonial Conspirator Thesis” in 
C Murungu and J Biegon (eds.) Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa (2011)  145 at 156. 
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 conflicts has also been seen as an obstruction to peace and reconciliation efforts.20 Some 
critics also argue that the ICC may also be used for political ends, for instance, in order to 
eliminate opponents.21 Some of these issues form the core of the African Union’s opposition 
to the ICC’s involvement in Uganda, after President Yoweri Museveni referred the situation 
in northern Uganda concerning mass atrocities committed by the Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA) to the Court. For the most part, the AU’s anti-ICC behaviour intensified soon after the 
indictment of President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, pursuant to the United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1593 (2005).22 This particular case has been controversial because Sudan 
is not a party to the Rome Statute and this was considered an affront to Sudan’s sovereignty.  
The principle of complementarity was an attempt to strike a balance between State 
sovereignty and repression of international crimes. However, with the culmination of the 
tension between these competing interests in the context of Africa, it may be useful to 
investigate whether the Rome Statute provides States with appropriate tools to maintain this 
delicate balance. It is also imperative to determine the extent to which membership to the 
Rome Statute fundamentally challenges State sovereignty. This requires a brief overview of 
the evolution and development of the notion of sovereignty of States. Criminal jurisdiction is 
one of the traditional bases of State sovereignty but due to the changing landscape of 
international relations, classical notions of State sovereignty no longer apply in international 
law.23 The Nuremberg trials lifted the veil of sovereignty.24 This principle is therefore no 
longer an absolute right. History has proved that uncontrolled notions of State sovereignty 
aggravated the culture of impunity for the most heinous crimes.  
20  This was the argument advanced by, among others, the Acholi Religious Leaders’ Peace initiative, that the 
ICC should stop further investigations and prosecutions in northern Uganda as its involvement could deter 
protagonists from joining peace talks. See also A du Plessis and A Louw ‘The ICC that Africa Wants,’ 
Symposium on International Crime in Africa Programme (2009) International Security Studies 1 at 6.  
21  Some scholars have argued that the ICC was used to settle political scores in Uganda as charges were only 
brought against the Lord Resistance Army and not President Musevini’s militia when there was evidence 
that they also committed heinous crimes during the conflict. See Souare 2009 Review of African Political 
Economy 377 (noting that “the whole story of referring the LRA to the ICC was a political strategy by the 
Ugandan government to achieve international criminalization of the group and to gain foreign support for its 
military operations against the rebels”). 
22  One of the trigger mechanisms for the ICC to assert its jurisdiction is by a Security Council referral acting 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of United Nations. See article 16 of the Rome Statute. 
23  During the negotiations for an international tribunal for punishment of international crimes, the proposals 
brought forward made a distinction between internal and external sovereignty, in a way, this goes to show 
that strict concepts of sovereignty do not apply in international law; a state no longer has the power to do as 
it pleases within its territory, it has to be in line with the rule of law and the law of nations. See also   “The 
Relationship Between State Sovereignty and the Enforcement of International Criminal Law Under the 
Rome Statute (1998): A complex Interplay” International Criminal Law Review (2009) 9 531 at 538. 
24  The Nuremberg trials set out the principles of International criminal law and emphasized that war criminals 
cannot hide behind the veil of state sovereignty. See Brand R A “External Sovereignty and International 
Law” (1995) 18 Fordham International Law Journal 1685, 1690. 
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 State sovereignty is a customary international law concept embedded in article 2 of the 
United Nations Charter, which emphasises that every sovereign State must be able to manage 
its own internal affairs without undue interference from other States, except for humanitarian 
intervention. For instance, in cases where the Security Council enforces its Chapter VII 
powers.25 The traditional understanding of sovereignty is that the State has political 
independence and must handle its internal affairs free from interference by the international 
community.26 However, this posed problems after the World War I because States invoked 
the concept to block attempts to bring those responsible for atrocities to book and to stall the 
establishment of an international criminal tribunal.27 However, under the current international 
order, sovereignty is subject to limitations.28 In the words of Boutros, the former UN 
Secretary General “[t]he time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty…has passed; [because] 
its theory was never matched by reality.”29 
This radical shift from the traditional State-centred view of international personality came 
after the incorporation of the concept of individual criminal responsibility into international 
criminal law after the World War II.30 The most fundamental of these in-roads on sovereignty 
of States is the complementarity regime. The ICC may be described as an intrusive institution 
as far as it may fundamentally curtails State sovereignty, in that it prosecutes States’ nationals 
should States not satisfy the complementarity criterion set out in article 17 of the Rome 
Statute.31 Although States have jurisdictional priority over crimes set out in the Statute, their 
25  See article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter (1945), 59 Stat 1031, Treaty Set No 993 (1945). It provides: 
“Nothing contained in this present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which 
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state…but this principle shall not prejudice the 
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII” 
26  See GB Helman and SR Ratner “Saving Failed States” Foreign Policy (1992-1993) 89 3 at 9. 
27  M Newton “Comparative complementarity: Domestic Jurisdiction Consistent with the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court” Military Law Review (2001) 20 at 24 opines that the concept of sovereignty 
did not only hamper attempts to establish an international criminal court but also restricted the application of 
the rule of law of nations. Powerful perpetrators escaped criminal liability for their actions under the guise of 
state sovereignty. Germany was against its nationals being prosecuted in an international tribunal (set up by 
the Allied Powers) for war crimes after World War I because they would infringe their sovereignty rights. It 
seems this was one of the impunity manoeuvres that have been put in place by most powerful leaders 
28  See P McKeon “An International Criminal Court: Balancing the Principle of Sovereignty against the 
Demands for International Justice (2009) St. John’s Journal of Legal Commentary 535 at 541. 
29  See Boutros B An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-making and Peace Keeping (1992) 9. He 
goes further to state that world leaders have a duty to understand that classical notions of State sovereignty 
no longer have a place in international law and urges them to “find a balance between the needs of good 
internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world”. 
30  See JN Maogoto War Crimes and Realpolitik: International Justice from World War I to the 21st Century 
(2004) 5. 
31  The Rome Statute has made significant breakthroughs to the concept of state sovereignty by endowing the 
ICC with complementary jurisdiction: classical notions of unconstrained sovereignty no longer apply in 
international criminal law since the Court has the power to wrest cases from national jurisdiction where 
states fail to prosecute in terms of the Statute. See A Cassese “The Statute of the International Criminal 
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 sovereignty is limited in the sense that whenever crimes have been committed within their 
territory, the ICC’s watchful eye exerts pressure on the State to perform its international law 
duties and prosecute, failing which the Court exercises its complementary jurisdiction.  
Additionally, in cases where a State decides not to prosecute, its entire legal and judicial 
system is scrutinized in terms of article 17, to determine the genuineness of the decision to or 
not to prosecute.32 The act of ratifying the Rome Statute therefore constitutes a sovereign act 
in itself; this is because a sovereign nation State of its own volition gives the international 
tribunal power to intervene where it is unable to meet its treaty obligations.33  The fact that 
the Court can still intervene in matters involving third States through the Security Council 
also curtails sovereignty of third States. This is exemplified by the Court’s involvement in the 
situation in Sudan concerning mass atrocities allegedly committed by, among others, the 
sitting head of State, President al Bashir. The case was referred to the Court through the 
Security Council Resolution 1593 of 2005.34  
The Court would not have jurisdiction over the situation in Darfur but for the resolution. 
Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute and does not accept the Court’s jurisdiction. This 
implies that failure to ratify the Rome Statute does not absolve the State of its international 
law duties. A Security Council resolution extends the Court’s jurisdictional reach to non-
member States, an approach that is quite unorthodox in international relations.35 This raises 
an important question, to what extent does membership to the Rome Statute constitute a 
fundamental challenge to sovereignty of Member States to the Rome Statute? The ICC is 
envisioned as the court of last resort, with States’ national courts being the prime fora. Thus, 
Court: Some Preliminary Reflections” (1999) 10 EJIL 144 at 145, he notes that the ICC is a “…very 
revolutionary institution that intrudes into state sovereignty by subjecting states’ nationals to an international 
criminal jurisdiction”. 
32  See A Ioana The ICC: Starting with Africa?  (PhD dissertation, Peter Paizmany Catholic University, 2008) 
42. 
33  See M Melandri “The Relationship Between State Sovereignty and the Enforcement of International 
Criminal Law under the Rome Statute (1998): A Complex Interplay” (2009) 9(3) Criminal Law Review 531 
at 536. He notes that the act of ratifying the Rome Statute is considered a sovereign act by a state, since it 
affirms its commitment to international criminal justice and gives a supranational judicial body powers to 
supplement any deficiencies in its judicial system. 
34  See Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005) Adopted by the Security Council at its 5158th meeting, 
on 31 March 2005 S/RES/1593 (2005). 
35  See article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (entered into force on 27 January 1980) UN 
Doc. A/CONF. 39/27. International Legal Materials, (1969) 679-735 (hereafter cited as Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties). It provides: “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith”. The third preambular paragraph of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties also emphasizes the principles of free consent and of good faith and the pacta sunt servanda rule. 
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 by vesting primary jurisdiction in States, the complementarity regime attempts to preserve 
sovereignty. However, this applies only in cases where States prosecute genuinely. 
Furthermore, while the complementarity regime endows States with primary jurisdiction to 
try serious international crimes, article 12(1) of the Rome Statute gives the Court inherent 
jurisdiction. It provides that once a State ratifies the Statute, such a State (automatically) 
accepts the Court’s jurisdiction with respect to the crimes listed in article 5. Additionally, 
Article 12 recognises the sovereignty of States that are not party to the Rome Statute as far as 
their consent is a prerequisite to the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over their nationals. It is 
however, noteworthy that the ICC may still have jurisdiction over nationals of a non-state 
party where the alleged crimes have been committed within the territory of a Member State, 
even if such a State has not accepted the Court’s jurisdiction.  
 
1.2.2 Textual Deficiencies in Article 17 of the Rome Statute 
Although concerns about the Court’s independence are mixed political-legal in nature, some 
of these issues seem to stem from questions regarding the proper interpretation and 
application of the principle of complementarity in practice given, the textual deficiencies in 
article 17. The regime of complementarity may be considered vague to the extent that it fails 
to define a standard criminal policy for prosecution of core international crimes. Furthermore, 
the article fails to establish standard methods for assessing when a State has taken an 
unjustified delay to bring the perpetrator to justice.36  
 
Generally, article 17 does not clearly define the standard of proof that must before the ICC 
Prosecutor to finds a particular State genuinely unwilling or unable to carry out its 
investigatory or prosecutorial functions.37 In terms of article 17(2), to determine 
unwillingness to prosecute, the ICC considers whether the proceedings were or are being 
undertaken or the decision not to prosecute was made to protect the perpetrator from criminal 
responsibility for the core international crimes.38 Additionally, the prosecutor has to 
determine whether there has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings showing reluctance 
36  See D Scheffer “The International Criminal Court: The Challenge to Jurisdiction” (26 March 1999) Address 
at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, Washington DC” 237. Available at 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/DavidSchefferAddressOnICC.pdf (accessed 27 August 2012). 
37  The criterion for unwillingness set out in article 17 is not objective; the Court has to determine a State’s 
unwillingness to prosecute “genuinely”. The subjective nature of this test renders it significantly vague. See 
A Cassese The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections (1999) 537. 
38  See Article 17(2) (a) of the Rome Statute. 
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 on the part of domestic authorities to bring the perpetrator to justice39 or whether the 
proceedings are not conducted independently or impartially.40 Article 17 does not specify 
what constitutes unjust delay; the decision is left to the ICC.41 In this regard, the thesis argues 
that in any legal system there is potential for delays despite the prosecutor’s willingness to 
prosecute timeously,42 especially if there is an on-going conflict. It is therefore imperative to 
arrive at a clear definition in order to remove these ambiguities, because the greatest concern 
of States is arbitrary decision-making regarding the availability and effectiveness of their own 
courts. 43 
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
The question that this thesis will examine is whether the complementarity regime established 
under article 17 provides States with appropriate tools to balance their rights of sovereignty 
with their commitment to an independent international criminal justice system. In all the eight 
situations that the ICC is currently investigating, questions have arisen whether the quest for 
justice and accountability for the most serious crimes of international concern should 
necessarily limit States’ sovereignty.44 However, given that under the Statute, States have 
39  See Article 17(2) (b) of the Rome Statute. 
40  This was one of the reasons for investing absolute jurisdictional powers in the predecessors of the ICC, the 
(ad hoc) International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) respectively. They had primary jurisdiction over national judiciaries because it 
became apparent that national courts would be unwilling to bring criminals to book or that the courts would 
have been biased owing to the nature of the conflict. See A Cassese International Criminal Law (2003) 349. 
41  The ICC is the sole arbiter in cases of admissibility and states’ willingness to prosecute. Article 119 also 
gives the ICC power to rule out any dispute concerning its judicial functions. This gives the ICC arbitrary 
review powers over national judicial systems and threatens national sovereignty of states. See J Gurule 
“United States Opposition to the 1998 Rome Statute Establishing an International Criminal Court: Is the 
Court’s Jurisdiction Truly Complementary to National Criminal Jurisdictions?” (2002) 35 Cornell 
International Law Review 1. 
42  See Scheffer “The International Criminal Court: The Challenge to Jurisdiction” Address at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Society of International Law, Washington DC (26 March 1999) 237. Available at 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/DavidSchefferAddressOnICC.pdf (accessed 27 August 2012). 
43  See P McKeon “An International Criminal Court: Balancing the Principle of Sovereignty Against the 
Demands of International Justice (2009) 12 St. John’s Journal of Legal Commentary 535. 
44  State Parties to the Statute have referred three situations to the Court since it became operational: in 
December 2003, the President of Uganda referred the situation in northern Uganda concerning mass 
atrocities committed by the Lord’s Resistance Army, to the Prosecutor. The Democratic Republic of Congo 
also referred the situation in the Ituri region of the country to the Prosecutor in April 2004, an investigation 
was opened on 23 June 2004. The government of the Central African Republic also referred the situation in 
CAR to the ICC on 22 December 2004 and an investigation was opened on 22 May 2007. Additionally, the 
prosecutor of the ICC officially opened an investigation into the situation in Darfur, Sudan on 6 June 2005, 
pursuant to the United Nations Security Council’s Resolution 1593 (2005). In March 2009, a warrant of 
arrest was issued against the Sudanese president Omar Hassan al-Bashir for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity in the Darfur region of the country. The Prosecutor also commenced an investigation into the 
situation in Libya as a result of the situation in the country as a result of which arrest warrants were issued 
on 27 June 2011 against the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, and Abdullah Al-
Senussi for crimes against humanity committed in Libya in February 2011. The ICC Prosecutor also 
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 latitude to try these same offences, it may be useful to investigate ways in which they could 
do so without necessarily compromising international criminal justice processes. This thesis 
aims to demonstrate that by expanding the ability of States to deal with international crimes, 
the tension that is currently developing between States and the ICC may be relieved.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
This analysis requires the thesis to dissect articles that outline the principle of 
complementarity. Scrutiny of articles 17, 18, 19 and 20 will therefore take centre stage. These 
will be analysed in tandem with the Court’s interpretation and application of the principle of 
complementarity in practice. In the end of it all, the question that this thesis will grapple with 
is whether the complementarity regime provides States with appropriate tools to balance their 
treaty obligations with their political rights. Does the regime constitute a balance conducive 
to a viable international criminal justice system as envisioned by the drafters of the Rome 
Statute or does it have prospects of undermining the Court’s integrity? Part of this 
investigation will entail a review of the Court’s jurisprudence on questions of admissibility of 
cases and assess how the decisions affect States’ perspectives about the independence of the 
Court, particularly within the African continent. This will also include a discussion on 
whether the complementarity regime has catered for regional bodies. This is motivated by the 
AU’s recent anti-ICC declarations and the subsequent establishment of the Africa Criminal 
Court to complement national courts of its Member States in prosecuting the crimes under the 
jurisdiction of the ICC. 
 
1.3.1 The Working Hypotheses 
The research to be undertaken is based on two assumptions. The first is that by expanding the 
ability of States to deal with international crimes, the tension that is currently developing 
between States and the International Criminal Court may be relieved. As noted above, there 
have been concerns about the Court’s respect for State sovereignty and its selection of 
cases.45 This thesis will therefore argue that encouraging national prosecutions and helping 
build the capacity of national courts, the ICC will be playing its complementary role. The 
second assumption is the thesis will effectively address flaws and shortcomings of the regime 
and that this will pave a way for a functional international criminal justice system. Although 
commenced an investigation into the post presidential election violence that erupted in Cote D’Ivoire (Ivory 
Coast) during which war crimes and crimes against humanity were allegedly committed. The ICC prosecutor 
also initiated an investigation into Kenya in relation to the post 2007 elections violence in which mass 
atrocities were committed 
45  M du Plessis The International Criminal Court that Africa Wants (2010) 13-15. 
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 the system may be dogged by an array of problems common to domestic judicial systems, the 
thesis will argue that putting a monitoring system in place will exert pressure on the domestic 
authorities and encourage them to show greater zeal in ending impunity. This, the thesis 
further argues, will ensure regular functioning of the complementarity regime. 
1.4 Purpose of Study 
As noted above, an array of criticisms have been levelled against the ICC since it became 
operational. Some of these concerns outline the issues that the ICC will have to deal with to 
ensure its future viability. For instance, the lacuna in article 17 have to be filled in order to 
assuage State’s fears about the Court’s alleged arbitrary application of the principle of 
complementarity in practice. If these concerns remain unattended, they could dissuade other 
African and less developed countries, from ratifying the Statute and this could undermine the 
quest for international criminal justice and further cripple the Court. Considering that of the 
108 members to the Rome Statute, 30 are from Africa,46 this makes Africa the biggest 
regional supporter of the ICC. With some African States threatening to rescind their 
membership to the Rome Statute, the relevance of the Court in conflict-torn societies will be 
undermined and this has roots that run back to impunity. Therefore, the purpose of this study 
is to put the principle of complementarity in a theoretical perspective and help provide a 
better understanding of the modalities through which it is applied. A critical examination of 
the provisions that embody this organising principle and the jurisprudence of the Court also 
help address the deficiencies therein, with the aim of finding solutions that can bring the 
Court and States into a healthy cooperative partnership that will not only safeguard the future 
of international criminal justice but will also deter authors of atrocious crimes. 
1.5 Significance of Study 
The principle of complementarity has always been a subject of fierce debate in international 
criminal law since its inception after World War I. The establishment of the ICC was stalled, 
among other reasons, by lack of consensus between member States on issues of jurisdiction, 
the very issues that were glossed over during the negotiations at the Plenipotentiaries 
Conference in The Hague in 1998. These issues have however surfaced in practice and could 
potentially undermine the future of the ICC. The hasty adoption of the Rome Statute has left 
46  The following 30 African states have ratified the Rome Statute and these are: Benin, Botswana, Burkina 
Faso, Burundi, Central African republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), DR Congo, Djibouti, Gabon, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Namibia, Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia, available at 
www.iccnow.org/countryinfo/RATIFICATIONSbyUNGroups.pdf  (accessed 17 February 2012). 
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 gaps that could threaten the future viability of this milestone institution. These gaps have in 
part led to concerns over the Court’s interpretation and application of complementarity in 
practice. Moreover, confidence in the Court has waned in Africa and the African Union 
seems to have adopted a hostile attitude towards the Court.47 This calls for a careful analysis 
of the problem at hand and solutions that will steer the course of international criminal justice 
in the right direction and ensure that the relevance of the ICC in Africa is not overshadowed 
by regional politics.   
 
1.6 Goals of the Research 
The overarching objective of this research is to investigate whether the Rome Statute 
provides States with appropriate tools to balance the need for a credible international criminal 
justice system with their political interests. Other aims of this thesis are: 
a) To ascertain the extent to which the Court constitutes a fundamental challenge to State 
sovereignty. 
b) To provide an account of how the ICC has applied complementarity in the eight 
situations currently under its investigation. 
c) To establish how to improve complementarity and strike a balance between the need 
for accountability and State’s sovereignty powers, with a view to lessen the tension 
that has developed between the ICC and African States. 
d) To offer recommendations and suggestions of ways in which the international criminal 
justice system, through a complementary process, can be enhanced and strengthened 
in order to effectively deal with impunity for serious international crimes, while still 
preserving the sovereignty of States that are party to the Statute. 
1.7 Limitations of the Study 
Although this study offers a broad discussion of the work of the ICC in Africa, due to time 
constraints, it focuses more on intricate issues pertaining to the interpretation and application of 
complementarity in the cases the Court is currently investigating. As complementarity keeps 
evolving, the time within which this research was undertaken was limited and as such, some 
facts required a little more deliberation. Suffice it to say, this area will need to be further 
developed in future as the fledgling Court continues to engage in a system of trial and error, to 
47  See JD van der Vyver “Prosecuting the President of Sudan: A Dispute between the African Union and the 
International Criminal Court” (2011) 11 African Human Rights Journal 683 at 684. 
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 help States mould their legal systems so that they are competent to deal with the crimes in the 
Rome Statute.  The interaction between an international judicial institution and national courts 
of sovereign States will possibly be dogged with challenges. Similarly, the ICC is caught in a 
maze of regional politics and it is believed that this research will help relieve the tension 
between the ICC and Africa.  
 
1.8 Research Methodology 
This research is mainly desk based, library research. A wide range of relevant primary and 
secondary sources will be relied on. Primary sources will include original versions of treaties 
and conventions, official government documents, judgements of international tribunals, 
United Nations’ Resolutions and other documents from the international institutions such as 
the United Nations’ organs. Secondary sources will include books, international reports, 
journal articles and other publications. The sources identified above will be used to establish 
the existing position and identify the shortfalls of the provisions of the Rome Statute 
embodying the principle in question. A critical analysis of the articles of the Rome Statute 
will reveal the flaws and shortcomings that cripple international criminal justice processes. 
The study will further explore the relationship between States and the ICC under the 
complementarity regime and investigate whether the regime does strike a balance between 
sovereignty of States and the need for an independent international criminal justice system. 
1.9 Structure of the Thesis 
This study is divided into five (5) chapters. The first chapter is a general introduction of the 
research to be carried out. Chapter two gives a historical overview of the principle of 
complementarity and explores the normative aspects of the complementarity regime. The 
nature of the relationship between the ICC and member States to the Rome Statute requires a 
critical examination of the background of the principle of complementarity. A brief history of 
the development of the principle provides a useful context that will bridge the gap between 
the theoretical underpinnings of the principle and its practical implications. This provides a 
better understanding of the current tension surrounding the Rome Statute complementarity 
regime and the issues raised by the possible repercussions the conflict between African States 
and the ICC may have on the Court’s future viability.  
 
After considering the historical, legal, political, philosophical and practical bases for the 
principle of complementarity, the thesis shifts its focus to the practical aspects of 
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 complementarity. It goes on to analyse the provisions that embody the principle of 
complementarity in chapter three. This chapter analyses the interplay between national 
judiciaries and the ICC. It significantly focuses on the salient issues in the interpretation and 
implementation of the principle in practice. The jurisprudence of the Court will be used to 
illustrate the interplay between national judiciaries and the ICC and comments will be made 
on the status of African courts and the AU’s attempt to establish a court with a similar 
mandate to that of the ICC. The discussion in the penultimate chapter will be centred on a 
collective and positive approach to complementarity. The chapter will define a policy of 
positive complementarity that can better solve the challenges the ICC is currently facing in 
practice.  A demonstrative excursion of the Court’s first State party referral, of the situation 
in Northern Uganda will be carried out. The chapter will also analyse the Prosecutor’s 
proprio motu investigations. In so doing, the chapter will investigate ways in which the 
power of the Prosecutor may be used to help strengthen the Rome Statute system at the 
national level in each case. This will help resolve the current jurisdictional clashes between 
States and the ICC. 
 
The fifth and last chapter of this thesis will make findings and offer recommendations on 
ways in which the international criminal justice system, through a positive complementary 
process, can be enhanced and strengthened in order to effectively deal with impunity for 
serious international crimes. It will identify conclusions established from the preceding four 
chapters. The chapter will tie up the ends by offering possible solutions to the perceived 
threats to independence and impartiality of the ICC in Africa. These recommendations will be 
mindful of the challenges African States currently face pertaining to weak judicial systems, 
which have in the past been regarded as “incompetent”, particularly in the face of conflicts. 
Suggesting a positive approach to the principle of complementarity seems to be the viable 
option as it will assist hamstrung developing States to be better equipped to deal with 
international crimes within their own systems, thereby establishing a functional international 
criminal justice system. These suggestions will in turn relieve the Court of the burden of 
cases from all over the world, without necessarily compromising criminal justice system 
processes. 
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Chapter Two 
 OVERVIEW OF THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter will explore the historical, philosophical, legal and practical development of 
complementarity, and the normative aspects that underpin the complementarity regime. It 
will trace its evolution from as far back as the twentieth century, in the aftermath of World 
War I, in the Peace Treaties, the Nuremberg Trials, and the Ad hoc Tribunals up to the Rome 
Statute. This analysis puts these developments in perspective, helps provide a better 
understanding of the Rome Statute complementarity principle, and how it has developed over 
the years since the Court became operational. After this analysis, the chapter will then 
compare the different models of complementarity of each era with the Rome Statute 
complementarity model. This is imperative, as the models that preceded it have inspired the 
Rome Statute complementarity model.  
 
Essentially, this analysis will bridge the gap between the theoretical underpinnings of the 
principle of complementarity and its practical implications, and help ameliorate the conflict 
between States and the ICC, regarding its application and interpretation. The chapter will 
then identify and analyse four models of complementarity: optional complementarity; the 
Nuremberg discretionary complementarity; the International Law Committee 
complementarity model and the Rome Statute model.48 These will be compared and the 
chapter will argue that the principle has emerged in different phases and that it has developed 
and been remodelled into the ‘final’ Rome Statute model. An intelligible appraisal of the 
normative aspects of the principle must therefore begin with definitive discussion of 
complementarity jurisdiction and the nature thereof. 
 
2.1 What is Complementarity? The Nature of the ICC’s Complementary Jurisdiction  
For purposes of this inquiry, the general understanding of the principle of complementarity is 
that it is a set of rules that govern the relationship between international and national courts.49 
48  See M El Zeidy The Principle of Complementarity: Origin, Development and Practice (2008) 6-7. He opines 
that these are the four major complementarity models, namely optional complementarity, the Nuremberg 
discretionary complementarity; the International Law Committee complementarity model and the Rome 
Statute model . 
49   See M Benzing et al “The Criminal Procedure Before the International Criminal Court: Main Features” 
(2006) 5 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 103 at 104. 
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 It endows the latter with investigative and prosecutorial prerogatives over international 
crimes, with the former only intervening in the event of inaction by municipal courts.50 The 
Rome Statute does not define complementarity, but provides that the ICC shall be 
complementary to national jurisdiction in paragraph 10 of the preamble to the Statute and in 
article 1 and links this principle to the admissibility criterion laid down in article 17 of the 
Statute.51 Although the drafters of the Rome Statute have uniquely designed article 17 to suit 
the demands impressed upon the international criminal justice system, the principle of 
complementarity is not necessarily a new phenomenon in international law. It was embedded 
in international law generally and has the same philosophical denominator as the notion of 
exhaustion of domestic remedies in international humanitarian law and the principle of 
conditional transfer of national jurisdiction. In essence, these principles require that the State 
be the prime fora, with the international tribunal being the court of last resort and having 
power to intervene only in situations where the State in question has failed to act or has not 
diligently prosecuted the matter. The complementarity scheme is an allocation of powers 
between the courts, through a division of tasks. States have jurisdiction over ordinary crimes 
and primacy to adjudicate the most serious international crimes first hand, failing which the 
Court will take over. The Rome Statute has guidelines that clearly define the scale of atrocity 
that elevates ordinary crimes to core international crimes, ensuring that these meet the 
Statute’s gravity threshold before the Court entertains them. 
 
The ICC has temporal52 subject-matter jurisdiction over the crimes listed in article 5 of the 
Rome Statute.53 The basis for the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is the atrocious nature of 
the crimes; these crimes constitute grave breaches of international law. These crimes must 
also be large scale and systematic and as such have a widespread impact: the scale of atrocity 
50  In terms of article 17 of the Rome Statute, the ICC has the mandate to complement inability or unwillingness 
to genuinely investigate the crimes proscribed by the Rome Statute. 
51  Paragraph 10 of the preamble to the Rome Statute provides: “Emphasizing that the International criminal 
Court established under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.” [Emphasis 
added]. Article 1 goes further to say: “An international criminal court is hereby established ... it shall be 
complementary to national jurisdictions…” [Emphasis added]. 
52  In accordance with well-established concepts of international law (non-retrospective application of law), the 
jurisdiction of the ICC is ratione temporis: the Court’s jurisdictional reach only extends to the crimes 
committed after the coming into operation of the Rome Statute, that is, crimes committed before July, 1 
2002 fall outside the ambit of the Court’s jurisdiction. The Court also has jurisdiction on state nationals only 
after the date on which state became a member to the Statute. This provision therefore properly renders the 
application of the statute not retroactive. 
53  The ICC’s jurisdiction extends to war crimes; crimes against humanity; genocide and aggression. See article 
5(2) of the Rome Statute (“…The court has jurisdiction…with respect to these crimes: the crime of 
genocide; crimes against humanity; war crimes; the crime of aggression.” 
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 must be such that it elevates ordinary crimes to the core international crimes. There is a moral 
ground for the Court’s jurisdiction; it is the quest for accountability for these crimes that 
motivated the creation of the ICC. If the ICC did not exercise jurisdiction over these crimes, 
this would undermine the Court’s integrity and credibility and its future viability would be at 
stake. The jurisdiction of the ICC is also in line with the customary international law concept 
of universal jurisdiction. As a supranational institution, the ICC may exercise its jurisdiction 
over the core crimes without any territorial linkages. However, the Court can only assert its 
jurisdiction where national courts have failed to prosecute diligently. Therefore, the Court’s 
jurisdiction may be said to be “conditional” upon the State realising its international law duty 
to prosecute nationally. This way, complementarity works as an implicit restriction on States 
so that they are remain active. State actors may also be “forced” to show greater zeal when 
prosecuting international crimes in order to avoid an ICC prosecution. 
2.2 The Theoretical Framework behind Complementarity 
2.2.1 The Duty of States to Prosecute International Crimes and the Aut Dedere Aut 
Judicare Rule 
The principle of complementarity is premised on international law principles with somewhat 
similar philosophical foundations. The theoretical underpinning of the complementarity 
regime is that international law is subsidiary to domestic law. This principle evinces the 
theoretical assumptions that no State or organisation is allowed to interfere in the affairs of a 
sovereign State. This right however has a corresponding duty: the State’s duty to manage 
internal matters that arise from its territory in a way that conforms to the world order. To 
safeguard this right, complementarity may only be invoked where national judicial systems 
are unavailable or incompetent.  
The essence of complementarity was to encourage States to prosecute international crimes 
within their judicial systems, thereby ensuring that the ICC does not arbitrarily supersede 
States’ jurisdiction. However, as noted above, this will only be the case where the State 
carries out its prosecutorial functions. It is an established rule of customary international law 
that States have a duty to prosecute international crimes. This phenomenon dates as far back 
as Grotius and was embraced by the ceasefire agreements during the First World War, 
between the Victors and the enemy countries. The Rome Statute also imposes an absolute 
duty on States to adjudicate crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide and aggression. 
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 Conversely, under the Rome Statute other States are not at liberty to prosecute when the State 
with jurisdiction fails to do so, the ICC has to assert its complementary jurisdiction. 
The duty to prosecute or extradite (aut dedere aut judicare) is also an absolute duty and the 
Rome Statute affirms it by vesting the right to primary jurisdiction in States.54 Pursuant to 
this duty, States are required to either prosecute nationally or refer cases to the Court.55 
Additionally, the Rome Statute also requires that States take the necessary measures at the 
national level to ensure the effective prosecution of those who hold the greatest responsibility 
for genocide, aggression, crimes against humanity and war crimes.56 If the State, for some 
reason, does not wish to prosecute nationally, it has the duty to refer the case to the Court. 
However, the power of the Court goes over and above the dichotomy of these rights and 
duties. Where the State fails to prosecute or refer the case to the Court, the Court will 
nonetheless take over and prosecute. 
2.2.2 Obligations Erga Omnes and Jus Cogens 
The obligation to prosecute the crimes proscribed by the Rome Statute derives from treaties 
and customary international law. The Rome Statute not only reiterates State’s duty to 
prosecute nationally but the crimes proscribed by the Statute have attained the jus cogens 
status. All States have an international obligation to prosecute a certain category of crimes, 
that is, those crimes that violate “peremptory norms of international law… from which no 
derogation is permitted, known as jus cogens.”57 The jus cogens status of these crimes 
imposes a legal duty on every state to prosecute them, whether or not they are party to the 
particular treaty that proscribes them.58 The definition of this concept by article 53 of the 
Vienna convention seems to give it more weight than treaty law and custom.59 Most of the 
treaties that proscribe certain conduct require all States to either prosecute the offender or 
54  See S.C. Res. 1456, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4688th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/RES/1456 (2003), it provides that 
“States must bring to justice those who finance, plan, support or commit terrorist acts or provide safe havens, 
in accordance with international law, in particular on the basis of the principle to extradite or prosecute”. 
55  The fact that the Rome Statute provides for State Party referrals under article 14 connotes the aut dedere aut 
judicare principle.  
56   See the 4th Preambular paragraph to the Rome Statute: “Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to 
the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be 
ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation.” 
57  This definition of jus cogens was set out in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 23 
May 1969 UN Doc A/CONF39/27 (hereafter The Vienna Convention). 
58  See K Obura “Duty to Prosecute International Crimes under International Law” in C Murungu and J Biegon 
(eds) Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa (2011) 13. 
59  See article 53 of the Vienna Convention. See also PA McKeon “An International Criminal Court: Balancing 
the Principle of State Sovereignty Against the Demands of International Justice” (2009) St. John’s Journal 
of Legal Commentary 535 at 537. 
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 extradite him to a “concerned” State or to a State that is willing to prosecute.60 Conduct that 
falls within the ambit of these treaties imposed an enforceable legal obligation on the State 
involved to prosecute; this is known as the erga omnes duty. Because the conduct complained 
of violates established norms of international law, failure by the State to prosecute constitutes 
a breach of the state’s treaty obligations.61 The Rome Statute similarly requires States to 
prosecute crimes of the same profile and requires a State to punish perpetrators of such, 
failing which the State will be in breach of its treaty obligations. 
 
2.2.3 Pacta Sunt Servanda  
It is important to note that the Rome Statute, like other treaties, is subject to the principles 
that underpin treaty law. The ICC, contrary to its counterparts, the ICTY and the ICTR, 
which were created through UN Security Council Resolutions, is a creature of a treaty and 
this is an indication that States that are members to the Statute did so voluntarily. The 
principle of complementarity in article 17 of the Rome Statute mirrors the well-established 
international law concept that parties who freely entered into agreements should honour their 
obligations thereunder, the pacta sunt servanda principle.62  As noted above, the crimes 
proscribed by the Rome Statute are subjects of various other treaties, and have attained jus 
cogens status.63  This means that obligations that flow from those treaties also extend to 
members to the Rome Statute. Thus, complementarity places a duty on States to prosecute 
these crimes according to established standards, in good faith. The Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties clearly describes the extent to which the notion of good faith applies in a 
given case.64 Article 27 of the Vienna Convention specifically prohibits a State from 
invoking its domestic laws to justify its failure to honour its international treaty law duties.65  
 
60  Conduct that fell within the ambit of these treaties imposed an enforceable legal obligation on the State 
involved to prosecute 
61  Article 27 of the Vienna Convention prohibits a State from invoking its domestic laws to justify its failure to 
honour its international treaty law duties. 
62  See M Melandri “The Relationship Between State Sovereignty and the Enforcement of International 
Criminal Law under the Rome Statute (1998): A Complex Interplay” (2009) 9(3) Criminal Law Review 531 
at 536. He notes that the act of ratifying the Rome Statute is considered a sovereign act by a state, since it 
affirms its commitment to international criminal justice and gives a supranational judicial body powers to 
supplement any deficiencies in its judicial system. 
63  See for instance, genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, GA Res 260 A (III) of 9 December 1948 and war crimes and crimes against humanity under the  
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc 
A/39/51  (1984). 
64  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (entered into force on 27 January 1980) UN Doc. A/CONF. 
39/27.  
65  See Article 27 of the Vienna Convention. 
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 Article 120 of the Rome Statute connotes this principle by deliberately disallowing 
reservations from any provision of the Statute.66 This provision evinces the theoretical 
assumption that a State that has freely entered into a treaty cannot derogate from its treaty 
obligation for political convenience. In the same vein, because a sovereign nation State of its 
own volition gives the ICC power to intervene where it is unable to meet its treaty obligations 
through ratification of the Rome Statute, States have an obligation to honour their obligations 
under the Statute. Moreover, since States have conditionally ceded their Sovereign powers 
(criminal jurisdiction) to the Court, they cannot challenge the involvement of the Court 
because of sovereignty, unless the Court’s involvement is not in line with the guidelines 
articulated in article 17 of the Statute. The pacta sunt servanda rule also requires that States 
take all measures at the national level to enable them to act as required under treaties they 
freely entered into. The Rome Statute also requires that States incorporate provisions of the 
Rome Statute into their legal systems, for instance, through implementation legislation. This 
prevents situations where States cite their national laws as excuses for their inability or 
unwillingness to discharge their treaty obligations. 
 
2.2.4 The Principle of Self-determination of Peoples and Nations 
The principle of self-determination of peoples and nations is an overarching guiding principle 
of international law that seeks to judge the legitimacy of power in international relations.67 
Articles 1(2) and 55 of the UN Charter provide that one of its purposes is to establish friendly 
relations between States, based on respect for the right to self-determination.68 Self-
determination was entrenched into the corpus of international law through a UN General 
Assembly resolution, the Right of Peoples and Nations to Self-determination General 
Assembly Resolution 637 (VII) of 16 December 1952.69 Additionally, the Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1960, also codifies the right to self-determination.70 The Declaration 
66  See article 120 of the Rome Statute: “No reservations may be made to this Statute.” 
67  See A Cassese International Law 2 ed (2005) 60. The right to self-determination first appeared in an 
international legal instrument in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1960. 
68  See articles 2(1) and 55 of the UN Charter. See also Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970). 
69  See The Right of Peoples and Nations to Self-determination General Assembly Resolution 637 (VII) of 16 
December 1952 GA Res. 637 ABC, 7 UN GAOR Supp. 20 UN Doc. 
70  See Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. 
GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16 U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960). 
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 provides that “all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural 
development”.71  
 
This notion is based on a number of postulates. It serves as an anti-colonialist rule: it 
prohibits all forms of colonialism by giving peoples or nations the right to independence and 
sovereignty.72 The principle also bans foreign military occupation of a sovereign State.73 The 
right to self-determination also seeks to end racial discrimination. It requires that all racial 
groups have full access to the government.74 In contrast with to principles of Westphalian 
sovereignty, the right to self-determination seeks to curtail the power of domestic political 
authorities, on one hand, by protecting the interests of the population concerned.75 On the 
other hand, it protects sovereign States from external power, for instance, colonialism. 
Although this principle erodes classical notions of sovereignty, it enhances legal protection of 
peoples and nations from abuse of power.76 In principle, the development of the principle of 
complementarity was informed by the fundamental premise on which the right to self-
determination rests: giving a sovereign State a chance to manage its internal affairs without 
external pressure. In the same vein, a State loses its jurisdictional prerogative under the 
complementarity regime, and cannot eschew international involvement if it fails to protect its 
citizenry.  
 
As a democratic principle, the right to self-determination condemns colonial rule, thereby 
preserving the independence and sovereignty of States. Complementarity also seeks to 
preserve sovereignty of States by entrusting the prosecution of Rome Statutes crime to 
national courts. It follows from the foregoing that the right to self-determination is part of the 
theoretical framework upon which the principle of complementarity was founded. It has 
71  See Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. 
GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16  67. 
72  A Cassese International law 2 ed (2005) 61. See also CG Berkey “International Law Domestic Courts: 
Enhancing Self-determination for Indigenous Peoples” (1992) 5 Harvard Human Rights Journal  65 at 76-
78 for a detailed discussion on the condemnation of colonialism. See Importance of the Universal 
Realization of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination and of the Speedy Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples for the Effective Guarantee and Observance of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 
2787, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp.29, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971). 
73  See Cassese International law 2005 61. 
74  See Cassese International law 2005 61 
75  See Cassese International law 2005 60 (noting that sovereign States cannot dispose of its population as it 
pleases, for instance, by ceding or annexing territories without taking into considerations, the wishes of their 
people). 
76  See Berkey 1992 Harvard Human Rights Journal 78. 
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 however, been argued in some quarters that the ICC merely pays lip service to 
complementarity and that the ICC is a tool of neo-colonialism due to its selection of cases.  
The evidentiary basis of this claim is weak because most African legal and judicial systems 
are weak, which makes them candidates for ICC intervention.  
 
In the eight cases that the Court is currently investigating, no concrete legal proceedings were 
underway in national courts when the Court stepped in. Lack of domestic proceedings, 
coupled with the fact that it is almost impossible to have functional judicial organs in most 
hamstrung African States during conflicts, refutes claims that the principle of 
complementarity is a neo-colonial policy. In principle, complementarity, like its antecedents, 
(sovereignty of states and the right to self-determination), seeks to preserve independence of 
States, by giving a State an opportunity to apply domestic means of redress before the ICC 
intervenes. 
 
2.2.5 The Subsidiarity of International Law 
The international criminal justice system has at its centre, mutually overlapping spheres of 
operation, the domestic legal order and the international legal order. The issue of when one 
order takes precedence over the other is a complex issue ad depends on the circumstances of 
each case.  It is however, worth noting that in terms of the concept of sovereign equality of 
States, the bridge upon which international relations rest,77 the domestic legal order takes 
precedence over international law. This is based on certain theoretical conceptions, monist 
and dualist theories. These theories delineate the hierarchy of laws in a given case.   
 
The monist theory postulates the primacy of international law. According to this theory, 
international law is the supreme law of the land and validates all other laws.78 Thus, where a 
national law is in conflict with a duly signed and ratified treaty, that treaty will take 
precedence. A monist State incorporates international law, for instance, treaties, into its legal 
system though the act of ratification, so that it becomes part of its body of law, together with 
national laws.79 The primacy of international law in this case is such that a monist State is 
bound to execute its international law duties regardless of whether they are in conflict with its 
77  See A Cassese International Law (2005) 48. 
78  Monism postulates that all treaties duly signed and ratifies by a State form part of the State’s legal order. If 
any of the domestic laws is in conflict with International law, international law will take precedence. 
79  See J Crawford Brownlie’s Principle of International Law 8th Ed. (2012) 48 (noting that once a Monist State 
has ratified a particular treaty, it applies it directly with its national laws). 
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 national laws. Article 27 of the Vienna Convention connotes the assumption that international 
law is primary to national law because it prohibits a State from using its national laws as bases 
for breach of its treaty obligations.80 
 
The dualist theory on the other hand, is predicated on the notion that international law is 
subsidiary to national law. This theory is based on a number of postulates. The Dualist State, 
as a sovereign being, voluntarily chooses to be bound by certain rules, as long as they 
conform to its national legal system. The theory is also based on the idea that two distinct 
legal systems can exist within one umbrella system. This notion proposes that whenever there 
is a conflict between the two sub-systems, national law will take precedence. In contrast to the 
monist theory, this notion evinces the presumption that International law is subsidiary to 
national law. Before international law applies in a Dualist State, it has to be incorporated into 
the domestic legal system through specific implementation legislation.81 However, should 
these laws be in conflict, domestic law prevails. This way, international laws may apply in 
part of as a whole. An example of a dualist State is the Kingdom of Lesotho. Section 2 of the 
Constitution of Lesotho, 1993 provides that the constitution is the supreme law of the land 
and invalidates any law that is inconsistent with any part of the constitution, to the extent of 
its inconsistency.82 
 
It is evident from the above exposition that although some theories assume the primacy of 
international law, the cumulative effect of most international law principles such as the 
exhaustion of domestic remedies, the duty to prosecute or extradite (the aut dedere aut 
judicare rule) is to maintain the primacy of national law. The lesson here is these legal orders 
exist in mutually overlapping spheres and that one may be lawfully seized in the right 
circumstances. This means that the primacy of national laws is not absolute in modern 
international relations.  International law is in principle, subsidiary to national law, unless 
there are countervailing reasons for the application of international norms. This could be for 
human intervention reasons or in the case of the ICC, due to a State’s failure to prosecute 
genueinely. 
80  See article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (22 May 1969) 1115 U.N.T.S 331, it provides 
that a State cannot cite provisions of its domestic laws or deficiencies therein as excuses for breach of its 
reaty obligations). 
81  See Crawford Brownlie’s Principle of International Law 2012 48. 
82  See section 2 of the Constitution of Lesotho Act No 5 of 1993(as amended): “This Constitution is the 
supreme law of Lesotho and if any other law is inconsistent with this Constitution, that other law shall, to the 
extent of the inconsistency, be void”. 
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Complementarity is the linchpin of the Rome Statute regime since it defines the relationship 
between the International Criminal Court and Member States to the Rome Statute.83 The 
philosophical foundation underlying complementarity is the distribution of powers between 
the national and international judiciaries. Since the principle prioritises national jurisdiction, it 
affirms the well-established principle of international law, that national laws of a sovereign 
State take precedence over international law. However, this applies only when the State in 
question observes international norms. The philosophy behind the subsidiarity of international 
law is to preserve sovereignty of States and to limit the jurisdiction of tribunals like the ICC 
only to clearly defined special cases, given their limited resources.  
 
Proponents of the complementarity regime were also mindful of the fact that international 
legal systems lack an integral aspect of every judicial system, the executive. Therefore, they 
entrusted the effective prosecution of the most serious crimes of international law to States 
through the principle of complementarity. The fact that national authorities have the primary 
responsibility to oversee prosecution, with the Court only being seized with the matter where 
States fail to prosecute genuinely confirms that international law is subsidiary to international 
law and as such must only be resorted to where the latter is inoperative or ineffective. 
 
2.2.6 The Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies Rule 
The requirement that one must have exhausted all available and effective local remedies 
before one seeks similar remedies from an international tribunal is a well-established 
international principle.84 The principle applies in international humanitarian law to protect 
individuals against the wrongdoing of their own States. This rule is premised on the idea that 
the State in question must have an opportunity to redress the wrong complained of before the 
matter is taken to an international court. The claim before the international court must 
however constitute an international wrong, thus, the injury complained of must be a result of 
for instance, an alleged violation of human rights.85 The principle appears to be firmly 
83  MA Newton “Comparative Complementarity: Domestic Jurisdiction Consistent with the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (2001) 167 Military Law Review 20 at 29 refers to complementarity as the 
bridge that carries the weight of the Rome Statute. 
84  See A Amerasinghe Local Remedies in International Law 2 ed (2004) 13. 
85  See A Amerasinghe Local Remedies in International Law 2 ed (2004) 17 (noting that the primary purpose of 
this rule is the “settling an international dispute by giving one party to it, a sovereign State, to apply its own 
means of redress”). 
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 entrenched in international through a number of human rights conventions.86 There are many 
aspects of this principle and applications of it that may have informed on the development of 
the principle of complementarity. According to this rule, a sovereign State must have a chance 
to apply its own rules and other policy considerations before a matter concerning its internal 
affairs is taken to the international plane.  The principle of complementarity also requires the 
ICC to prosecute only in the right circumstances: where the domestic courts in question fail to 
prosecute diligently or are inoperative. The principle of exhaustion of local remedies is based 
on the philosophical notion that it brings justice closer to the population that host victims of 
international wrongs.  Similarly, complementarity values perceptions of the domestic 
populations that host victims of these crimes in the Rome Statute. Therefore, it seeks to bring 
justice closer to the victims, so that justice is not only done, but is seen to be done. 
 
Moreover, the rationale behind both principles is that municipal courts are better placed to 
appraise the facts of these cases than international courts because they have a closer link to 
the cases and can expedite the trial process. In contrast, international litigation may be 
expensive and time-consuming. The exhaustion of local remedies rule, like complementarity, 
is a tiered allocation of functions between a national and an international court. They both 
uphold the primacy of domestic law by giving States latitude to handle matters first hand, 
while detracting as little as possible sovereignty, should a State fail to act genuinely. Thus, if 
a State fails to prosecute in all the right circumstances, then the relevant international tribunal 
will intervene the relief sought is either unavailable or ineffective at the municipal level. The 
foregoing account shows that the primary responsibility to act rests with national courts. 
However, circumstances may require conditional transfer of jurisdiction to an international 
judicial body. In such cases, failure by the national court in question to handle the matter in 
accordance with international norms legitimises the jurisdiction of the relevant international 
body.   
 
2.2.7 The Principle of Conditional Ouster of National Jurisdiction 
One of the basic precepts of State sovereignty is the right to exercise territorial authority, 
including criminal jurisdiction over internal matters and persons within its territory. 
Nevertheless, with recent developments in international law, this right is not absolute. Thus, 
there are situations where a State may have to relinquish its judicial powers in favour of an 
86  See article 41 (c) of the ICCPR; article 26 of the ECHR; article 46 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights; article 11(3) on the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms or Racial Discretion. 
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 international tribunal that has powers over the same matter. In such cases, the international 
tribunal is normally required to defer to national courts and only act where the latter fails to 
act accordingly. The theory of conditional transfer of national jurisdiction mirrors certain 
aspects of the principle of complementarity. Conditional transfer of jurisdiction is predicated 
on conditional primacy of national jurisdiction, with an international tribunal intervening 
where the former fails to redress the matter in a manner in line with established standards.87 
Certain theoretical conceptions of this principle, for instance, humanitarian intervention, may 
throw some light on the manner in which complementarity applies.  
The concept of conditional transfer of jurisdiction only applies where a State party to a treaty 
fails to meet certain standards provided for in the treaty. For instance, article 17 has 
preconditions to the transfer of national jurisdiction to the ICC. Before the Court could 
exercise its jurisdiction, the State must have shown unwillingness or inability to prosecute 
genuinely. This way, complementarity is a matter of prioritising domestic jurisdiction, and 
conditionally transferring it to the ICC when States fail to meet the criteria in article 17. The 
rationale behind the principle of conditional ouster of national jurisdiction is that the primary 
responsibility to prosecute international crimes rests with national courts. Similarly, under the 
complementarity regime, States have a primary duty to prosecute nationally, and failure to 
prosecute conditionally transfers jurisdiction to the ICC.  
Within the Rome Statute system, the ICC has default complementary jurisdiction and has the 
mandate to intervene when States fail to prosecute. This arrangement conditionally transfers 
the jurisdiction of States to the ICC when the criteria in article 17 have been satisfied. This 
notwithstanding, criminal jurisdiction is one of the traditional bases of State sovereignty and 
as such, States have a duty to preserve it and not to let others usurp it.88 The cumulative effect 
of the principles discussed above is to vest primary jurisdiction in national courts.89 The 
foregoing accounts necessitate an analysis of the historical overview of the principle of 
complementarity. This will shed some light on the different ideologies, political leanings and 
circumstances within which the principle of complementarity evolved. 
87  See M Bohlander (ed) International Criminal Justice: A Critical Analysis of Institutions and Procedures 
(2007) 315. 
88  See M Bohlander (Ed) International Criminal Justice: A Critical Analysis of Institutions and Procedures 
(2007) 314 (noting that domestic jurisdiction takes precedence over international law in terms of hierarchical 
superiority rules and that States have a duty to protect and preserve it). 
89  See BS Brown “Traditional Bases of Jurisdiction over International Law Crimes” ( 1998) 23 Yale Law 
Review 383 for a detailed account. 
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 2.3 The Historical Evolution of Complementarity 
2.3.1 The Post World War I Era 
The first traces of the principle of complementarity emerged in the aftermath of World War I 
where the idea of international adjudication of cross-border crimes was first mooted. A series 
of peace treaties that advocated for punishment of the authors of the war for violations of the 
laws and customs of war and principles of humanity were concluded between the Allied 
Powers and each of the defeated countries.90 Although States have primary jurisdiction over 
their nationals by virtue of the customary international law concept of State sovereignty, there 
was a general observation that domestic courts alone could not properly administer the ends 
of justice where their citizens are involved in war crimes.91 States appreciated the need for 
international intervention but were reluctant to relinquish their sovereign powers to an 
international institution, hence they suggested optional complementarity model.  
 
It must be noted at this point that the complementarity model in the peace treaties was more 
default than optional as the Allied Powers had the power to review and take over prosecutions 
if the State Parties to the treaties did not meet the expected prosecutorial standards. In the end, 
traces of the principle of complementarity in the peace treaties merely set precedent for the 
future models of the principle. The first major optional complementarity was suggested by the 
League of Nations in the Draft Convention for the Creation of an International criminal Court 
in 1937.92 Events leading to the adoption of the 1937 Draft Convention on the Creation of the 
International Criminal Court, which mirrors optional complementarity, will be discussed in 
detail below.  
 
 
90  The Treaty of Versailles was concluded between the Allied (United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy) 
and Associated Powers of Germany on 28 June 1919. Other peace treaties were also concluded between the 
Allied Powers and the enemy countries: St. Germaine-En-Laye (with Austria on September 10, 1919); 
Neuillty-sur-siene (with Bulgaria on November 27, 1919); Trianon (with Hungary on June 4, 1920) and 
Sèvres, (with Turkey on August 10, 1920). See the Holocaust Encyclopaedia available at 
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007428 (Accessed 10 November 2012). See also the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Report on Commission of Responsibilities of the Conference 
of Paris on the Violations of the Laws and Customs of War 1919 Pamphlet no.32 American Journal of 
International Law 98. 
91 This was mainly due to the fact that those who were responsible for war and the heinous acts committed 
therein were still in power and could manipulate the system. Also, notions of sovereignty were invoked so as 
to shield criminals from prosecution. See WA Schabas An Introduction to the International Criminal Court 
(2011) 1. 
92  See Report to the Council on the First Session of the Committee League of Nations document 
C.184.M.102.1935V. 
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 2.3.2 The Peace Treaties: Setting Precedent for Complementarity 
Towards the end of World War I a series of ceasefire agreements were concluded and during 
the negotiation stages of the treaties, the idea of establishing an international judicial body to 
punish authors of the war was proposed. However, most States saw the idea of an 
international tribunal for punishing war criminals as legally premature.93 Nonetheless, at the 
preliminary Peace Conference in Versailles in 1919, the Allies created a Commission on the 
Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties whose function 
was mainly to investigate who bore responsibility for the world war and to punish them 
accordingly.94 A sub-commission was formed and it proposed the establishment of a 
supranational institution, the High Tribunal, for punishing those war criminals identified by 
the Commission.95 The United States of America and Japan, members of the Commission, 
argued that resort to an international criminal tribunal would be impractical since there was no 
precedent for a tribunal of that nature.96 Instead, the American delegate proposed the trying of 
the accused in the military Tribunals of the Allied and Associated Powers.97  
Germany was also opposed to the idea of its nationals being prosecuted by any tribunal other 
than German courts, arguing that this would infringe upon its sovereignty rights.98 The Allies 
93  At the time, international criminal prosecution for these crimes was unprecedented; there were no 
international institutions and instruments set up for purposes of punishing these international crimes, it was 
argued that this rendered the idea of international adjudication legally premature. Rather, the American 
delegate proposed that recourse be had to the existing system of military tribunals. See the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, Reports of Majority and Dissenting Reports of American and Japanese 
Members of the Commission of Responsibilities: Conference of Paris 1919 Pamphlet no.32 American 
Journal of International Law 97-98. 
94  These would be the ex-Kaiser and any other person who was involved in the ordering of the commission of 
criminal acts during the hostilities and those who failed to stop them. For a general discussion, see M El 
Zeidy The Principle of Complementarity: Origin, Development and Practice (2008) 11; See C Bassiouni 
“From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a Permanent International 
Criminal Court” (1997) 10 Harvard Human Rights Journal 15 and BB Ferencz “International Criminal 
Courts: the Nuremberg Legacy” (1998) 10 Pace International Law Review 203 at 207. 
95  This tribunal was to be composed of 22 judges from the Allied Powers and its mandate was to try those who 
committed criminal as during World War 1. See El Zeidy The Principle of Complementarity: Origin, 
Development and Practice (2008) 11. See also, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Report on 
Commission of Responsibilities of the Conference of Paris on the Violations of the Laws and Customs of 
War 1919 Pamphlet no.32 American Journal of International Law 98. 
96  See the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Reports of Majority and Dissenting Reports of 
American and Japanese Members of the Commission of Responsibilities: Conference of Paris 1919 
Pamphlet no.32 American Journal of International Law 97-98. [Hereinafter the Commission of 
Responsibilities Report] 1-3. See also Schabas An Introduction to the International Criminal Court 4 ed. 
(2011) 3 (noting that the United States hostility to the idea of an international tribunal was based on the 
argument that it would be ex post facto justice since there was no legal precedent for such a tribunal then). 
97  See the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Reports of Majority and Dissenting Reports of 
American and Japanese Members of the Commission of Responsibilities: Conference of Paris 1919 
Pamphlet no.32 American Journal of International Law 97-98. 
98  Some of the German military officials (such as General Tirpitz and Admiral Lundendoff) accused of 
criminal acts during the war issued declarations to the effect that they would not stand trial before a foreign 
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 adopted a compromise approach and decided that Germany could prosecute her nationals in 
her own Supreme Court, the Reichsgericht, in Leipzig.99 Basically, the Allies came to the 
conclusion that the offer of the German Government was “compatible with the execution of 
Article 228” and accordingly decided “to leave full and complete responsibility with the 
German Government” to proceed with the prosecution and judgement of her nationals.100  
However, the Allied Powers were to review these proceedings to determine the genuineness 
of the German government to administer justice. If these Leipzig trials were found to be 
unsatisfactory101 pursuant to article 228 of the Treaty of Versailles the Allies would try the 
accused in their own military Tribunals.102 Article 228 of Versailles provides: 
“The German Government recognises the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to bring before 
military Tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war. 
Such persons shall, if found guilty, be sentenced to punishment laid down by law. This provision will 
apply not withstanding any proceedings or prosecution before a Tribunal in Germany or in the territories 
of one of her allies...”103 
This provision is the first of the peace treaties after World War I to set precedent for the 
principle of complementarity.104 The language of the provision in question, on the face of it, 
reflects the Allied military Tribunals’ review powers over the proceedings. It nonetheless 
reflects a complementary arrangement. This facet of complementarity gave Germany primary 
jurisdiction to try her nationals, with the Allied Tribunals only intervening to offset 
incompetence at the Leipzig trials. The fact that the Allies decided to concede to the Leipzig 
trials and yet  reserved the power to wrest specific cases from their jurisdiction upon finding 
that they were not conducted in good faith, mirrors a complementary arrangement between 
tribunal, German officials also announced that no German national would be surrendered to a foreign  
tribunal. For a discussion of the reason behind the complementarity compromise in the Treaty of the 
Versailles, see El Zeidy The Principle of Complementarity: Origin, Development and Practice (2008) 15. He 
concludes that the Allies’ adoption of a complementary scheme, which required that they defer jurisdiction 
to Germany was a “de facto result of respect for German sovereignty”. 
99  See article 227 and 228 of the Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers of Germany, 
(Concluded at Versailles), Jun. 28, 1919, reprinted in 2 BEVANS 43 (hereinafter, “Treaty of Versailles”). 
100  See H Patzig et al German War Trials. Reports of the Proceedings Before the Supreme Court in Leipzig. 
With Appendices [hereinafter “the Leipzig Report”] (1921) 17-18. 
101  See German War Trials. Report of the Proceedings Before the Supreme Court in Liepzig. With Appendices 
(1921) 17-18. See also Mohammed (2008) 16.  If the Allies were of the Leipzig trial did not mete out just 
judgements, they had a right to try the accused in their tribunal. 
102  See Bassiouni 1997 Harvard Human Rights Journal 14. See also El Zeidy The Principle of 
Complementarity: Origin, Development and Practice (2008) 17. He notes that although the principle was 
never really invoked in practice, the notion of complementarity began “to crystallize when the Allies 
demanded the surrender of a large number of German war criminal” pursuant to Articles 228 and 229 of the 
Treaty of Versailles.  
103  Article 228 of the Treaty of Versailles. 
104  See D Thiam “Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind Part II (Including the Draft 
Statute for an International Criminal Court” (1983) II Yearbook of the International Law Commission 
A/CN.4/364 138. Available at http://wwww.un.org/law/icl/index.htm (accessed 25 February 2013). See also 
Mohammed The Principle of Complementarity: Origin, Development and Practice (2008) 18. 
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 the Reichsgericht and the Allied Governments’ Military Tribunals. Despite this 
complementary arrangement, only a small number of perpetrators were tried in the Leipzig 
trials105 and the Allies did not review the proceedings.106 
Meanwhile, other peace treaties that included the St. Germaine-En-Laye;107 Neuilly-sur-
siene;108 Trianon109 and Serves110 were concluded between the Allied Powers and the enemy 
countries, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey.111 These treaties had common penalty 
clauses copied from article 228 of the Treaty of the Versailles.112 A complementary 
arrangement is replicated in these treaties as well since the spirit of article 228 from which 
these common articles were copied mirrored a complementary scenario. Arguably, these 
articles also advocated for a complementary arrangement between State parties to each of the 
treaties and the Allies because these common provisions give the Allies a right to intervene in 
case the State Parties fail to prosecute their own nationals.113 However, commitment to 
international prosecution had waned and the Allies never tried any of the cases or reviewed 
national court’s proceedings. 
This is how complementarity emerged in the form of restrictive complementarity where the 
Allied Tribunals were not to intervene unless and until national (German) courts failed to 
conduct satisfactory trials.114 This model was based on strict notions of complementarity in 
the sense that complementarity would apply by default should the Allies find the trials in 
105   See JN Maogoto War Crimes and Realpolitik: International Justice from World War I to the 21st 
Century (excerpt) (2004), (he argues that these constituted ‘sham trial’ as only a handful of perpetrators were 
tried, and they got off with minor sentences ranging from six months to four year’s imprisonment). 
Mohammed (2008) 15 also notes that out of a list of 895 offenders, only 45 stood trial in Germany. See also 
Bassiouni 1997 Harvard Human Rights Journal 19-20. 
106  See El Zeidy The Principle of Complementarity: Origin, Development and Practice (2008) 18. 
107  Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria (St. Germain-en-Laye, 10 September 
1919) entered into force 16 July 1920 Australian Treaty Series 1920 No. 3. 
108  Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Bulgaria, and Protocol and Declaration 
signed (Neuilly-sur-Seine, 27 November 1919).  
109  Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary and Protocol and Declaration 
(signed at Trianon June 14 1920) WWI Document Archive. 
110  The Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and the Ottoman Empire UK Treaty Series 
No. 11 of 1920. 
111  These treaties were also concluded between the Allied Powers and the enemy countries: St. Germaine-En-
Laye (with Austria on September 10, 1919); Neuillty-sur-siene (with Bulgaria on November 27, 1919); 
Trianon (with Hungary on June 4, 1920) and Sèvres, (with Turkey on August 10, 1920). See the Holocaust 
Encyclopaedia available at http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007428 (accessed 27 
August 2012). 
112  Article 173 of St Germaine; article 154 of Trianon’ article 118 of Nueilly and article226 of Sevres 
reproduced article 228 of the Treaty of Versailles word for word. See El Zeidy The Principle of 
Complementarity: Origin, Development and Practice (2008) 18 in this regard. 
113  See El Zeidy The Principle of Complementarity: Origin, Development and Practice (2008) 17. 
114  See generally El Zeidy The Principle of Complementarity: Origin, Development and Practice (2008). 
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 German courts not to be in good faith, and once this determination was made, it did not matter 
that the accused in question had already faced trial in Germany or elsewhere.115 Although the 
text of Article 228 mirrors a strict primacy of the Allied military tribunals, by giving the 
Allied Powers rights to wrest specific unsatisfactory cases from the Reichsgericht, there is a 
shift to a more complementary approach when the Allies defer to the Reichsgericht. 
Essentially, the fact that the Allies had the power to intervene whenever national proceedings 
seemed to be not in good faith reflects the spirit of complementarity.116 Even though the 
Allies took no action to implement this proposal, it marked an important step in the 
intellectual elaboration of the concept of complementarity in the international criminal justice 
system. 
Similarly, in this complementary approach to prosecution of war criminals features the idea of 
implementation legislation. Germany amended its laws specifically for purposes of 
prosecuting the accused war criminals according to the Allied powers’ constitution of 
acceptable proceedings.117 This as will be seen later in the chapter, is a requirement of the 
Rome Statute that Member States implement provisions of the Rome Statute in their legal 
system in order to conform to the Rome Statute’s criminal justice system. The principle 
further develops into another version after the peace treaties, namely, optional 
complementarity under which formal consent of the complaint State was required before an 
international tribunal could hear a case.118 This is the model mirrored in the 1937 draft 
Convention for the International Criminal Court and in the 1951 and 1953 Draft Statutes of 
the Committees on International Criminal Jurisdiction. 
2.3.3 Optional Complementarity  
The first major model of optional complementarity, which requires a State to either prosecute 
international crimes nationally or opt for international prosecution of its nationals, surfaced 
during in the 1937 Convention for the International Criminal Court and this was mirrored in  
subsequent drafts. Although this model took form in the 1937 Convention for an International 
Criminal Court, a series of events paved way for it. For instances, negotiations for an 
115  See Article 228 of Treaty of Versailles Jun. 28, 1919, reprinted in 2 BEVANS 43. 
116  See H Patzig et al German War Trials. Reports of the Proceedings before the Supreme Court in Leipzig. 
With Appendices [hereinafter “the Leipzig Report”] (1921) 17-18. 
117  See M El Zeidy The Principle of Complementarity: Origin, Development and Practice (2008) 16. 
118  This form of complementarity featured in the 1937 Convention for the Creation of an international criminal 
court and in the 1951 and 1953 Draft Statutes of the Committees on International Criminal Jurisdiction: this 
type of complementarity was based on state consent and the subsequent relinquishment of jurisdiction to the 
international tribunal. See El Zeidy The Principle of Complementarity: Origin, Development and Practice 
(2008) 5. 
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 international criminal court and proposals tabled at various meetings, first by the 1920 
Advisory Committee of Jurists and the subsequent International Law Association Conferences 
that also discussed the idea of establishing the said court.  
2.3.4 The 1920 Advisory Committee of Jurists 
Pursuant to article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations (Treaty of Versailles), 119  that 
endowed the Council of the League of Nations with the power to compose and distribute 
amongst members for adoption, a draft Statute establishing the permanent court of justice. 
The Council appointed an Advisory Committee of Jurists in 1920, to draw a plan for the 
establishment of the proposed court. According to the proposals presented by delegates, the 
proposed court would have jurisdiction to prosecute and punish crimes against international 
public order and the universal law of nations.120 States would still have jurisdiction over other 
crimes but a special arm of the Court, a High Court of International Justice, would prosecute 
those that are against the universal law of nations.121 This mirrored a complementary scheme; 
both tribunals would have concurrent and complementary jurisdiction. However, States were 
not ready to cede their criminal jurisdiction to such a forum and due to time constraints and 
disagreements between delegates; and never drew up the draft.122 
 
2.3.5 The International Law Association Conferences 
Another facet of the complementarity principle surfaced during the International Law 
Association conferences between 1922 and 1924. This also had attributes of optional 
complementarity because its implementation depended on State’s consent to its nationals 
being tried by a tribunal of an international character. At the 31st subsequent conference in 
Buenos Aries in 1922, Professor Hugh H.L. Bellot presented a paper emphasizing the urgent 
need to establish a permanent international court. After much deliberation, Professor Bellot 
was tasked with drafting and submitting to the International Law Association committee, a 
draft statute for the creation of the said court. At a subsequent meeting in Stockholm, 
Professor Bellot presented the draft statute.123 According to Article 25 of the draft, the court 
would have jurisdiction over any citizen of any State provided the relevant authorities from 
119  The article provides that “Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League for adoption 
plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice.” 
120  See BB Ferencz “International Criminal Courts: the Nuremberg Legacy” (1998) 10 Pace International Law 
Review 203 at 208  
121  See El Zeidy The Principle of Complementarity: Origin, Development and Practice (2008) 27. 
122  El Zeidy The Principle of Complementarity: Origin, Development and Practice (2008) 27. 
123  See HL Bellot, “La Cour Permanente Internationale Criminelle” 3 Reuce Internationale de Droit Penal, 
335 in El Zeidy The Principle of Complementarity: Origin, Development and Practice (2008) 33. 
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 the complainant’s country have consented to the case being heard by the court.124 Some 
committee members argued that the court should act as an appellate court with the power to 
determine whether justice had been properly administered by the national courts, however, 
most members objected, arguing that this would give the court too much power.125  
 
From the draft statute, the proposed court’s jurisdiction would be complementary although it 
was dependent upon formal consent from the territorial or national State. This would 
however, only be the case where the complainant furnished evidence of consent from his/her 
State. The court’s complementary jurisdiction would therefore be optional.126 Moreover, upon 
cessation of the hostilities, since the military courts were ad hoc and would cease to have 
jurisdiction, the proposed international court would then have jurisdiction over war 
criminals.127 Accordingly, the court would play a complementary role although this was only 
possible after obtaining State consent. These early proposals indicate how the principle of 
complementarity evolved and developed through its different facets, even though the court did 
not materialise since States were still reluctant to relinquish their sovereignty. These forums 
laid a theoretical foundation for the principle of complementarity. 
 
In 1925, there was an Inter-parliamentary Union Conference for discussing ways of 
criminalizing aggression and international repression of other international crimes committed 
by individuals in Washington DC and Ottawa. A number of problems were identified, for 
instance, reconciliation of State sovereignty with international repression of crimes committed 
by individuals from sovereign states, or crimes committed within the territory of those 
124  See ILA Draft Statute for the Permanent International Criminal Court “Historical survey of the question of 
international criminal jurisdiction” Memorandum by the Secretary-General (Sales No. 1949. Vol 8) 
Appendix 4 61. Article 25 provides:  
“The jurisdiction of the court embraces all complaints or charges of violations of the laws and customs of 
generally accepted as binding or contained in International Conventions or in Treaties in force between 
states of which the complainants and defendants are subjects or citizens respectively. The court shall also 
have jurisdiction over all the offences committed contrary to the laws to the laws of humanity and the 
dictates of conscience.” 
125  See D Thiam “Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind Part II (Including the Draft 
Statute for an International Criminal Court” First report on the draft code of offences against the peace and 
security of mankind, by Mr. D. Thiam, Special Rapporteur A/CN.4/364 139. Available at 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_364.pdf (accessed 25 February 2013). 
126  See D Thiam “Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind Part II (Including the Draft 
Statute for an International Criminal Court. See also Article 24 of the ILA Draft Statute for the Permanent 
International Criminal Court. It provides that the court would only exercise its jurisdiction where the 
complainant had “first obtained the fiat or formal consent of the Law Officers, Public Prosecutor or Minister 
of Justice…of his own state”. [Emphasis added]. 
127  See El Zeidy The Principle of Complementarity: Origin, Development and Practice (2008) 33. 
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 states.128 These issues were the result of the earlier Union’s general meeting in Berne in 1924 
regarding the criminalization of the war of aggression. The discussions made a distinction 
between internal and external sovereignty to address this problem since most States were not 
prepared to relinquish their sovereignty powers (criminal jurisdiction over their own nationals 
and over crimes committed on their soil) to an international forum.129 Professor Vespasian V. 
Pella, on behalf of the Permanent Committee to Study Questions of the Union on the 
Criminality of Wars of Aggression and the Organisation of International Repressive 
Measures,130 presented a report to address this issue. According to Professor Pella’s report, 
external sovereignty was not absolute and was limited by the very nature of international 
relations and the necessity of harmonious relations between States. 131  
 
At the end of the conference, issues of jurisdiction of the proposed permanent Court of 
International Justice were addressed and it was agreed that the said court would have 
jurisdiction over all international offences committed by individuals and those that by their 
nature preclude the jurisdiction of national courts. Although it appears the proposal seeks to 
give the proposed court exclusive jurisdiction, it may be argued that national authorities 
would also have a hand in the prosecutions, thereby reflecting a complementary scheme 
between the permanent international court of justice and domestic courts. This was apparent 
in the wording of the proposal that although the international tribunal would enjoy exclusive 
rights to jurisdiction over certain crimes - where national courts had no jurisdiction. There 
were other cases over which national courts would have jurisdiction, and these would be tried 
municipally. 
 
Proposals for an international criminal court continued on an informal basis, for instance, in 
Brussels in 1926 the International Association of Penal Law held a conference for purposes of 
discussing among others, the jurisdiction of the court. It was proposed that the court should 
128  The draft statute was adopted by the International Association for Penal Law in 1926. See “Historical Survey 
of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction” Memorandum by the Secretary-General (Sales No. 
1949. Vol 8) appendix 7 75. See also Ferencz 19980 Pace International Law Review 208 for a general 
discussion of the nature and extent of the jurisdiction of the proposed court. 
129  P Mackeron “An International Criminal Court: Balancing the Principle of State Sovereignty Against the 
Demands of International Justice” (1996-97) 12 St. John’s Journal of Legal Commentary 536 at 541. 
130  This committee was appointed at an earlier 22nd Inter-Parliamentary Union conference in Berne in 1924, to 
provide answers to the questions raised regarding the criminalization of the wars of aggression and the 
appropriate internationals repressive measures to be undertaken. 
131  Report of the 1925 Inter-Parliamentary Union, XXIII Conference Washington and Ottawa 1-13 October 
1925 “Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction” UN Publications Sales No. 
1949(8) 100. 
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 prosecute among others, prostitution, drug trafficking, counterfeiting of currency and crimes 
of national security. However, most states emphasised their reluctance to renounce their 
sovereignty rights.132 The congress therefore agreed that in cases where an accused person 
could not be prosecuted by domestic authorities, because of uncertainties133 over the territory 
on which the crimes were perpetrated, they would be subject to the jurisdiction of the 
international court. In essence, the court would be complementary to national courts in this 
case because it would only intercede where no state can prosecute due to lack of 
jurisdiction.134 The complementary jurisdiction of this court would be to offset lack of 
jurisdiction by municipal systems in specific cases. 
 
2.3.6 The 1937 League of Nations for the Creation of an International Criminal Court 
In response to political crimes that were committed between 1931 and 1934 that culminated in 
the assassinations of King Alexander of Yugoslavia and French Foreign Minister, the French 
government addressed a letter to the Secretary General of the League of Nations regarding the 
need to establish an international criminal court. This was after failed attempts to extradite 
those implicated in the assassins to France so that they could stand trial for the assassination 
of King Alexander.135 The League of Nations passed a resolution in December 1934 that 
established a Committee of Experts for the International Repression of Terrorism.136 The 
Committee was tasked with drafting a convention pertaining to the crime of terrorism and for 
establishing an international court with jurisdiction to punish terrorists.137 The committee 
convened in Geneva in 1935 to consider the proposal of the French government that was 
submitted to the League of Nations, as well as other governments’ suggestions.138 
The French proposal favoured a complementary arrangement; it proposed that national courts 
be given primary jurisdiction, with the international court only intervening where those 
accused of the crimes in the Terrorism Convention have taken refuge in a country which does 
132  See El Zeidy The Principle of Complementarity: Origin, Development and Practice (2008) 35. 
133  This could be either because the territory on which the crime was committed is unknown or because there is 
a dispute as to the sovereignty over the territory where the crimes took place. See El Zeidy The Principle of 
Complementarity: Origin, Development and Practice (2008) 33. 
134  See C Bassiouni 1997 Harvard Human Rights Journal 14. The principle of complementarity was reflected in 
these proposals; however, the tribunal’s materialisation was undermined by political ideologies. 
135   El Zeidy The Principle of Complementarity: Origin, Development and Practice (2008) 44. 
136  See Report to the Council on the First Session of the Committee (held April 30 to May 8 1938) League of 
Nations document C.184.M.102.1935V 2. 
137  See Report to the Council on the First Session of the Committee (held April 30 to May 8 1938) League of 
Nations document C.184.M.102.1935V 2. 
138 The Committee of Experts comprised of 11 members from United Kingdom, Chile, Belgium, France, 
Hungary, Italy, Poland, Roumania, the USSR, Spain and Switzerland,  
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 not wish to prosecute them. France also suggested that the court’s jurisdiction also extend to 
cases where the custodial State refuses to extradite the suspect but wishes to defer to the 
international tribunal.139 The court would also have jurisdiction where the State with 
territorial jurisdiction over the case waives jurisdiction before its domestic courts.140 The 
Romanian delegate, Professor Vespasian V. Pella, supported the French suggestion but put 
emphasis on priority of national jurisdiction. He argued that whole idea of an international 
criminal court would only be ‘conceivable’ “if the custodial voluntarily renounces its right” to 
prosecute,141 but also expressed his government’s scepticism about the court’s future viability 
because its jurisdiction was optional as there was no obligation on member States to defer to 
the court’s jurisdiction.142  
The committee adopted the report comprising the draft Convention for Creation of an 
International Criminal Court and the draft Convention for the Repression of Terrorism and 
presented them to the League.143 However, the delegates were divided on the issue of 
establishing the court, the Hungarian delegate considered the establishment of an international 
criminal court at the time to be in retrospect.144 The United Kingdom representative argued 
that his government had the resources to efficiently deal with terrorism internally.145 The 
Polish delegate also stated that his government “sees no need for the creation of the court”.146   
139  See Report to the Council on the First Session of the Committee League of Nations document 
C.184.M.102.1935V. 19. 
140  See Report to the Council on the First Session of the Committee League of Nations document 
C.184.M.102.1935V. 19. The French delegate proposed concurrent jurisdiction between the proposed court 
and national judiciaries to cater for situations where the accused has taken refuge in a country that lacks 
political will to punish him. See El Zeidy The Principle of Complementarity: Origin, Development and 
practice (2008) 47. He states that the proposed international criminal court “was intended as a default 
jurisdiction that was triggered when the criteria….is satisfied”. 
141  See Report to the Council on the First Session of the Committee League of Nations document 
C.184.M.102.1935V. 19. 
142  See Observations by Governments on the Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism 
and Draft Convention for the Creation of the International Criminal Court Series I League of Nations 
document A.24.1936V 1-3. 
143  See Report to the Council Adopted by the Commission for the Repression of Terrorism on January 15, 1936 
League of Nations document A.7.1938.V. [C.36 (1) 1936.V 2. 
144  See Observations by Governments on the Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism 
and Draft Convention for the Creation of the International Criminal Court Series II League of Nations 
document A.24 (a).1936V 5-8. 
145  See Observations by Governments on the Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism 
and Draft Convention for the Creation of the International Criminal Court Series II League of Nations 
document A.24 (a).1936V 5-8. The United Kingdom and India did not support the proposals for an 
international court because they argued that they could deal with terrorism within their national legal 
systems. See El Zeidy The Principle of Complementarity: Origin, Development and Practice (2008) 48 
noting that the delegates were “divided on to the desirability of creating the court in principle and on the 
‘timelines’ of its creation.” 
146  See Observations by Governments on the Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism 
and Draft Convention for the Creation of the International Criminal Court Series II League of Nations 
document A.24 (a).1936V 1-3. 
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 Despite the division between States, the draft statutes were adopted in 1937 at a conference in 
Geneva after revision, to accommodate concerns aired at earlier conferences.147 Under Article 
3 of the Draft Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court, a State party 
could try the accused before its national courts; extradite him to another State party to the 
convention; or remit him to the proposed international criminal court.148 Article 10 of the 
Draft Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Terrorism also provides: 
 “where in virtue of the present Convention a High Contracting Party has to bring to trial a 
person accused of one of the offences provided for by article 2 and 3, the law of that High 
Contracting Party shall determine what court shall have jurisdiction to try such person.”149  
Both these conventions mirrored optional complementarity as the international court could 
only supplement national jurisdictions if the State concerned chose to submit the accused to 
the court. This implied serious practicality issues for the proposed court; consequently, the 
convention was only ratified by India.150  
The post-World War I era saw the principle of complementarity evolve into  different  facets, 
from optional complementarity to more strict notions in the Nuremberg Tribunals and the 
compromise approach model in the Rome Statute. Each of these models has been influenced 
by the theoretical, historical, practical, political and legal notions of its time. For instance, in 
the peace treaties, due to States’ reluctance to relinquish their sovereignty, the proposed 
international tribunal would only exercise its jurisdiction upon finding the German trials 
unsatisfactory.151 Although the Article 228 of the Versailles and the common treaties of St. 
Germaine-En-Laye;152 Neuilly-sur-siene;153 Trianon154 and Serves155 echoed primacy of the 
147  See Observations by Governments on the Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism 
and Draft Convention for the Creation of the International Criminal Court Series I League of Nations 
document A.24.1936V. 
148  See Report to the Council Adopted by the Commission for the Repression of Terrorism on January 15, 1936 
League of Nations document A.7.1938.V. [C.36 (1) 1936.V Appendix II 8. This provision  laid down the 
criteria for admission of cases before the proposed tribunal. 
149  Report to the Council Adopted by the Commission for the Repression of Terrorism on January 15, 1936 
League of Nations document A.7.1938.V. [C.36 (1) 1936.V Appendix II 8. 
150  El Zeidy The Principle of Complementarity: Origin, Development and Practice (2008) 56. 
151  See generally El Zeidy The Principle of Complementarity: Origin, Development and Practice (2008) 29. He 
notes that the notion of complementarity in the peace treaties was basically a presupposition of Germany’s 
failure to hold satisfactory trials, and the Allies would invoke the penalty clauses in the peace treaties and 
thereby play a complementary role, if Germany failed to administer justice in good faith. 
152 Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria (St. Germain-en-Laye, 10 September 
1919) entered into force 16 July 1920 Australian Treaty Series 1920 No. 3. 
153  Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Bulgaria, and Protocol and Declaration 
signed (Neuilly-sur-Seine, 27 November 1919).  
154 Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary and Protocol and Declaration 
(signed at Trianon June 14 1920) WWI Document Archive. 
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 Allied military courts, the fact that the Allies gave Germany and other parties a chance to try 
their nationals in their domestic courts gives the Allied tribunals a supplementary role. This 
scenario provided a theoretical background for the principle of complementarity. However, 
the Allied governments never invoked provisions of the common articles that complete the 
complementarity regime between the Allied Tribunals and the courts of the Member States to 
the peace treaties despite Germany and Turkey holding sham trials meting out minor 
judgements and only trying a handful of the offenders.156 .  
 
Traces of optional complementarity can also be found in the International Law Association 
proposals for an international tribunal. According to these proposals, the said court would 
only have jurisdiction where the States concerned gave formal consent.157 The court’s 
jurisdiction would also extend to cases where the territory on which the crimes were 
committed was unclear or no State has jurisdiction over the crimes in question158. 
Furthermore, optional complementarity is reflected in the 1937 League of Nations draft 
conventions on the creation of an International Criminal Court and the prevention and 
punishment of terrorism. The draft conventions advocated for State’s primary jurisdiction, 
with the tribunal only intervening where the State that had jurisdiction would not wish to 
prosecute or where the offender had refugee status in such a State, and the State in question 
refused to extradite him159. However, in the turmoil of the post-war period, the provisions that 
mirror the principle of complementarity were never really invoked and its practicality never 
tested.  
 
2.4 Complementarity in the Post World War II Era 
The Allied Powers’ attempts to prosecute war criminals after the First World War did not 
yield the desired results as only minor sentences were meted out at the Leipzig trials and other 
155  The Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and the Ottoman Empire UK Treaty Series 
No. 11 of 1920. 
156  See J Mogoto War Crimes and Real Politik: International Justice from World War I to the 21st Century 
(2004) 4-5.  See also C Bassiouni 1997 Harvard Human Rights Journal 15. 
157  See ILA Draft Statute for the Permanent International Criminal Court “Historical survey of the question of 
international criminal jurisdiction” Memorandum by the Secretary-General (Sales No. 1949. Vol 8) 
Appendix 4 61, Article 25. 
158  See ILA Draft Statute for the Permanent International Criminal Court “Historical survey of the question of 
international criminal jurisdiction” Memorandum by the Secretary-General (Sales No. 1949. Vol 8) 
Appendix 4 61. 
159  For the full text of the  1937 League of Nations Draft Convention for the Creation of an International 
Criminal Court and the Draft Terrorism Convention see Report to the Council Adopted by the Commission 
for the Repression of Terrorism on January 15, 1936 League of Nations document A.7.1938.V. [C.36 (1) 
1936.V. 
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 war criminals were not prosecuted.160 War criminals were therefore not deterred from 
committing crimes in the future, and a series of crimes led to the Second World War161. 
During the course of the war, in 1941 the League of Nations Union created the London 
International Assembly and representatives of the Allied Governments made 
recommendations for a court that would effectively punish those who were responsible for 
war crimes committed during the war.162 Proposals for an international forum to punish 
authors of the atrocities were presented.  
However, the issue of the competence of the proposed forum was debated.163 The Belgian 
delegate, M de Baer, proposed that States be given latitude to try war criminals in their own 
courts (except for Germany) with the international criminal court only handling the most 
serious of these crimes, because the court alone could not possibly handle all the cases 
alone.164 In subsequent meetings, it was agreed that the proposed court should intervene only 
when the Allied courts have no jurisdiction or it is ‘impossible’ or ‘inconvenient’ to prosecute 
in national courts.165 In addition, the said court would prosecute where the State that has 
jurisdiction on the matter decides to refer the case to the international criminal court.166 This 
proposed some kind of a complementary scheme between national courts and the international 
160 For instance, the Kaiser was never tried since Germany refused to honour the peace treaty. Holland also 
refused to extradite Kaiser arguing that there was no international court at the time try and punish aggression 
by a sovereign, and this would also mean that the treaty was being applied ex post facto as the alleged 
aggression was perpetrated before its coming into force. See, B Ferencza “International Criminal Courts: 
The Legacy of Nuremberg (1998) 10 Pace International Law Review 203 at 207. 
161 The Second World War was triggered by assassinations of King Alexander of Yugoslavia and the French 
Foreign Minister in 1934, the affected nations resorted to war, Germany against Europe; Japan invaded 
Manchuria, and India invaded Ethiopia, there was a series of invasion and acts of aggression going on 
around the world up until 1941. See B Ferencza “International Criminal Courts: The Legacy of Nuremberg 
(1998) 10 Pace International Law Review 203 at 209.  
162 See Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/7/Rev. 1 UN 
Sales no 1949.v.8 (1949) 11. 
163 See London International Assembly – Commission II on the Trial of War Criminals TS 26/873 232. 
164  London International Assembly – Commission II on the Trial of War Criminals TS 26/873 234. Mr Baer 
appreciated the necessity of the International criminal court but argued that the court would not be competent 
to handle all cases from across the world alone. He proposed a division of tasks between the two for a, 
municipal authorities were to continue trying cases that they could handle, with the proposed court dealing 
with the most serious crimes. 
165   London International Assembly – Commission II on the Trial of War Criminals TS 26/873 228-9. 
166  See London International Assembly – Commission II on the Trial of War Criminals TS 26/873 282-3. Before 
the international criminal court could have jurisdiction the following criteria had to be met:  
1. The accused must have committed crimes in several jurisdictions rendering it impractical to try him 
separately in each of the countries. 
2. The crimes in question must have been of an international character. 
3. The accused must be a head of state which implies the gravity of the case. 
4. National courts must be unable to prosecute the accused due to difficulties in obtaining the necessary 
evidence or the accused. 
5.  National courts could also waive jurisdiction in the interests of justice, viz., if the political situation 
in the country is still unsettled post- war and it would be desirable to try elsewhere to avoid 
suspicions of bias.  
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 court, national courts were to prosecute where they had jurisdiction or where it was 
convenient or in the interests of justice to do so.167 The international criminal would also have 
supplementary jurisdiction where the State with jurisdiction is ‘unable’ to prosecute due to an 
unfavourable post-war environment. The complementarity model proposed here was also 
optional in as far as, the State with jurisdiction could opt not to prosecute and rather refer the 
case to the proposed court. In this manner, the proposed court would be complementary where 
the State decides, among others, to defer jurisdiction.  
In the revised Draft Convention for The Creation of the International Criminal Court prepared 
by M de Baer in 1943, Article 3(1) provided that “…no case shall be brought before the Court 
when a domestic court of any of the United Nations has jurisdiction to try the accused and it is 
in a position and willing to exercise such jurisdiction.”168 It is conclusive from this provision 
that the jurisdiction of the said court would be triggered by “inability” on the part of the 
municipal system to prosecute, for instance, where the State is still unsettled after the war, or 
an unwillingness to pursue the case. This criterion features in the Rome Statute 
complementarity model, where the ICC has complementary jurisdiction to try the most 
serious crimes of international concern, where a State show ‘inability’ or “unwillingness” to 
genuinely prosecute.169  
Generally, proposals for an international criminal tribunal during and after World War II were 
more inclined towards a division of tasks between the proposed tribunal and municipal courts, 
and these put more weight on the importance of national courts, as the prima fora for 
prosecution of war criminals.170 These proposals for an international criminal tribunal 
culminated in the establishment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg for 
punishment of those who were responsible for the war and for crimes against peace and 
crimes against humanity 
167  The Allied powers favoured a division of labour scenario between the two courts. The rationale behind this 
was that it was more convenient for these cases to be dealt with internally, and to avoid flooding the 
international court with cases that could be prosecuted by national courts, only serious crimes had to be tried 
by the proposed court. See El Zeidy The Principle of Complementarity: Origin, Development and practice 
(2008) 62. 
168  For the text of the draft convention for the creation of the international criminal court that deals with issues 
of jurisdiction (Articles 3 and 4(1)), see London International Assembly – Commission II on the Trial of War 
Criminals TS 26/873 324-325. 
169  See Article 17 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
170  See El Zeidy The Principle of Complementarity: Origin, Development and Practice (2008) 61-62 (noting 
that the proposals established optional concurrent and complementary jurisdiction between the two fora. He 
further notes that the philosophy behind opting for complementarity jurisdiction was among others, to avoid 
a backlog of cases in the international criminal court, and also because national judiciaries were seen as the 
“forum conveniens”).  
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 2.4.1The Nuremberg International Military Tribunal – Discretionary Complementarity 
The four victors of the Second World War, United States of America; Great Britain; France 
and the Soviet Union, the Allied Powers, established the International Military tribunal: in 
order to prosecute German officers, Nazi leaders, who had committed war crimes, crimes 
against peace and crimes against humanity during the war.171 In terms of the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal for the Trial of the Major War Criminals (herein after the 
“IMT charter”)172that established the tribunal, the, jurisdiction of this tribunal was limited to 
Germans who were responsible for atrocities committed in Occupied Europe.173 The tribunal 
was set up to try only major war criminals of the European Axis, while majority of other 
minor crimes were to be tried by national judiciaries.174 This reflects a complementary 
scheme because both the international tribunal and national courts work together and 
prosecute war criminals but each forum deals with its category of crimes. Twenty four (24) 
German war criminals were charged with conspiracy to commit the crimes listed in the IMT 
Charter175, there were other thirteen subsequent trials at the Nuremberg.  
 
The text of the IMT Charter refers to the Moscow declaration of 1943176 in which the parties 
agreed that German war criminals be tried in the countries in which the crimes in question 
were committed so that the international military tribunal focussed only on major crimes with 
no particular territory.177 This also mirrored a complementary arrangement. This model of 
complementarity was born after in the International Law Association proposals for an 
international criminal court, where the international tribunal would only exercise its 
jurisdiction to complement lack of jurisdiction while national courts, in this case, of the 
171  See H Jescheck “The General Principles of International Criminal Law Set out in Nuremberg, as Mirrored in 
the ICC Statute” (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 38. 
172  See also Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, 
Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, U.N.T.S. 279, as amended, Protocol to Agreement and Charter, Oct. 6, 1945.). 
The Charter is also sometimes referred to as the London charter because it was concluded in London on 8 
august 1945. See Jescheck 2004 Journal of International Criminal Justice 38. 
173  Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 
59 Stat. 1544, U.N.T.S. 279.  
174  See BD Meltzer “War Crimes: The Nuremberg Trial and the Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia”- the 
Seegers Lecture (1995-96) Valparaiso University Law Review 30. See also R Woetzel The Nuremberg Trials 
in International Law (1960) for a general discussion. 
175  See Ferencz 1998 Pace International Law Review 214.  
176  Article 4 of the IMT charter provides, “Nothing in this agreement shall prejudice the provisions established 
by the Moscow Declaration concerning the return of war criminals to the countries where they committed 
their crimes.…” 
177  This model of complementarity was born after World War I, where the international tribunal only exercises 
its jurisdiction to complement lack of jurisdiction while national courts, in this case, of the territorial state as 
opposed to the national state, were endowed with jurisdiction over international crimes committed during the 
war. 
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 territorial state as opposed to the national State, were endowed with jurisdiction over 
international crimes committed during the war. 
 
However, this differed from the complementary scheme envisaged by penal provisions in the 
peace treaties, as this tribunal would have exclusive jurisdiction over the core crimes. This left 
the less serious crimes to domestic courts, whereas the idea of complementarity envisaged by 
the peace treaties embraced the concept of deferral to national courts, an approach that is 
central to the notion of complementarity.178 The Nuremberg model of complementarity 
however, contemplates a division of tasks between the national and international courts, with 
each court dealing with its own set of cases. This approach seems to reflect the doctrine of 
supremacy of the international court over municipal systems in that the Nuremberg Tribunals 
had exclusive jurisdiction over high profile cases while national courts only had jurisdiction 
to adjudicate low-level cases. This however, offset lack of jurisdiction of each of the forums 
because the other would have a particular set of cases to handle where the other does not have 
such powers, thereby playing a complementary role. 
 
2.4.2 The Tokyo Tribunal 
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East was also established after the Second 
World War by General Douglas MacArthur, a Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in 
the Far East, through the Charter for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, as 
amended.179 Like the Nuremberg Tribunal, this tribunal was set up for trying Japanese war 
criminals for alleged crimes of aggression, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The 
jurisdiction of this particular tribunal also extended to the major war criminals with the 
Japanese courts seized with jurisdiction over minor offences hence, reflecting a 
complementary relationship between the tribunal and domestic courts. 
 
2.4.3 The Ad Hoc Tribunals 
The primacy of the ad hoc tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (hereinafter the ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
178  See El Zeidy “The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement International Criminal 
Law” (2001-2002) 23 Michigan Journal of International Law 869 at 875. 
179 The tribunal was established by a special proclamation found in Department of State Bulletin (USA) vol XIV 
No 349 361. 
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 (hereinafter the ICTR) has been emphasised in most legal texts.180 The ad hoc tribunals were 
established pursuant to the Security Council Resolutions.181 The Statutes that established the 
two tribunals, that is, article 9 of the ICTY Statute182 and article 8 of the ICTR Statute,183 
outline the relationship between the ad hoc tribunals and national courts respectively. They 
provide verbatim that these international tribunals and national courts shall have concurrent 
jurisdiction to prosecute serious human rights violations committed in each territory.184 
However, these Statutes vested the tribunals with primary jurisdiction: 
“The International Tribunal shall have primacy over national courts. At any stage of the procedure, the 
International Tribunal may formally request national courts to defer to the competence of the 
International Tribunal in accordance with the present Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of 
the International Tribunal.”185 
Inasmuch as the above provision emphasises primacy of the tribunals over national courts, it 
also reflects a complementary relationship between these forums. The provisions provide that 
at any stage of the proceedings (in national courts); the tribunal may request national courts to 
defer to the jurisdiction of the tribunals. This means that the tribunal may intervene in any 
given case and prosecute on an international level.186 The report by the Secretary-General on 
the Former Yugoslavia also emphasised that the intention of the Security Council was not to 
bar national courts altogether from exercising their jurisdiction with respect to the crimes 
listed under the ICTY Statute.187  
The Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals significantly envisaged the idea of division of labour 
between the respective States and the tribunals through concurrent jurisdiction. Although this 
180  See A Cassese International Criminal Law (2003) 349; SJ Mallesons et al “ICTR – Jurisdiction, Completion 
Strategy and the Transfer of Cases to Domestic Courts” (2011) Humanitarian Law Perspectives 6; M El 
Zeidy 2001-2002 Michigan Journal of International Law 869; El Zeidy “From Primacy to Complementarity 
and Backwards: (Re)-visit1ng Rule 11 bis of the Ad hoc Tribunals” (2008) 57 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 403 at 405. 
181  United Nations Security Council Resolution 827 (1993) established the ICTY. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. 
SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, 3417th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). 
182  Article 9 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 
1991, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, 3417th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). 
183  Article 8 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th 
Sess., 453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994). 
184  See article 8(1) of the ICTR Statute and article 9(1) of the ICTY Statute. 
185  Article 8(2) of the ICTR Statute and article 9(2) of the ICTYS Statute respectively. See also Report of the 
Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808(1993) UN SCOR 48th Sess 
UN Doc S/25704 (1993) [hereinafter Secretary-General's Report on the Former Yugoslavia] paras 64-65. 
186  The rationale behind the prosecutorial discretion here is the same as the rationale for primacy of the tribunal, 
namely, because it was highly likely that prosecutions by national courts would be unfair and biased, given 
the nature of the situations and circumstances under which the crimes were committed. 
187  See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), 
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 9H 64-5, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993). 
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 arrangement was subject to the discretion of the prosecutor of each tribunal, it mirrors a 
complementary regime because national courts had a hand in the criminal prosecution of their 
nationals, unless and until the international tribunal requested a deferral. Even in the case 
where the tribunal has requested a deferral, there is still complementarity because the tribunal 
steps in at any stage of the proceedings in the national courts, to supplement them in whatever 
respect they may be lacking, for instance, in cases where municipal proceedings may be 
impartiality. 
Moreover, pursuant to the ICTR’s Completion Strategy, Rule 11(bis) of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence was amended in May 2005.188 The amendment gave the Tribunal the 
authority to transfer low or mid-level cases that were already before the Tribunal back to the 
national courts for investigation and/or prosecution.189 These cases were to be referred to a 
State with jurisdiction provided they were ‘willing and adequately prepared to accept such 
cases’.190 The said State must have “a legal framework which criminalises the alleged conduct 
of the accused and provides an adequate penalty structure”.191 In addition, the prosecutor had 
to monitor those proceedings in the national courts to ensure that they conformed to the fair 
trial requirements.192 The prosecutor also had the power to revoke any transfer should he find 
the proceedings unsatisfactory. This is a clear case of complementarity, when one of the 
forums, international or national is lacking in one way or another, it could be supplemented or 
complemented through the prosecutor’s power of referral or deferral.  
Additionally, the issue of jurisdiction was raised in Prosecutor v. Tadic,193 and the 
proceedings before the ICTY mirrored a complementary approach to prosecution of 
international crimes. First, Dusko Tadic was arrested in Germany for crimes against 
humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and genocide, but the Tribunal 
requested a deferral of jurisdiction from Germany because pursuant to article 9 (2) of the 
188  See International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence Extraordinary Plenary Session (30 may 2006) IT/32/REV. 38 8. 
189  In terms of Rule 11bis the prosecutor could apply for transfer of a case already before the tribunal either to 
the country where the crime was committed; where the accused was arrested or any other country with 
jurisdiction and ‘willing and adequately prepared to accept such a case. See G Norris “Closer to Justice: 
Transferring Cases from the International Criminal Court” (2010) 10 Minnesota Journal of International 
Law 204 at 209. 
190  See President of the ICTR, Annex 1 (A), U.N. Doc. S/2009/247 (May 14 2009). 
191  See Decision on the Prosecution’s Appeal against Decision on Referral under Rule 11bis (Prosecutor v. 
Hategekimana) (Appeals Chamber) [2008] Case No. ICTR-00-55B-R11bis 40. 
192  Rule 11bis (D) (iv). 
193  Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic Case No. IT-94-I-I, (Aug-10, 1995) International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia: (Decision on the Establishment of the International Tribunal). 
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 ICTY Statute the Tribunal had primacy over national courts.194 Tadic challenged the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal arguing that the ICTY Statute’s grant of primacy to the Tribunal 
over national courts violated international law. The Tribunal held that the crimes that Tadic 
was charged with were universal in nature and did not fall exclusively under the jurisdiction 
of the affected nations.195 The approach of the Tribunal mirrored a complementary approach 
because by the nature of the crimes committed, an international tribunal had the power to try 
the case. Although the statute advocated a strict primacy approach, there is still division of 
tasks between national courts and the international tribunal. 
It is also worth noting that there was a shift from the strict primacy of the tribunals to a more 
discretionary type of complementarity. This was because the complementary relationship 
between the two fora was dependent on the prosecutors’ exercise of their discretionary powers 
to defer cases to national courts or request the national courts to refer to its jurisdiction during 
the proceedings. The amendment somehow reversed the primacy approach of the ad hoc 
tribunals to a complementary approach in the form of division of labour between the 
international tribunals and the domestic courts.196 While the Tribunal only handled the high 
profile cases, there was a division of tasks between the low and medium level cases. 
Since the amendment, the prosecutor has transmitted about eight transfer requests to the 
Appeals Chamber but so far, only two have been granted. Before a referral is granted, the 
legal and judicial system of the State to which the case is being referred is evaluated to 
determine its ability to prosecute, that is, if the crimes in question are punishable in its system. 
An inquiry into how well it can protect witnesses and offer fair trials is also made. The cases 
against Munceslas Munyeshaka197 and Laurent Bucyibanita198 were successfully referred to 
France as the French legal and judicial system fit the profile. The prosecutor’s request to refer 
the Bagaragaza’s case199 to the Republic of Norway was one of those that were not granted. 
In this matter, the accused was charged with genocide and in the alternative, conspiracy to 
194  G Watson “The Humanitarian Law of the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal: Jurisdiction in Prosecutor v. 
Tadic” (1996) 36 Virginia Journal of International Law 689 at 692. 
195  Tadic argued that he could either be tried in Germany or Bosnia. He further argued that when the case was 
referred to the tribunal he was already on trial, this was dismissed and the tribunal held that the proceedings 
against him were at an investigation stage and were not a trial. See G Watson 1996 Virginia Journal of 
International Law  693. 
196  See M El Zeidy 2008 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 410. 
197  Prosecutor v Munyeshaka, Case No. ICTR-2005-97-I, Decision on the Prosecutor’s request for the Referral 
of Munceslas Munyeshaka’s indictment to France (Nov. 20, 2007). 
198  Prosecutor v Bucyibanita, Case No. ICTR-2005-85-I, Decision on the Prosecutor’s request for the Referral 
of Munceslas Munyeshaka’s indictment to France (Nov. 20, 2007). 
199 Prosecutor v Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR-2005-86-R11bis, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion to Refer to 
the Kingdom of Norway (May 19, 2006). 
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 commit genocide. Norway’s body of criminal law did not adequately address the crimes in 
question; alternatively, the accused would be charged under the homicide act. Accordingly, 
the request was dismissed because Norway was ‘unable’ to treat genocide as a serious 
international crime.200 
Similarly, under the Rome Statute complementarity regime, for a State to be able to 
investigate the crimes listed therein, its legal system must explicitly deal with the crime in 
question, that is, it must incorporate the ICC’s body of law so that it meets the required 
standards for prosecution of the core crimes. Should the ICC find the State’s legal system not 
in conformity with the requirements of the Rome Statute, the ICC will wrest the case in 
question from the jurisdiction of the State and prosecute, thereby, playing a complementary 
role. For instance, in his report to the Security Council about the situation in Darfur, the ICC 
Prosecutor stated that he had studied the Sudanese laws and procedure relating to the 
Sudanese justice system of administration of criminal justice and traditional dispute resolution 
systems. From his reading of these laws, he believed that they were not adequate to address 
the crimes arising out of the situation, and that no criminal proceedings had yet been initiated 
against the people his office sought to pursue.201 This means that Sudan met the 
complementary criterion laid down by the Rome Statute and as such, the ICC would have 
jurisdiction to prosecute. 
2.4.4 The Genocide Convention 
The principle of complementarity was also further developed during the drafting of the 
Genocide Convention. On December 11, 1946, the United nations General Assembly passed 
Resolution 96(1) through which it transmitted a request to the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) to prepare for the drafting of a genocide convention.202 The Council established 
an Ad hoc committee to prepare a draft convention and merge it with the one already 
prepared by the United Nations Secretariat.203 During the negotiations for the Genocide 
Convention, a number of proposals were tabled, in the draft prepared by the Ad hoc 
Committee, article VII dealt with issues of jurisdiction. It provided: 
“The trial of persons accused of punishable acts shall be by a competent tribunal of the state in the 
territory of which the act was committed. Alternatively, punishable acts may be tried by such 
200 See G Norris 2010Minesota Journal of International Law 211. 
201 See First Report of the Prosecutor of the international Criminal Court , Mr Luis Moreno Ocampo, To the 
Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), 29 June 2005 3-4, see W Burke-White “Implementing a 
Policy of Positive Complementarity in the Rome System of Justice” (2008) 19 Criminal Law Forum  59. 
202  G.A. Res 47(IV) 4th session Historical Survey UN Doc A/CN.4/7Rev 1 30. 
203  G.A. Res 47(IV) 4th session Historical Survey UN Doc A/CN.4/7Rev 1 30. 
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 international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting States which shall 
have accepted its jurisdiction.”204 
This provision envisages a complementary scheme between national courts and an 
international tribunal with jurisdiction to prosecute and punish acts of genocide. It recognises 
the right of a territorial State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction, be it competent, with the 
international tribunal only intervening where it has jurisdiction or where the State with 
jurisdiction has accepted jurisdiction of the tribunal. However, some States argued that the 
establishment of an international court was premature as acts of genocide could be repressed 
internally, within the States’ domestic legal systems. Advocates of national repression of 
genocide sought to preserve the sovereignty of States, arguing that relinquishing State 
sovereignty to such a judicial body might “wound national pride” of the State concerned. 
Other delegates envisioned a complementary arrangement but proposed that the proposed 
criminal court should have jurisdiction to prosecute leaders of criminal acts. That is, the 
instrumentalities of the State where there is evidence that the territorial State had a hand in the 
commission of acts complained of, or it did nothing to stop them. National courts would 
therefore have jurisdiction over the less serious cases. Other States, for instance, France, 
proposed an international court with compulsory jurisdiction over the crime of genocide. 
Another proposal by the United States favoured a tribunal with limited and supplementary 
powers. The tribunal would exercise its jurisdiction only when a State with territorial State 
failed to prosecute. This proposal sought to preserve State sovereignty while at the same time 
ensured that acts of genocide went unpunished; the ad hoc Committee adopted this proposal. 
On December 9, 1948, the General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereinafter the Genocide Convention), through 
Resolution 260(III).205  
The drafting history of this Convention highlights the importance of complementarity as the 
most viable procedural guideline for prosecution of international crimes. It also shows that it 
was a form of a compromise on the part of the States since they had to cede part of their 
sovereignty rights to a supranational tribunal. It also goes to show the commitment of States 
to repress international crimes and fight impunity. However, the proposed complementarity 
204  Article VII of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Dec. 9, 1948, 102 
Stat.3045, 78 UNITS 227. 
205 G.A.Res., 260 (III) 3rd session, 179th plenary meeting, 9 December 1948, 174-177. The Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat.3045, 78 UNITS 227 was 
adopted on 9 December 1948 and came into force on 12 January 1951. 
47 
 
                                                            
 provision did not make it to the final draft of the convention, as States feared that this would 
undermine the jurisdiction of the proposed court.206 
2.5 The Rome Statute Complementarity Model 
The Rome Statute complementarity as noted above is embodied in article 17 of the Rome 
Statute. Article 17 has incorporated this model into the admissibility criteria. This particular 
model, as will be argued later, is a refined version of the earlier models. A historical 
overview of complementarity in general has shown that it keeps evolving and these 
developments reflect a tentative consensus between all the models. Each subsequent model 
has been influenced in one way or another by the models that preceded it. The phases that this 
principle has gone through since its inception in international criminal law show a pattern of 
allocation of duties between international judicial bodies and national courts. The Rome 
Statute model prioritises national prosecution, unless it proves inadequate based on the 
criterion laid down in article 17. 
 
2.5.1 Preparatory Works for the Rome Statute Model 
Pursuant to the General Assembly Resolution 117(II) of 21 November 1947, the International 
Law Commission prepared a Draft Code of Offences Against Peace and Security of Mankind. 
The Commission was also asked to consider the desirability of creating an international 
criminal court. The Commission prepared a draft Convention for this purpose in 1994. 
During the meetings that were held to discuss and develop the draft statute, most of the 
delegates advocated for a complementary relationship between the proposed court and 
national judiciaries, because they were not ready to completely relinquish their sovereignty 
rights. An Ad hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court was 
appointed to develop the draft prepared by the International Law Commission in accordance 
with General Assembly Resolution 49/53 of December 9, 1994. 
 
It was apparent in the proposals tabled by States that, although they appreciated the urgency 
of establishing the court, their biggest concern was loss of sovereignty. Most delegates 
favoured a criminal court that would promote national jurisdiction rather than replace it, and 
only invoke its jurisdictional powers if the state concerned lacks the necessary willingness or 
206 See Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, Sixth Committee, 42nd meeting; UN 
DOC.A/C.6/SR.98, 379. 
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 ability to investigate and prosecute crimes listed under the draft convention.207 This 
complementary scheme was favoured for a number of reasons: that national courts are for 
many reasons the forum conveniens because it was easier for them to access evidence, 
witnesses and machinery to ensure speedy trials;208 also to avoid a backlog of cases at the 
international court.  
 
However, to ensure the practicality of the court and quell fears of those States that argued that 
the court would be useless if States are given primary jurisdiction, the delegates adopted a 
compromise approach: endowing the court with limited (complementary) jurisdictional reach 
while preserving State’s jurisdictional powers to be the first to prosecute. This way, States 
could still have their sovereignty while the international court played its role of being the 
guardian of international criminal justice, whenever a State shows inability or unwillingness 
to prosecute international crimes.209A conference was called by the General Assembly in 
Rome, Italy, to finalise the adoption of the Convection.210 The Preparatory Committee 
revised the International Law Commission draft convention in line with hundreds of 
proposals and amendments suggested by States. Of the issues brought to the fore was the role 
of the United Nations Security Council, the guardian of international peace and security. 
Since it is a political body, most States argued that the fact that the Council has powers to 
defer to the jurisdiction of the Court, any situation it considers a threat to international peace 
and security, even when the International Criminal Court has no jurisdiction over a case, will 
undermine the independence of the Court.211 Additionally, the fact that the complementarity 
safety valve does not apply in the case of Security Council referrals worried most delegates 
since complementarity was meant to limit the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.  
 
207  RS Lee (ed.) The International Criminal Court – The Making of the Rome Statute, Issues Negotiation 
.Results (1999) 3. 
208  See El Zeidy The Principle of Complementarity: Origin, Development and Practice (2008) 62. 
209  See Report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court UN GAOR, 
50th Sess., Supp. No.22, UN DOC. A/50/22 (1995) para 31. 
210  The United Nations Diplomatic Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International 
Criminal Court of 15 June to 17 July 1998. 
211  Under the Unite Nations Charter, Chapter VII thereof, the United Nations Security Council has the power to 
maintain peace and security and in terms of the Rome statute, the Council may transmit a case to the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, for prosecution. In this case the rules of complementarity do 
not apply and even non-member states’ situations may be prosecuted whether the state in question has 
accepted the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court or not. See article 16 of the Rome Statute in this 
regard. 
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 It was also apparent in the proposals and amendments that States were reluctant to create a 
court that would impinge on their sovereignty and this meant the convention was at a risk of 
not receiving the requisite number of ratifications for it to be operational. The only safe option 
was to reach a compromise between the preservation of State sovereignty and an effective and 
independent criminal justice system through complementarity jurisdiction. At the end of the 
conference, the issue of the jurisdiction of the court was resolved. National courts were given 
priority to prosecute international crimes committed on their soil, and the International 
Criminal Court was to be the court of last resort. This would only apply where the State 
concerned shows “unwillingness” and “inability” to genuinely prosecute. At the end of the 
conference, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (hereinafter the Rome 
Statute) was adopted despite the divisions between states.212 The Rome Statute entered into 
force on July 1, 2002 upon the sixtieth ratification213, thereby creating the International 
Criminal Court with complementary jurisdiction to prosecute and punish the most serious 
crimes of international concern: war crimes, crimes against humanity, aggression and 
genocide. 
2.5.2   Analysis of the Rome Statute Model 
The complementarity model in the Rome Statute is the result of a compromise approach 
adopted at the Rome conference. This compromise sought to limit jurisdictional reach of the 
international court and to preserve sovereignty of States. This was motivated by the concern 
that the court may supersede States and exercise its jurisdiction should they fail to honour 
their duty to investigate and prosecute international crimes. Article 35 of the 1994 
International Law Commission Draft Convention for the International Criminal Court 
provided a blueprint for the Rome Statute complementarity model. Due to States’ reluctance 
to give up their sovereignty to an international tribunal, the draft convention provided that the 
international court would prosecute where it is inconclusive whether the crime was duly 
investigated at the national level.214 However, to safeguard State sovereignty, the draft 
predicated the Court’s jurisdiction on the formal consent of the territorial or custodial state.215 
However, at the Rome Conference the consent prerequisite was hailed for undermining the 
212  M Newton “Comparative Complementarity: Domestic Jurisdiction Consistent with the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (2001) 167 Military Law Review 20 at 22. 
213  The delegates adopted the statute for a vote of 120, with 7 votes against it and 21 abstentions. See Newton 
2001Military Law Review 23. 
214  M Smith “The Principle of Complementarity in the Origins of Federal Civil Rights Enforcement, 1866-
1871” (2011) 1 at 25. Available at http://bepress.com/matthew_smith/1 (accessed 27 August 2012). 
215  See M Smith “The Principle of Complementarity in the Origins of Federal Civil Rights Enforcement, 1866-
1871” (2011) 1 at 27. 
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 very existence of the court, as this left room for the possibility of the offender escaping 
punishment  in ‘politically sympathetic’ States.216 
 
The Rome Statute did away with the requirement of State consent, by ratifying the Rome 
Statute, the Member State was considered to have consented to the court’s jurisdiction for any 
future cases where the State fails to investigate or prosecute crimes of concern to the 
international community, instead of the State having to give consent for every single case.217 
To safeguard States’ sovereignty rights, the Rome Statute adopted a unique system of 
distribution of tasks between State parties to the statute and the Court, which embodies a 
carrot-and-stick mechanism.218 The Rome Statute gives States primary jurisdiction over the 
crimes enumerated by article 5, thereby limiting the jurisdiction of the Court to cases where 
States fail to punish those responsible.219  
 
The model of complementarity reflected in article 227 and 228 of the treaty of Versailles and 
common articles of the other peace treaties220 differs from that set out by the Rome Statute. 
The Rome Statute model attempts to balance sovereignty of States and the jurisdiction of the 
court, by limiting the Court’s jurisdiction to only those crimes listed under article 5, and to 
cases where the State fails to prosecute. The peace treaties on the other hand merely provided 
that the Allied Powers would review German and Turkey trials should they find them 
unsatisfactory, they would assume jurisdiction ad prosecute. Germany amended its laws in 
order to be in a good position to prosecute its nationals; this was Germany’s manoeuvre to 
protect its sovereignty. However, under the Rome Statute, States are required to implement 
the Statute’s body of law into their legal systems so that they are in a good position to try the 
crimes enumerated by article 5. Under the Rome Statute, the Court oversees that domestic 
216  See Smith “The Principle of Complementarity in the Origins of Federal Civil Rights Enforcement, 1866-
1871” (2011) 1 at 18. 
217  See M Melandri “The Relationship Between State Sovereignty and the Enforcement of International 
Criminal Law under the Rome Statute (1998): A Complex Interplay”  (2009) 9(3)  Criminal Law Review 531 
at 536. He notes that the act of ratifying the Rome Statute is considered a sovereign act by a state, since it 
affirms its commitment to international criminal justice and gives a supranational judicial body powers to 
supplement any deficiencies in its judicial system.  
218  Kulundu South Africa and the International Criminal Court: Investigation the Link Between 
Complementarity and Implementation (LLM Thesis, Rhodes University, 2005) available at 
eprints.ru.ac.za/view/creators/kulundu=3Akenneth_wanyama=3A=3A.html (Accessed 13 September 2012). 
219 For the Court to seize jurisdiction over the core crimes, the state concerned must have shown an 
unwillingness and/or inability to ‘genuinely’ prosecute. See generally article 17 of the Rome Statute. 
220  See Article 173 of St Germaine; article 154 of Trianon’ article 118 of Nueilly and article226 of Sevres. 
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 courts administer international criminal justice, by intervening, should the State fail to 
adjudicate these crimes genuinely. 
 
The Rome Statute complementarity model also differs from the optional complementarity 
model proposed by the International Law Association, the association proposed a court with 
universal jurisdiction over any individual; however, the State concerned had to have 
consented to an international trial. However, the proposal sought to give willing States an 
opportunity to hold trials nationally before the court could intervene. The Rome Statute model 
does not require State consent for the Court to be able to assert its jurisdiction, if a nation 
State fails to prosecute, the Court, upon finding the State unwilling or unable to genuinely 
prosecute, will assume adjudicative duties. On the other hand, the Association of Penal Law 
complementarity model sought to solve the conflict of jurisdiction cases, the international 
tribunal would supplement lack of jurisdiction in that it had universal jurisdiction, for 
instance, where no state has jurisdiction or a few States have jurisdiction.221  
 
The Rome Statute model has solved the jurisdiction issue, it gives the Court temporal 
jurisdiction and the States have primary jurisdiction, with the Court being the court of last 
resort, where a State that has jurisdiction fails to prosecute. In terms of the 1937 
complementarity model, the proposed international court would be seized with jurisdiction 
where the custodial or territorial State was unwilling to prosecute and refused to extradite the 
suspect. The State had the option of referring the case to the Court. Moreover, the Rome 
Statute model differs from the complementarity model of the ad hoc tribunal’s in that the 
tribunals adopted a strict primacy approach while the Rome Statute adopts a reverse approach, 
which vests prosecutorial prerogatives in the State, unless they show an unwillingness to 
prosecute, in which case the Court would exercise its complementary jurisdiction. 
 
The emergence of complementarity in the modern international law has a different meaning: 
the Rome Statute requires States’ legislative efforts to incorporate the ICC body of law into 
their systems so that they are “able” to prosecute those responsible for serious international 
crimes.222 This differs from the preceding models that compromised international justice for 
221  J Stigen The Relationship Between The International Criminal Court And National Jurisdictions: The 
Principle Of Complementarity (2008) 38. 
222  L Yang “On the Principle of Complementarity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court” 
(2005) 4 Chinese Journal of International Law 121 at 123. 
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 sovereignty of States. The Rome Statute sought to find a compromise between sovereignty 
and a credible international criminal justice system through a number of ways. It did this by 
doing away with the consent requirement; limiting the Court’s jurisdictional reach by giving 
States primary jurisdiction; and by giving the Court the power to trump on State sovereignty 
whenever States failed to honour their duties. The Statute gives the ICC the inherent authority 
to oversee enforcement of International criminal law and at the same time limits, its powers to 
those cases where the State has failed to act according to the ICC’s concept of acceptable 
conduct.  
 
The Rome Statute also requires that before the Court can exercise its jurisdiction the case in 
question must be of sufficient gravity223 making sure the Court does not supplant jurisdiction 
of States but acts in those cases where the State may be politically sympathetic to the 
offender.224 The developments in the transformation of the complementarity principle reflect 
a paradigm shift in the formulation of the principle since its inception in the peace treaties up 
to the Rome Statute. The differing models of the principle each influenced by the political, 
historical, philosophical, practical and legal circumstances of its time have evidenced this. As 
opposed to the preceding models, which tilted the balance towards state sovereignty, the 
Rome Statute model relies on domestic courts to administer the ends of international criminal 
justice, with the ICC stepping in to supplement lack of justice.  
 
Classical notions of sovereignty no longer have a place in international relations and 
international justice is greatly sought after by nations. In the words of the renowned author 
Michael Newton, complementarity reflects the “reality that justice must be rooted in the 
perceptions and perspectives of the domestic population that hosts the victims of the crimes to 
represent an authentic and inherent virtue.”225 The Rome Statute’s principle of 
complementarity was successfully demonstrated in the case of R v. Sec 'y of State for Def226. 
This is a case where the prosecutor deferred to a national judiciary that was willing and able 
to prosecute genuinely.227 The ICC Prosecutor had received communications of alleged 
223  See article 17 of the Rome Statute. 
224  These maybe cases where the offender is a high ranking official. 
225  M Newton “The Complementarity Conundrum: Are We Watching Evolution or Evisceration?” (2010) 8 
Santa Clara Journal of International Law 141. 
226  See generally R v. Sec'y of State for Def., (2007) 3 W.L.R. 33 (H.L.). 
227  The prosecutor did not assert jurisdiction over the cases upon finding the British judiciary system to be in 
line with the Rome Statute complementarity criteria. See Newton 2010 Santa Clara Journal Of International 
Law 138-139. 
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 unlawfully killing and torture or Iraqi civilians by British Soldiers during their occupation in 
Iraq. When the British authorities assumed jurisdiction over the soldiers and continued to try 
them, the ICC did not intervene because the British government acted in accordance with the 
Rome Statute standards and further action by the Court was unwarranted.228  
 
 
2.6 Positive Complementarity: Refining the Rome Statute Traditional Complementarity 
Model? 
The principle of complementarity defines the contours of the ICC-State relationship. Since the 
ICC began its operations, the traditional Rome Statute complementarity model has been 
refined by practice into what is termed ‘positive complementarity’ by legal scholars.229 This, 
it has been argued, was reflected from the Prosecutor’s statement that the number of cases it 
handles need not measure the efficacy of the fledging court but by the absence of such cases, 
which would be indicative of functional domestic judiciaries.230 This is different from the 
model envisioned by the Rome Statute, the traditional Rome Statute complementarity model 
that envisioned the ICC as an inherent authority that will enforce international criminal law, 
by supplementing national courts should they fail to prosecute the most serious crimes of 
international concern. Michael Newton opines that the practice of the Court may signal a 
paradigm shift from the traditional complementarity principle of the Statute that highlighted 
the ICC as the fallback forum that respects the primacy of domestic courts to prosecute and 
punish the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute. This reflected ‘a healthy 
synergy’ between the domestic courts and international processes, to one built on ‘a 
presumption of competition.231 He further argues that if the textual premises of 
complementarity “become the vehicle for superimposing the prosecutorial preferences of the 
Court over the good faith reasoning of domestic officials applying the law of the sovereign, 
the intellectual foundations of the court will have been eviscerated and its long term viability 
severely undermined.”232 
 
228  See Newton 2010 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 140. 
229  W Burke-White “Implementing a Policy of Positive Complementarity in the Rome System of Justice” 
(2008) 19 Criminal Law Forum 59. See also M Newton “Comparative Complementarity: Domestic 
Jurisdiction Consistent with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court” (2001) 167 Military Law 
Review 20. 
230  Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (16 June 2003) available 
at http://www.acc-cpi.int/otp/otp_ceremony.html (accessed 13 September 2012). 
231  See Newton 2010 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 138-139. 
232  Newton 2010 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 138-139 
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 This concern has been raised in some quarters with regard to the cases that the ICC is 
currently investigating. The concern has been that instead of the Court leaving prosecution of 
the core crimes to the jurisdiction of national courts; and only asserting its jurisdiction to 
complement national courts, it is at the front lines and wrests every case it can lay its hands 
on from the jurisdiction of domestic courts. This criticism has been levelled against the court 
in particular, concerning the case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo.233 When the 
ICC issued an arrest warrant against Lubanga, he was already awaiting trial in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
However, when the situation in the Ituri region of the DRC was referred to the ICC, the 
accused was only charged of minor crimes, enlisting and conscripting children soldiers and 
sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment. Some scholars argue that the tension that has taken 
hold in practice between African States and the Court is owing to the court’s arbitrary 
application of the principle of complementarity.234  
 
When the then prosecutor, Mr Luis Moreno-Ocampo, first assumed his duties in 2003, he 
reaffirmed his commitment to a complementarity regime that encouraged national 
prosecutions, with the Court only focussing on high profile cases, that is, cases involving 
people who bear the greatest responsibility for the core crimes.235 He also promised to 
embark on a ‘positive’ approach to cooperation and the principle of complementarity by 
encouraging genuine domestic proceedings, liaison with international and national networks 
and adopting a system that reinforces State cooperation with the Court.236 The prosecutor’s 
commitment to a system that uphold the ideals that underpin complementarity in theory 
would make sure that the Court and national courts existed in a constructive and beneficial 
manner. However, complementarity in practice has not yielded the results envisioned by the 
drafter’s of the Rome Statute. The philosophical, political, historical and practical factors that 
influenced the current model of complementarity seem to have been abandoned in the quest 
for accountability.  
233  The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ICC-01/04-01/06-2941. 
234  See Newton 2010 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 138-139. See also L Keller “The Practice of the 
International Criminal Court: Comments on ‘The Complementarity Conundrum” (2010) 8 Santa Clara 
Journal of International Law 199 at 214.  They argue that the Court’s recent importation of the third 
criterion to the two-tiered test in article 17 only makes it hard for States  to appear willing or able to 
prosecute nationally. 
235  See Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor (September 2003), available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/otp/otp_policy.html (last accessed 27 November 2012). 
236  Address by the Prosecutor to the Third Session of the Assembly of States Parties (6 Sept. 2004), available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/LMO_20040906_En.pdf (last accessed 27 November 2012). 
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As a fledging court, the ICC seems to have abandoned the traditional complementarity model 
that vested prosecutorial prerogatives in States, with the Court only intervening where States 
fail to honour their treaty obligations. This has in part, contributed to the tension that has 
taken hold within the ICC complementarity regime, particularly in the case of Africa. 
Michael Newton argues that this tension has been fermenting since the adopting of the Rome 
Statute, because some of the issues were glossed over during the negotiations in Rome.237 He 
opines that this tension inherent in the Statute has manifested itself through “the politicized 
exploitation of a purported textual constraint designed to prioritize domestic jurisdiction” and 
the natural evolution of a treaty provision which is undertaken with due deference to the 
competing interests of sovereign States and the normative interests that gave rise to the very 
concept of complementarity”.238 
 
The tension inherent in the complementarity provision is finally playing out and practice 
indicates that it will cause a ‘confidence crisis’239 that would undermine the Court’s future 
viability. Cooperation is central to the complementarity regime and without State’s political 
support, the effective operation of the ICC is at stake. If complementarity is used to usurp 
prosecutorial powers of good willing States, by wresting every case from their jurisdiction, 
even when States make every effort to be in line with the Rome Statute’s constitution of 
acceptable legal and judicial status, the principle of complementarity will lose significance 
and the long-term effectiveness of the ICC will be undermined.240 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter put the principle of complementarity in a theoretical perspective, traced its 
evolution in international criminal law and explored its development. This analysis 
discovered that the principle is premised on international principles with the same 
philosophical denominators, for instance, the subsidiarity of international law, the duty of 
States to prosecute international crimes nationally. Four major models of complementarity 
237  See Newton 2001 Military Law Review  23 (noting that “its hasty adoption in the last hours of the Rome 
Conference was warranted despite the fact that the complex substantive interface of treaty provisions was 
never wholly debated or analyzed in depth until after the adoption of the Rome Statute”). 
238  See Newton 2010 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 142. 
239  M Newton 2010 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 122-123. 
240  Complementarity among others, is a guarantee that state’s sovereignty will not be superseded arbitrarily, if 
Member States feel the principle no longer protects their interests, this may undermine the institutional 
foundations of the court and the quest for accountability. See Newton 2010 Santa Clara Journal of 
International Law 142. 
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 were also identified, the first being optional complementarity. This model was based on 
States’ consent to jurisdiction of the Court and voluntary surrender of the State’s criminal 
jurisdiction.241 The second model, discretionary complementarity was only exercised on the 
discretion of the International Military Tribunal judges. This facet of complementarity was 
based on the division of tasks between the national courts and the International Military 
Tribunal. Amendment of Rule 11bis also reversed the strict primacy approach of the ad hoc 
tribunals and introduced a kind of ‘occasional’ complementarity.242 Another model of 
complementarity principle, conditional upon consent by the State, was formulated in the 1994 
International Law Commission’s Draft Convention for the Creation of an International 
Criminal Court243 A comparison of these models reveals overlapping features and shows a 
tentative consensus between the models. The upcoming chapter will critically analyse the 
articles that embody the principle of complementarity and examine the extent to which 
textual deficiencies in article 17 and other shortcomings of the complementarity regime have 
contributed to the tension that has taken hold between States and the ICC in Africa. 
241  El Zeidy The Principle of Complementarity: Origin, Development and Practice (2008) 5. 
242  The amendment gave the prosecutor had powers to refer low and medium cases to national courts, for 
purposes of investigation or prosecution. 
243  See article 35 of the ICL Draft Convention for the International Criminal Court in section 3.1.1 for the 
admissibility criterion. See also footnotes 218, 221 and 224 on the complementarity reflected in the 1994 
ILC Draft. 
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 Chapter Three 
THE ROME STATUTE’S COMPLEMENTARITY REGIME 
3.0 Introduction 
The previous chapter traced the evolution of the principle of complementarity and discussed 
the theoretical framework within which it evolved. The current chapter will discuss the 
admissibility criterion under article 17 of the Rome Statute and identify the flaws therein 
while referring to precedents from other international criminal tribunals. The aim is to put 
into perspective the deeply rooted source of the tension between the ICC and African States 
concerning the interpretation and application of the principle of complementarity in practice. 
A deeper analysis of the interplay between the ICC and national judiciaries, both theoretical 
and practical, remains necessary in the circumstances. To this end, the ICC’s jurisprudence is 
repeatedly drawn on throughout the chapter to provide examples and precedents.  
 
The chapter will also reflect and comment on the salient issues pertaining to the Court’s 
decisions in admissibility challenges and their implications. The chapter will also discuss the 
widely held perceptions about the manner in which the Court has executed its mandate in 
Africa. Furthermore, the chapter will consider the role of regional bodies such as the African 
Union and investigate whether they also have a complementary role. The African Union 
Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice 
and Human Rights will be examined in this regard. This provides a basis for analysing the 
implications of the involvement of these bodies within the ICC regime. This discussion 
should enable the author to explain the tension that has been inherent in the complementarity 
regime. 
 
3.1 The Principle of Complementarity: Rules of Admissibility 
Article 17 of the Rome Statute sets out instances where the ICC may not entertain cases when 
they are being dealt with properly by municipal courts. This criterion requires that national 
judicial systems be competent to deal with the crimes listed in the Statute according to 
international standards. The aim is to ensure accountability and change the culture of 
impunity that has for decades, plagued the international criminal justice system. The criterion 
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 has an in-build “carrot and stick” mechanism that encourages States to prosecute international 
crimes within their judicial systems, or else the ICC will be seized of the matter.244 
3.1.1 The Drafting History of Article 17 
The issue of jurisdictional reach of international tribunals has been a subject of intensive 
negotiations since the idea of an international criminal tribunal was born.245 However, some 
of these issues were glossed over during the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court in Rome 
(hereinafter “the Conference of Plenipotentiaries”).246 Jurisdictional reach and powers of the 
ICC were similarly some of the most contested substantive issues during the Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries.247 The Preparatory Committee used the International Law Association Draft 
Statute for the International Criminal Court (hereinafter the ILC Draft)248 as a basis for the 
Rome Conference, after incorporating numerous proposals and suggestions from States.249  
 
244  See K Kulundu South Africa and the International Criminal Court: Investigating the Link between 
Complementarity and Implementation (LLM Thesis, RU, 2005) IV. 
245  Proposals for the creation of an international criminal tribunal date as far back as after World War I, 
however, the issue of jurisdiction of the proposed tribunal sparked so much controversy that it took decades 
to finally reach a compromise through the complementarity principle in the Rome Statute. 
246  The United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court in Rome (hereinafter “the Conference of Plenipotentiaries”) Rome, Italy- June 15 to July 17, 
1998 was called pursuant to the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions adopted in 1996 and 1997, 
UN Doc. A/RES/51/203; UN Doc. A/RES/52/160. There were divergent views regarding the jurisdiction of 
the ICC, some States, such as Germany suggested that the Court be endowed with universal jurisdiction. On 
the other hand, some delegates’ proposals sought to limit the jurisdiction of the ICC: they suggested that 
States be allowed to opt out of the Court’s jurisdiction. However, to avoid a total collapse of the conference, 
the Bureau adopted a compromise approach by narrowing down the preconditions for the exercise of the 
Court’s jurisdiction and by disallowing any more amendments to the final complementarity provision as it 
represented a “delicate” balance. The Statute was therefore presented on a “take-it-or-leave- it” basis, 
thereby glossing over some of the unresolved issues. See P Kirsch & J Holmes “The Birth of the 
International Criminal Court: The 1998 Rome Conference” in O Bekou and R Cryer The International 
Criminal Court (2004) 35  (pointing out that the chairman of the conference presented the final package with 
a caveat that last minute changes would upset the fine balance). 
247  The United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court in Rome, Italy, June 15 to July 17, 1998. See P Kirsch and J Holmes, “The Birth of the 
International Criminal Court: The 1998 Conference” (1998) 3Canadian Yearbook of International Law  7-8 
and 25. They note that the provisions that embody the principle of complementary and issues of 
admissibility are some of the most controversial and largely contested and carefully crafted parts of the 
Rome Statute. See also SK Lee The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, 
Negotiations, Results (1999) 22. 
248  See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Fifth Session Official Records of 
the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N Doc. A/49/10 (1993) 105; reprinted in 2 
Yearbook of International Law Commission Part 2 UN DOC A/CN./4/SER.A/1994 Add. 1 (1994) 2. 
249  For the consolidated version of the ILC Draft see Report of the Preparatory Committee on Establishment of 
the International Criminal Court Vol 1 (Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee March – April and 
August 1996) United Nations Official Records, Fifty-First Session, Supplements No. 22 and 22A a/51/22 
(1996). 
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 The proposals ranged from those that sought to give the Court universal jurisdiction to those 
that sought to limit the Court’s jurisdiction. For instance, the German delegate suggested that 
the proposed Court be endowed with absolute powers to try the core crimes for which all 
States already had universal jurisdiction under customary international law.250 However, most 
of the proposals sought to limit jurisdictional reach of the court. French and American 
delegates strongly suggested that the Court should only have jurisdiction in specific cases 
where the State with jurisdiction had given its consent, and also that States be allowed to opt 
out of the jurisdiction of the Court for specific crimes.251 The United States advocated for 
mandatory consent of the State of the accused’s nationality before the court could exercise its 
complementary jurisdiction.252 These suggestions were criticized because they would 
undermine the purpose and existence of the Court, instead a case-to-case consent requirement 
was proposed and this was incorporated into Article 35 of the ILC Draft.253 The spirit of 
Article 35 of the ILC Draft was that the proposed international criminal court would have 
250  The German delegate, arguing that the act of ratifying the Rome Statute should have the legal effect of 
giving the ICC power to exercise universal jurisdiction over core crimes, stated that “[U]nder current 
international law, all States may exercise universal criminal jurisdiction concerning acts of genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes, regardless of the nationality of the offender, the nationality of the victims 
and the place where the crime was committed. This means that, in a given case of genocide, crime against 
humanity or war crimes, each and every state can exercise its own national criminal jurisdiction, regardless 
of whether the custodial state, the territorial state or any other state has consented to the exercise of such 
jurisdiction beforehand. This is confirmed by extensive practice [T]here is no reason why the ICC - 
established on the basis of a Treaty concluded by the largest possible number of States - should not be in the 
very same position to exercise universal jurisdiction for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes 
in the same manner as the Contracting Parties themselves. By ratifying the Statute of the ICC, the States 
Parties accept in an official and formal manner that the ICC can also exercise criminal jurisdiction with 
regard to these core crimes.” See Discussion Paper Submitted to the Preparatory Committee by Germany, 
A/AC. 249/1998/DP. 2, 23 March 1998. 
251 The US delegate objected to Germany’s universal jurisdiction proposal, arguing that while the idea of 
universal jurisdiction theoretically sounded like a good step towards international justice, “… it is not a 
principle accepted in the practice of most governments of the world and, if adopted in this statute, would 
erode fundamental principles of treaty law that every government in this room support(s).” Instead, he 
advocated for formal consent of the territorial or nationality State as a precondition to the ICC’s jurisdiction. 
See Statement of the United States on 9 July 1998 in the Committee of the Whole regarding Discussion 
Paper, Bureau, Part 2 (Jurisdiction, Admissibility, and Applicable Law) Committee of the Whole, United 
Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries, Rome Italy, 15 June – 17 July 1998, 
A/CONF.183/C1/L.53 6 July 1998. 
252  See P Kirsch and J Holmes “The Birth of the ICC: The 1998 Rome Conference” (1998) 36 Canadian 
Yearbook of International Law 10. 
253  Article 35 of the ILC Draft was used as a blueprint for Article 17 of the Rome Statute. See Report of the 
International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Fifth Session Official Records of the General 
Assembly, U.N. GAOR 49th Sess., Supp No. 10, U.N Doc. A/49/10 (1993) 105. Article 35 provides: 
“[t]he Court may, on application by the accused or at the request of an interested State at any time 
prior to the commencement of the trial, or of its own motion, decide, having regard to the 
purposes of this statute set out in the Preamble, that a case before it is inadmissible on the ground 
that the crime in question; 
b) is under investigation by a State which has or may have jurisdiction over it, and there is no 
reason for the Court to take any further action for the time being with respect to the crime; or 
c) is not of such gravity to justify further action by the Court.” 
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 jurisdiction to prosecute specific cases only where the proceedings by a State that had 
jurisdiction were either “unavailable” or “ineffective”. The language of the provision was 
heavily criticized for vagueness and subjectivity.254 It was suggested that a more objective 
approach be adopted.255 Other provisions in the draft that dealt with issues of admissibility, 
for instance, article 42 (the ne bis in idem provision), were also to be merged with article 35 
so that it represented a blanket provision for the complementarity doctrine.256 The preamble 
was accordingly amended257 and the words “unable” and “unwilling” replaced “unavailable” 
and “ineffective”.258 
 
Article 35 was also amended to accommodate a more objective test whose main premise was 
that the ICC’s jurisdiction was intended for three situations. These included, cases where the 
State with jurisdiction was unable or unwilling to prosecute genuinely; or where the State had 
investigated the matter but had decided not to prosecute and that decision was influenced by 
an unwillingness or inability to prosecute genuinely.259 This language mimics the London 
International Assembly’s proposal for an international criminal court of 1941, established by 
254  See Report of the Preparatory Committee on Establishment of the International Criminal Court, UN GAOR, 
51st Sess., Vol. 1 Supp. No 22 U.N. Doc A/51/22 (1996). See also M El Zeidy “The Principle of 
Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement International Criminal Law” (2002) 23 Michigan 
Journal of International Law 869 at 897. He notes that some of the delegated felt that the language of the 
preamble was too vague and intrusive, as it was confusing as to what would render proceeding ineffective or 
unavailable. See also J Holmes “The Principle of Complementarity” in SK Lee (ed.) The International 
Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations, Results (1999) 45. 
255  Most of the delegates were not comfortable with the wording of article 35 and found the use of words such 
as “unavailable” and “ineffective” confusing, instead the words “unable” and “unwilling” were inserted. See 
Decisions Taken By The Preparatory Committee At Its Session Held 4 to 15August 1997, U.N. GAOR 52nd 
mtg. U.N. DOC A/AC.249/1997/L.8/Rev. 1 (1997) 11-12. 
256  See Report of the Preparatory Committee on Establishment of the International Criminal Court, UN GAOR, 
51st Sess Vol. 1 Supp. No 22 U.N. Doc A/51/22 (1996) 164. 
257  Before the amendment, the preamble read, "Emphasizing further that such a court is intended to be 
complementary to national criminal justice systems in cases where such trial procedures may not be 
available or may be ineffective"[emphasis added]. See Report of the International Law Commission on the 
Work of its Forty-Fifth Session Official Records of the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR 49th Sess., Supp No. 
10, U.N Doc. A/49/10 (1996) 3. 
258  In essence, the preamble read: “[E]mphasizing further that the international criminal court shall complement 
national criminal justice systems when they are unable or unwilling to fulfill their obligations to bring to trial 
such persons. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Fifth Session 
Official Records of the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR 49th Sess., Supp No. 10, U.N Doc. A/49/10 (1996) 2, 
[emphasis added]. 
259  See Decisions Taken By The Preparatory Committee At Its Session Held 4 to 15August 1997, U.N. GAOR 
52nd mtg. U.N. DOC A/AC.249/1997/L.8/Rev. 1 (1997) 10-11. Article 35 (2) provides: 
 “Having regard to paragraph 3 of the Preamble, the Court shall determine that a case 
is inadmissible where: 
a) the case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the 
State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution;  
b) the case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has 
decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness 
or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute.” 
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 the League of Nations during World War II.260 Article 3 (1) of the London International 
Assembly Draft Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court states that 
“…no case shall be brought before the Court when a domestic court of any of the United 
Nations has jurisdiction to try the accused and it is in a position and willing to exercise such 
jurisdiction.”261 The underlying premise of both provisions is that the international criminal 
court may only have jurisdiction in cases where the State that has jurisdiction is either not in a 
position, that is, unable, or is not willing to prosecute the crimes punishable under the 
respective draft Statutes. 
 
The consolidated version of article 35 of the ILC Draft further laid down the criteria for 
determining unwillingness and inability and the same text features in the Rome Statute’s 
Article 17.262 A careful analysis of the negotiating history of Article 17 shows that the major 
concern of States was arbitrary loss of their sovereignty. Most of them were reluctant to 
relinquish their sovereign rights lest they create a Court with the power to wrest arbitrarily 
cases from their jurisdiction. Eventually, a compromise that both limited the jurisdictional 
reach of the ICC and protected sovereignty of States was ultimately reached to quell States’ 
fears. Thus, a complementarity regimen where national courts of the territorial and national 
States were to be courts of first instance was established, with the International Criminal 
Court only having jurisdiction where the former fails to prosecute, due to unwillingness on 
their part or inability to prosecute genuinely.263 
 
From the foregoing, it is clear that States were resolved to establish an international court that 
would work hand-in-hand with national courts. There were however perennial concerns that 
such a court might supplant domestic jurisdiction as opposed to supplementing it, hence the 
delegates insistence upon limited jurisdiction. It is contended that the making of the ICC 
largely depended on the complementarity compromise adopted at the Conference of 
260  See London International Assembly – Commission II on the Trial of War Criminals TS 26/873 282-3. 
261  See article 3(1) of the Draft Convention for the Creation of the International Criminal Court, London 
International Assembly – Commission II on the Trial of War Criminals TS 26/873 324-325. [Emphasis 
added.] 
262  See article 35 (3), Ibid. Article 35 features word for word in the final draft of the Rome Statute but as article 
17. See Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 
United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, U.N. DOC. A/CONF. 183/2 Add.1(1998). 
263  See generally, article 17 of the Rome Statute  
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 Plenipotentiaries. 264 This approach, on the face of it, also reflects a tiered allocation of duties 
where municipal courts have to prosecute the Rome Statute crimes at first instance, failing 
which the ICC will intervene. Only after determining the basis of decision not to prosecute 
and/or incompetence of national courts to prosecute genuinely, can the ICC entertain the 
case. The ICC therefore has a twofold mandate: to review and assess the expediency of 
national prosecutions and to adjudicate in case they fail to meet the criterion in article 17. It is 
submitted that the ICC’s mandate to be both supervisory and autonomous recalls the need for 
the Court to manage its independence while maintaining its legitimacy as a supervisory 
judicial body in practice. On the other hand, if the ICC were to defer to national courts at 
every instance, this would undermine its integrity, inasmuch as usurping jurisdictional 
discretion and supplanting national jurisdiction will put the future of the Court at stake.  
 
3.1.2 The Admissibility Provision: Article 17 
Article 17 of the Rome Statute is framed in a negative language; it lays down instances in 
which the International Criminal Court may not exercise its complementary jurisdiction.265 
By so doing, the admissibility criteria implements the principle of complementarity as the 
ICC may only assert its jurisdiction where the criteria in article 17 have been met. It provides: 
“1. Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court shall determine that a case is 
inadmissible where:  
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State 
is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution; 
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not 
to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of 
the State genuinely to prosecute; 
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of the complaint, and a 
trial by the Court is not permitted under article 20, paragraph 3; 
(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.  
 
2. In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall consider, having regard to the 
principles of due process recognized by international law, whether one or more of the following exist, 
as applicable: 
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made for the purpose of 
shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court referred to in article 5; 
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the circumstances is inconsistent with 
an intent to bring the person concerned to justice; 
264  See Newton 2001 Military Law Review 47 stating that complementarity played an important role in the 
negotiating history of the Rome Statute because “debate centered not on its merits or appropriateness, but on 
perfecting the most agreeable textual approach that would gain state consensus.” 
265  See article 17 of the Rome Statute. It sets out guidelines for admitting cases before the ICC; the Court may 
only exercise its complementary jurisdiction where the criterion has been met. It provides: “Having regard to 
paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where…”. 
[Emphasis added.] 
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 (c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or impartially, and they were or 
are being conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring 
the person concerned to justice. 
 
3.  In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether, due to a total or 
substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the 
accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.”266 
 
In terms of article 17, a case is inadmissible before the International Criminal Court when it 
has been or is being investigated or prosecuted by a State that has jurisdiction over the matter, 
for instance, the State whose national is the accused in the case concerned.267 The ICC may 
also not have jurisdiction in cases where a State has investigated the matter and has decided 
not to try the accused.268 However, the ICC may exercise its jurisdiction if the State’s decision 
to prosecute or not to prosecute was due to an “unwillingness” or “inability” to prosecute 
genuinely.269 Essentially, the jurisdiction of the ICC is limited by a presumption of 
inadmissibility apparent in the language codified in Article 17. The Court has to satisfy itself 
that a case is not admissible in domestic courts before it asserts its complementary 
jurisdiction. For purposes of this determination of admissibility, the complementarity regime 
has at its core, a two-tiered inquiry; whether a particular State is “in a position,” that is, “able” 
or “unwilling” to genuinely prosecute perpetrators of the crimes proscribed by the Rome 
Statute. This means that even if there has been an investigation or prosecution by a national 
court, it will not foreclose the jurisdiction of the ICC should the Prosecutor find that the State 
was not sincerely resolved to serve justice and try the accused in terms of the Rome Statute. 
 
3.2 Unwillingness to Prosecute Genuinely 
The question of unwillingness is one prong of the dual core admissibility test laid down under 
article 17 of the Rome Statute. In cases where the State has initiated an investigation but has 
decided not to pursue the matter to trial, the ICC Prosecutor has to determine whether the 
decision not to prosecute was made in bad faith. That is, was the decision influenced by 
unwillingness on the part of the authorities to punish the accused. Although the Court’s 
jurisprudence is limited on substantive issues of complementarity, most cases have discussed 
issues of unwillingness in respect of arrest warrants. For instance, in an application for an 
266  See Article 17 of the Rome Statute. 
267  A State may also have jurisdiction over a case because the alleged crimes were committed within its 
territory, thus the territorial jurisdiction model. 
268  See article17 (1) of the Statute. 
269 These notions of “unwillingness’ and “inability” on the part of the state to genuinely prosecute the crimes 
proscribed by the Statute will trigger the ICC’s complementary jurisdiction even if a case has been 
investigated and/or prosecuted if the Prosecutor is convinced that the state concerned was not sincerely 
resolved to administer the ends of justice in good faith. See Article 17 (1) (b) of the Rome Statute. 
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 arrest warrant by the ICC Prosecutor in Prosecutor v Katanga,270 the defence argued that the 
case was inadmissible before the ICC in terms of article 17 (1) (a) of the Rome Statute. 
Katanga argued that conduct that was the subject of the arrest warrant was the same as that 
which the Congolese government had charged him for prior to the referral of the situation to 
the ICC. In this case, the ICC Prosecutor had applied for warrants of arrest against Germain 
Katanga, an alleged commander of the Force de resistance patriotique en Ituri (FPRI). The 
ICC prosecutor made similar applications in the cases of Thomas Lubanga271 and Ngudjolo 
Chiu272. These applications were based on allegations of crimes against humanity (murder, 
sexual slavery and rape) and war crimes (conscripting child soldiers and attacking a civilian 
population destruction of property; pillaging; sexual slavery and rape) having been committed 
by these Congolese nationals in the Ituri region of the country. 
 
The defence submitted that the crimes Katanga was under investigation for in DR Congo 
also covered the Borogo incident relied on in the ICC warrant. It was argued therefore that 
the Trial Chamber should determine whether there were proceedings in the DRC and 
whether these extended to his conduct in Borogo. Moreover, the defence argued that for 
purposes of this inquiry, the Court had to determine whether the same person was being 
investigated for the same conduct as that for which he was investigated in DR Congo.273 It 
was proposed that the Court must do a ‘comprehensive conduct’ inquiry for this 
determination. The prosecution challenged this on the basis that investigations by the DRC 
did not cover the crimes cited in the warrant, allegedly committed by Katanga during an 
attack in the Borogo village.274 The prosecution further argued that the interpretation of the 
‘same conduct’ test adopted by the defence was inconsistent with the spirit of the 
270  See Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Decision on the Evidence and Information Provided by the prosecution 
for the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest for Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-4, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 6 
July 2007. 
271  See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, 
Art. 58, ICC-01/04-01/06-8-US-Corr, 10/02/2006, para. 18, unsealed pursuant to Decision ICC-01/04-01/06-
37 dated 17/03/2006. 
272  See Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the Evidence and Information Provided by the 
Prosecution for the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest for Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-262, Pre-
Trial Chamber I, 6 July 2007. 
273  See Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Reasons for the Oral Decision on the 
Motion Challenging the Admissibility of the Case (Article 19 of the Statute), ICC-01/04-01/07-1213, Trial 
Chamber II, 16 June 2009.at paras 11-12. 
274  Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo, Public Redacted Version of the 19thMarch 2009 Prosecution 
Response to Motion Challenging the Admissibility of the Case by the Defence of Germain Katanga pursuant 
to Article 19(2)(a), ICC-01/04-01/07-1007 (30 March 2009) para 109-110. 
65 
 
                                                            
 admissibility test as it was subjective.275 The Trial Chamber held that the case was 
admissible because the DR Congo government was unwilling to investigate or prosecute 
Katanga in respect of his conduct in Borogo. His argument that the investigations against 
him were all embracing and inclusive of the attack in Borogo was dismissed. It is interesting 
that the DRC confirmed their unwillingness to prosecute Katanga in this regard through a 
concession that the suspect was never investigated in relation to Borogo.276 Based on this the 
Trial Chamber stated that: 
“When, as in the present case, the existence of national proceedings is the sole reason for a possible 
finding of inadmissibility, it is a conditio sine qua non for such a finding that national proceedings 
encompass both the person and the conduct which is the subject of the case before the Court”277 
 
It should be noted that in this case the Trial Chamber did not venture into the ability prong of 
the admissibility test. However, it is quite intriguing that the issue of inactivity was never 
brought into question when the government’s reason for referring the cases to the ICC was an 
inability to apprehend the suspects. Instead, this issue was mentioned in the Appeal 
Chamber’s decision, which seems to suggest that once there is evidence of domestic 
inactivity, inability is no longer in question.278 Article 17 requires the ICC to weigh the 
admissibility of the case not only on unwillingness or inability to prosecute but also on other 
factors despite the existence of domestic proceedings. Assuming that a State is ‘unable’ to 
prosecute merely because there have been no investigatory or prosecutorial efforts at the time 
the ICC asserted its jurisdiction is, to say the least, arbitrary decision making regarding the 
State’s inability to prosecute.279 It follows from the Court’s approach however, that a State 
referral may be interpreted as a gesture of unwillingness to prosecute on the part of the State, 
275  The prosecution argued that States sought to make the ‘same conduct’ test as objective as possible and that 
adopting the ‘comprehensive conduct’ proposed by the defence would upset the objectivity of the test and 
would lead to inconsistencies. In fact, the unwillingness criterion was reworked at the Rome Conference 
during the negotiations in order to do away with the subjectivity because states feared that a subjective test 
would lead to inconsistencies. See J Holmes “The Principle of Complementarity” in SK Lee (ed.) The 
International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations, Results (1999) 45 
(noting that most delegates feared that the wording of this provision was too subjective and broad in its 
scope and therefore confusing). 
276  See Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo, Transcript of Hearing of 1 June 2009, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-65-
ENG ET, at 78, lines 11–19; at 79, lines 18–21; at 81, lines 4–7; at 85, line 1–86, line 3; at 93, lines 14–16; 
at 94, line 12. 
277  See Decision on the Evidence and Information provided by the Prosecution for the Issuance of a Warrant of 
Arrest for Germain Katanga ICC-01/04-01/07-4 para 19. 
278  See Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 
June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case, ICC-01/04-01/07-1497 25-09-2009 2/44 IO T OA8, 25 
September 2009, para 2 (”Inaction on the part of a State having jurisdiction (that is, the fact that a State is 
not investigating or prosecuting, or has not done so) renders a case admissible before the Court, subject to 
article 17 (1) (d) of the Statute”).  
279  The Rome Statute envisages a situation of inability as where due to total or substantial collapse of the 
judicial system, the State cannot apprehend the accused, collect evidence or carry out the proceedings.. 
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 more so where the proceedings have begun but have not been concluded.280 What is also 
interesting from the Trial Chamber’s decision is that it has exported another criterion of 
unwillingness not envisaged by article 17(1) (a), a State Party referral. The Chamber stated 
that a State may be deemed unwilling to prosecute where it “chooses not to investigate or 
prosecute a person before its own courts, but has nevertheless every intention of seeing that 
justice is done” and has accordingly referred the case to the ICC.281  
 
It is submitted that it is insufficient to make these decisions based on one prong of the 
admissibility test, because the unwillingness of a State to prosecute does not mean it is also 
unable to prosecute. Before the Court seizes itself of a matter, it should be satisfied on all 
accounts that the case is admissible before it, particularly where the accused and not the 
State, challenges admissibility. In essence, the proper construction of the admissibility criteria 
and the Rome Statute as a whole requires that the ICC ensure that all factors laid down in 
article 17 have been considered before the Court intervenes. These, it will be argued later, is 
the spirit of the complementarity regime, that the ICC be the court of last resort and only 
intervene where States have failed to act accordingly.282 
 
Furthermore, a national justice system may be said to be unwilling to prosecute genuinely 
where it initiates investigation and/or prosecution yet the proceedings are inconsistent with 
the intention to punish the perpetrator. For instance, where the State holds a mock trial or 
where the proceedings are ongoing but there has been a substantially long and unexplained 
280  See Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07OA 8, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. 
Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the 
Case (Sept. 25, 2009), available at http'/www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc746819.pdf (accessed 12 August 
2013). The Trial Chamber held at paragraph 77 that there are two forms of ‘unwillingness’. The first 
instance is due to the State’s intention to obstruct justice. In this case, the chamber envisioned a case where a 
State initiates proceedings which are inconsistent with the intention to bring the perpetrator to justice, for 
instance, holding sham trials or unjustified long delays in bringing the person in concluding the trial. The 
Trial Chamber also found that a self-referral is also another form of unwillingness. The Chamber noted that a 
State may be willing to bring the accused to justice but not willing to prosecute him within its national 
courts, and opt to refer the case to the ICC instead. Because of this, the Trial Chamber held that the DRC’s 
referral of the Katanga case to the ICC, ‘acquiescing his surrender to the Court’ and the government’s failure 
to challenge the admissibility of the case clearly demonstrated its unwillingness to try him nationally. See 
also A Senier “Introductory Note to the International Criminal Court: Prosecutor v Katanga and Chui” 
(2010) 49 International Legal Materials 45 at 46. 
281 See Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo, Reasons for the Oral Decision on the Motion Challenging the 
Admissibility of the Case (Article 19 of the Statute), ICC-01/04-01/07-1213-tENG, 16 June 2009 para 77. 
282 See M El Zeidy “The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement International Criminal 
Law” (2001-2002) 23 Michigan Journal of International Law 869 at 898 (noting that the Prosecutor in his 
assessment whether a case is or would be admissible, should prove, on the one hand, that the State which is 
investigating the case is unwilling or unable to prosecute, and on the other hand that the case is of the 
requisite gravity to warrant action by the Court).  
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 delay. In this case, the matter is pursued even up to the trial stage just so the State ‘appears’ to 
be administering justice while the idea is to protect the perpetrator from possible prosecution 
by another forum, particularly the ICC. These proceedings are some kind of a veil; since the 
accused appears to have been ‘tried’ by his State, it bars further prosecution by another forum, 
even if he was exonerated of all charges.283 However, the regime established by article 17 
attempts to offset impunity through complementary jurisdiction should evidence prove that 
national proceedings were phony. 
 
3.2.1 Shielding the Perpetrator from Justice: Sham Trials 
On the other hand, domestic authorities may be deemed unwilling to punish the perpetrator 
and feigning a trial where the proceedings against the person in question are inconsistent with 
an intention to administer justice, but rather seek to protect the accused from trial by an 
impartial judicial body such as the ICC. The shielding of a perpetrator from justice may 
manifest itself in “sham” trials. A sham trial occurs when a State decides to prosecute with the 
intention to exonerate the accused, but initiates proceedings just to bar the ICC or any other 
State with jurisdiction and political will to prosecute from exercising jurisdiction over the 
matter. In order for the Prosecutor to determine that the proceedings against a certain 
perpetrator were in bad faith, s/he has to inquire whether they conform to “internationally 
established principles of due process”, and investigate whether they were impartial and 
independent.284  
 
An independent and/or impartial judiciary is one whose judges are free from political 
influence and decisions not influenced by any other organ of the State. Internationally 
established principles of due process advocate a fair trial, judicial autonomy and unbiased 
application of the law. Therefore, if the Prosecutor finds that the proceedings were biased 
towards shielding the perpetrator, the case will be admissible before the ICC. Failure by 
283 The double jeopardy rule (the ne bis in idem rule under article 20(3) of the Rome Statute) protects an accused 
from being tried more than once for the same conduct. Therefore, if an accused has been tried for the crimes 
punishable under the Rome Statute municipally, a case against him for the same conduct is inadmissible 
before the ICC in terms of article 17(1) (c) and article 20(3), unless of course there is evidence to the effect 
that prior proceedings were a sham, in which case the case would be admissible. 
284 See W Schabas An Introduction to the International Criminal Court 4 ed. (2011) 86, he notes that article 
requires the Prosecutor to assess the quality of justice done by national courts, substantively and 
procedurally before he finds them unwilling to genuinely prosecute. See also Rule 51 ICC Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, UN Doc. PCNICC/2000/Add.1 (2000) (it provides: “the Court may consider, inter 
alia, information that the state…may choose to bring to the attention of the Court showing that its courts 
meet internationally recognized norms and standards for the independent and impartial prosecution of 
similar conduct”). 
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 domestic authorities to follow recognised standards of a fair trial will render a State unwilling 
to prosecute the accused genuinely, as will an unreasonably long delay in the proceedings. 
The concept of a fair trial also requires that an accused be afforded a speedy trial. Therefore, it 
follows that an unjustified delay in the proceedings, which also goes against the due process 
thesis, renders a case admissible before the ICC. 
 
It follows from the foregoing that failure to afford the accused a fair trial renders a case 
admissible before the Court. However, considering the hateful nature of conflicts in Africa, a 
factor that makes most African criminal justice systems appear uneven-handed, especially in 
those States that have experienced conflicts serious enough to attract the Court’s attention, it 
is unlikely that the Court will find the proceedings therein “fair” or independent.285 There is 
always a possibility of domestic authorities having to prosecute a fellow or rival ethnicity or 
political party war criminal. It is understood that chances of the proceedings being fair are 
bleak in such instances. 
 
3.2.2. Unjustified Delay 
A national judicial system may also be regarded as unwilling to prosecute genuinely where 
there has been an unexplained and long delay in bringing the perpetrator to justice.286 Article 
17 does not specify what exactly constitutes unjustified delay but this may be interpreted as 
when a State has taken an unreasonably long and unexplained delay to prosecute.287 It is 
because of this lacuna that the author submits that in the absence of a standard prescription 
period for investigation or prosecution, the Court’s decision as to unwillingness or otherwise 
of a State to prosecute based on an unjustified delay is rather flawed.288 This leaves the issue 
of timely prosecutions open to broad and possibly diverse interpretations. Due to differing 
285  Primacy of the ad hoc tribunals’ primary jurisdiction was in part based on fear of the domestic courts’ 
possible partiality in the proceedings in the ICTY and ICTR due to antagonism among the Croats, Serbs and 
Muslims on the one and between the Tutsis and the Hutus on the other. 
286  See Article 17 (2) (2). 
287  An “unreasonably long and unexplained delay” in domestic proceedings was hailed as confusing at the 
Rome Conference during the negotiations and an “unjustified delay” was used instead. However, it is still 
not clear how much time is unjustifiably long in order for a state to be said to be unwilling to prosecute, 
given the differing legal system party to the complementarity regime. 
288 The ICC is the sole arbiter in cases of admissibility and states genuineness to prosecute. Article 119 also 
gives the ICC power to rule out any dispute concerning its judicial functions. The fact that the Court 
exercises both a supervisory and restraint role expands the Court’s reach. The dual capacity of the Court is 
gives the ICC arbitrary review powers over national judicial systems and threatens national sovereignty of 
states. See J Gurule “United States Opposition to the 1998 Rome Statute Establishing an International 
Criminal Court: Is the Court’s Jurisdiction Truly Complementary to National Criminal Jurisdictions?” 
(2002) 35 Cornell International Law Review 2. 
69 
 
                                                            
 legal systems, some delays may be justified within other States legal systems. It is therefore 
important that the OTP liaises with States and come up with a period so that it is clear that a 
State that has not initiated any proceedings within that time is unwilling to prosecute. 
 
However, in light of recent developments regarding the admissibility criterion, before 
inquiries are made into unwillingness or otherwise of a State to prosecute, the existence of 
national proceedings should be established. The ICC’s jurisprudence has brought about 
interesting developments. Precedence has been set to the effect that before an inquiry can be 
made into the unwillingness or inability to prosecute genuinely, it should be determined first 
whether there were actually any proceedings, be it investigatory or prosecutorial efforts at the 
national level. This in essence, is in line with article 17 (1) (a) which provides that a case is 
inadmissible before the ICC when “it is being investigated or prosecuted by a State with 
jurisdiction over it.” This was clearly articulated by the Appeals Chamber’s decision in 
Prosecutor v Katanga: 
“In considering whether a case is inadmissible under article 17(1)(a) and (b) of the Statute, the initial 
questions to ask are (1) whether there are on-going investigations or prosecutions, or (2) whether there 
have been investigations in the past, and the State having jurisdiction has decided not to prosecute the 
person concerned. It is only when the answers to these questions are in the affirmative that one has to 
look to the second halves of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) and to examine the question of unwillingness and 
inability. To do otherwise would be to put the cart before the horse. It follows that in case of inaction, the 
question of unwillingness or inability does not arise; inaction on the part of a State having jurisdiction 
(that is, the fact that a State is not investigating or prosecuting, or has not done so) renders a case 
admissible before the Court, subject to article 17(1) (d) of the Statute.”289 
 
The Appeals Chamber’s decision that a case is admissible before the ICC if and when there 
have not been any proceedings in national courts pertaining to a certain case  is, arguably, 
based on the presumption that absence of adjudicative action indicates the State’s 
unwillingness or inability to prosecute and as such, renders the  case admissible before the 
ICC.290 Similarly, as argued above, when the Ugandan and Congolese governments referred 
their respective situations to the ICC under article 14 of the Rome Statute, the Court did not 
289  Prosecutor v Katanga (Judgment on the Appeal against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 
2009 on the Admissibility of the Case) (ICC, Appeals Chamber, Case No ICC-01/04-01/07-1497, 25 
September 2009) at 78. 
290  See T Hansen “A Critical Review of the ICC’s Recent Practice Concerning Admissibility Challenges and 
Complementarity” (2010) 13 Melbourne Journal of International Law 217 at 218 (stating that 
“inactivity…automatically renders a case admissible before the Court”). [Emphasis added]. See also N 
Jurdi, ‘Some Lessons on Complementarity for the International Criminal Court Review Conference’ (2009) 
34 South African Yearbook of International Law 28 at 29-30. He notes that it follows from the Court’s 
jurisprudence that “once national courts fail to take any action or are unwilling or unable to conduct 
investigations and prosecutions … the ICC will find the situation admissible”. 
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 sua sponte venture into the unwillingness criterion.291 The Court’s interpretation of self- 
referrals: that they constitute inability on the part of each government to prosecute is 
inconsistent with article 17.292 Pre-trial Chamber II applied the same two-phased test laid 
down in Katanga in Prosecutor v Muthaura293 and Prosecutor v Ruto294. In these cases the 
Kenya government sought to challenge the admissibility of cases before the ICC against three 
Kenyan officials on 31 March 2011, pursuant to article 19(2)(b), arguing that  proceedings 
against them were already under way in Kenyan Courts.295 Pre-trial Chamber II reiterated that 
the question of whether the State is “unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the 
investigation or prosecution” only becomes relevant after determining the existence or not of 
proceedings in the national courts.  
 
The Pre-Trial chamber further dismissed the requirement of genuineness of the investigation 
as not being significant at this stage, stating that when assessing whether the State is indeed 
investigating, “the genuineness of the investigation is not at issue; what is at issue is whether 
there are investigative steps.”296 It is worth noting that although the Pre Trial Chamber relied 
on the dictum in Katanga, circumstances of these cases were largely different. In Katanga, the 
accused challenged the admissibility of his case even though his State, the DRC had referred 
it to the ICC claiming an inability to prosecute.297  
 
291  Article19 (1) provides that before the ICC asserts its jurisdiction , even in the absence of admissibility 
challenges by any party, the Pre Trial Chamber may determine the admissibility of the case against the 
criteria set out by article 17 of the Statute. 
292  See Hansen 2010 Melbourne Journal of International Law 222. He opines that the ICC in an attempt to 
avoid dealing with the sensitive unwillingness test decided that both cases were admissible due to an 
inability to prosecute. The Democratic Republic of Congo referred their situation to the ICC pursuant to 
article 14 of the Rome Statute (State Party referral) through a letter addressed to the Prosecutor. See Press 
Release, ICC, Prosecutor Receives Referral of the Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Apr. 19, 
2004), available at http://www.icc-cpl.int/press/pressreleases/19.html. (Accessed 15 June 2013). The 
Ugandan government also referred the situation in Uganda to the ICC Prosecutor. See Press Release, ICC, 
President of Uganda Refers Situation Concerning the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC (Jan. 29, 
2004), available at http://www.icccpl.int/pressrelease_details&id=16&l=en.html. (Accessed 15 June 2013).  
293  See Prosecutor v Muthaura (Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the 
Admissibility of the Case pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute) (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Case No 
ICC-01/09-02/11-96, 30 May 2011) [44]. 
294  See Prosecutor v Ruto (Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the 
Admissibility of the Case pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute) (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Case No 
ICC-01/09-02/11-101, 30 May 2011) [48]. 
295  Prosecutor v Muthaura Appeal 40 and Prosecutor v Ruto Appeal 41. 
296  See Prosecutor v Muthaura Appeal (ICC, Appeals Chamber, Case No ICC-01/09-02/11-274, 30 August 
2011) 40; Prosecutor v Ruto Appeal (ICC, Appeals Chamber, Case No ICC-01/09-01/11 -307, 30 August 
2011) 41. 
297  The DR Congo, in its letter of referral to the PTC claimed that it was unable to apprehend the suspect.  
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 On the other hand, in Ruto and Muthaura the basis of the admissibility challenge was from a 
State that claimed that it was willing and able to prosecute its nationals. The main argument 
was that Kenya could not be held to be unwilling or unable to prosecute because 
investigations into the named suspects’ criminal conduct were already under way in 
Kenya.298 The government claimed that necessary preliminary steps towards investigation 
and prosecution of those who had a hand in the 2007 post-election violence that engulfed 
their country, including those identified as suspects by the ICC, were being undertaken and 
that these constituted “existing national proceedings”.299 In support of this “investigatory 
action” argument, evidence of constitutional and judicial reforms was presented.300 
 
Over and above this, the Kenyan government undertook to complete all the cases against the 
named suspects by September 2011 and to keep the Court abreast with the developments.301 
Pre-Trial Chamber II found that although Kenya’s express will to investigate was a good 
sign, there was a “situation of inaction” evident from the government’s contradictory 
accounts regarding the existence of national proceedings. The Chamber also stated that there 
should actually be on-going national proceedings (concrete evidence of such steps) as 
opposed to intended future investigations.302 Similarly, the DRC in Katanga led evidence 
proving their investigation did not extend to the attack he orchestrated against civilians in 
Bogoro, in the Ituri Province of the DRC, on which the ICC arrest warrant was based.303 
This, it is argued, is evidence of a State that was aware of, but failed due to unwillingness or 
otherwise, to genuinely investigate. This differs from a government that implies that it is 
“willing” and “able” to prosecute and that it was in the process of investigating. This 
according to article 17(1) (a) would render the cases inadmissible before the ICC since they 
were “being investigated by a State with jurisdiction”.  
 
298  See Prosecutor v Muthaura and Prosecutor v Ruto in n49 above. 
299  These steps were the enactment of the new constitution in 2010 in terms of which all ratified treaties 
automatically form part Kenyan legislation; and the setting up of the War Crimes Division of the High 
Court. 
300  The Government referred to the recent enactment of the new Kenyan Constitution as evidence of legal 
reform putting it in a position to satisfactorily try the crimes listed under the Rome Statute. 
301  Ruto Admissibility Challenge (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Case No ICC-01/09-01/11-19, 31 March 2011) 
13. 
302  See the Chambers comments on evidence of inactivity in Muthaura Pre-Trial (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 
Case No ICC-01/09-02/11-96, 30 May 2011) 59; Ruto Pre-Trial (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Case No ICC-
01/09-02/11-101, 30 May 2011) 63-64. Pre-Trial Chamber II noted that the fact that the Kenyan government 
failed to submit reports to prove the existence of ongoing investigations into the cases already before the 
Court is not convincing that there may be on-going proceedings. 
303  Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-0 1/04-01/07-949 19. 
72 
 
                                                            
 The Defence in Katanga argued that the overzealous Prosecutor has eroded the principle of 
complementarity. Moreover, it contended that the current interpretation of the concept of 
complementarity by the ICC does not uphold the ideals and theories that underpin the 
principle, in that: 
 “[It] negates the concerns raised by States at the Rome Conference, defeats the principle’s 
object and purpose and turns it on its head; the current regime -as developed by the Court’s 
early practice . . . is de iure one of complementarity, but de facto is nothing less than primacy 
of the ICC over national courts.”304  
 
This raises the important question: what is the threshold for evidence of investigatory action 
at the national level?  
 
In an appeal against the Trial Chamber’s decision to dismiss Kenya’s application, the Appeals 
Chamber held that in order for a case to be inadmissible before the ICC, “the national 
investigation must cover the same individual and substantially the same conduct as alleged in 
the proceedings before the Court.”305 The Appeals Chamber dismissed Kenya’s argument that 
the cases were not admissible before the ICC because they involved “suspects at the same 
hierarchical level” as those being investigated in Kenya. The Trial Chamber further noted 
that: “[a]t this stage of the proceedings, where summonses to appear have been issued, the 
question is no longer whether suspects at the same hierarchical level are being investigated by 
Kenya, but whether the same suspects are the subject of investigation by both jurisdictions for 
substantially the same conduct.”306 
 
The Appeals Chamber also held that although there was evidence that some instructions were 
issued for investigations into the same crimes being investigated by the ICC, the Kenyan 
Government failed to provide it with concrete information “about the asserted, current 
304  See Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-0 1/04-01/07-949, Motion Challenging Admissibility of the Case 
by the Defence of Germain Katanga, pursuant to Article 19(2) (a) of the Statute, article 53 (Mar. 11, 2009) at 
19. See also Linda Keller “The Practice of the International Criminal Court: Comments on ‘The 
Complementarity Conundrum” (2010) 8 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 199 at 214 (noting that 
“The ICC practice to date can be interpreted to support … [the] contention that the ICC is undermining 
complementarity via a rigid interpretation of State action on the same case. In particular, it seems 
problematic that states conducting wide-ranging investigations into war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
and genocide might be required to include the specific enumerated act that would be chosen by the 
Prosecutor and/or confirmed by the PTC.”). 
305  See Muthaura Appeal (ICC, Appeals Chamber, Case No ICC-01/09-02/11-274, 30 August 2011) 39; Ruto 
Appeal (ICC, Appeals Chamber, Case No ICC-01/09-01/11-307, 30 August 2011) 40. 
306  See (ICC, Appeals Chamber, Case No ICC-01/09-02/11-274, 30 August 2011) 41; (ICC, Appeals Chamber, 
Case No ICC-01/09-01/11-307, 30 August 2011) 42. 
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 investigative steps undertaken.”307 The Appeals Chamber accordingly dismissed Kenya’s 
claim that State Parties’ statements must be respected and presumed to be “accurate and made 
in good faith unless there is compelling evidence to the contrary.”308 The Chamber held that 
instead of this rather subjective test suggested by Kenya, the State concerned should submit 
concrete and specific evidence to demonstrate that indeed they are investigating or 
prosecuting the case(s) before the ICC.309 Hansel Thomas is of the view that the required 
“probative and significant actions” by national authorities comprise police statements 
indicating the time and place and when they visited the crime scene; witnesses if any have 
been identified; and proof that domestic authorities have already interviewed the suspects.310 
It follows therefore that the Kenyan government failed to meet the threshold for existing 
proceedings since no concrete and specific information was furnished to prove that, among 
others, the accused had been interviewed or a list of identified witnesses. It may also be 
implied from the Court’s decision that failure to prove existence of ongoing investigations, in 
the form of police statements and perhaps forensic evidence a year or more after the crimes 
were committed, is indicative of the State’s unwillingness to prosecute. 
 
In Prosecutor v Lubanga,311 the Court adopted a different approach to solve the issue of 
existence of national proceedings. This case involved an application by the ICC Prosecutor 
for a warrant of arrest against Congolese national Thomas Lubanga Dyilo for war crimes and 
several counts of conscripting child soldiers. The defence challenged the admissibility of this 
case before the ICC arguing that it under investigation in a State with jurisdiction. Lubanga 
was in custody in the DRC for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide when the 
DRC government referred his case to the ICC. The Prosecutor argued that the subject of 
307  See Muthaura Appeal and Ruto Appeal paragraphs 60 and 64 respectively. The Appeals Chamber further 
stated that for a State to proof that a case is inadmissible before the ICC, it should furnish ‘evidence of a 
sufficient degree of specificity and probative value that demonstrates that it is indeed investigating the case’ 
and that “it is not sufficient merely to assert that investigations are ongoing”. See Muthaura Appeal (ICC, 
Appeals Chamber, Case No ICC-01/09-02/11-274, 30 August 2011) 61; Ruto Appeal (ICC, Appeals 
Chamber, Case No ICC-01/09-01/11 -307, 30 August 2011) 62. 
308  Muthaura Appeal (ICC, Appeals Chamber, Case No ICC-01/09-02/11-274, 30 August 2011) 62, quoting 
Prosecutor v Muthaura (Document in Support of the ‘Appeal of the Government of Kenya against the 
Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case pursuant 
to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute’) (ICC, Appeals Chamber, Case No ICC-01/09-02/11-130, 20 June 2011) 6, 
8 (‘Kenya’s Document in Support of Appeal  Application’); Ruto Appeal (ICC, Appeals Chamber, Case No 
ICC-01/09-01/11-307, 30 August 2011) 63. 
309  See Hansen 2010 Melbourne Journal of International Law 227 (he notes that this may comprise “police 
reports attesting to the time and location of visits to crime scenes and documentation demonstrating that 
witnesses and the (ICC) suspects have been interviewed by the authorities”). 
310  See Hansen 2010 Melbourne Journal of International Law 227. 
311  See Lubanga Arrest Warrant (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No ICC-01/04-01/06-8-US-Corr, 10 February 
2006). 
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 criminal investigation or prosecution must be the same – that, the proceedings must be 
against the same person and for the same criminal conduct for a case to be inadmissible 
before the ICC. Based on the foregoing, the prosecution argued that the case was admissible 
before the Court since the accused was not in custody in the DRC in respect of the crimes for 
which he was charged under the ICC warrant. Applying the “same person, same conduct” 
test, Pre-trial Chamber I stated that the threshold for assessing the existence of investigatory 
and prosecutorial activities at the national level, is whether the proceedings in the national 
courts involve the same person and the same conduct that is the subject of an ICC 
investigation.312  
 
Although these developments will help clarify certain aspects of the admissibility criterion, 
the importation of the stringent “same person same conduct” test renders the criterion too 
technical. The requirement that the charges and conduct alleged in a domestic court be 
significantly similar to that alleged by the Court makes it even harder for States to prosecute 
nationally. This is geared towards the ICC finding States unwilling to prosecute, as it requires 
States to have thoroughly investigated and charged similar conduct of which the accused is 
charged before the ICC, even if the accused was charged of far more serious crimes before 
national courts, as was the case in Prosecutor v Lubanga.313 On the other hand, a State may 
also be deemed unwilling to serve justice where the proceedings are not conducted 
“independently or impartially”.314 Additionally, if the ICC determines whether the 
proceedings before national courts are not independent or impartial, that is, if there are 
irregularities or unfairness in the proceedings to the detriment of the accused person; or if 
national courts cannot effectively administer justice due to an interest in the outcome of the 
proceedings,315 the ICC will take over.316  
312  See Lubanga Arrest Warrant (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No ICC-01/04-01/06-8-US-Corr, 10 February 
2006) 31. 
313  See Lubanga Arrest Warrant (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No ICC-01/04-01/06-8-US-Corr, 10 February 
2006) 31. 
314  This was one of the reasons for investing absolute jurisdictional powers in the predecessors of the ICC, the 
(ad hoc) International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) respectively. They had primary jurisdiction over national judiciaries because it 
became apparent that national courts would be unwilling to bring criminals to book or that the courts would 
have been bias owing to the nature of the conflict. See also A Cassese International Criminal Law (2003) 
349. 
315  In this case, it is argued, such an interest would be shielding the accused from criminal responsibility despite 
there being extenuating circumstances. Article 17(2) (c) seems to envision a situation where local 
proceedings are insincere because they are being carried out in a manner that in inconsistent with an 
intention to administer justice. 
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3.2.3 Independence and Impartiality of Proceedings 
The admissibility criterion in article 17 (2) (c) properly requires a fair and impartial trial. 
Article 17 provides that a case is admissible before the ICC where a State that has jurisdiction 
over the case has or is prosecuting but the proceedings are not independent or impartial. 
Guarantees of an independent and/or an impartial tribunal are principles of due process 
recognised by both domestic and international law.317 Due process requires that the accused 
be considered innocent until proven guilty and be afforded a fair trial. The notions of judicial 
independence and/or impartiality are codified by most national and international judicial 
systems, and constitute legal standards of every judicial body.318 These notions derive from 
the doctrine of separation of powers advocated by the French philosopher Montesquieu in 
L’Espirit des Lois.319 Montesquieu’s doctrine of separation of powers advocated for an 
independent judiciary, separate and free from influence of other arms of government, the 
legislature and the executive. He cautioned that a judicial system that is not insulated from 
political influence exposes the life and liberty of its subjects to arbitrary control.320 
 
An independent judiciary has the following characteristics: it is not subordinate to any organ 
of State and its judgements are predictable because they are based on legal precedent.321 An 
impartial tribunal on the other hand is one that is not biased in favour of either side.322 Legal 
scholarship in this area is divided as to whether impartiality and independence are similar 
notions.323 Koslosky distinguishes between the two, arguing that judicial independence, as 
316  The rationale for the strict primacy of the ad hoc tribunals, the ICTR and the ICTY was that due to the nature 
of the conflicts in the respective regions, it was believed that proceedings before national courts would be 
compromised as the conflicts emanated from tribal wars and ethnic cleansing.  
317  B Francois-Xavier “The Right to an Independent and Impartial Tribunal: A Comparative Study of the 
Namibian Judiciary and International Judges” (2008) The Independence of the Namibian Judiciary 243 at 
247. 
318  See A Cassese International Criminal Law (2003) 393-394 (noting that the requirement of an independent 
and impartial trial constitutes a general principle of law and gives rise to the most fundamental human 
rights). International Human Rights Instruments also advocate for independence and impartiality of 
adjudicative bodies as basic human rights. See Article 14 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR); Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); Article 8(1) 
of the American Convention of Human Rights (ACHR). 
319  C S Montesquieu L’Esprit des Lois Book XI chapter 6 (1748). 
320  See Montesquieu L’Esprit des Lois Book XI chapter 6 (1748). 
321  See T Meron “Judicial Independence and Impartiality In International Criminal Tribunals” (2005) 99 The 
American Journal of International Law 359 (noting that “when judges are independent and act in accordance 
with the law, their decisions have a certain predictability, because they are based on existing law, judicial 
precedent, and the unbiased application of that law to the facts at issue”). 
322  Francois-Xavier 2008 The Independence of the Namibian Judiciary 247. 
323  See DR Koslosky “Towards an Interpretative Model of Judicial Independence: A Case Study of Eastern 
Europe” University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law (2009-2010) 31 203 at 226-227; Francois-
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 opposed to impartiality, which is more concerned with the transparency of the judicial 
process and reasoned judgements, is concerned with the de facto operation of the court.324 
Legal precedent also distinguishes between independence and impartiality of a judicial 
tribunal. The Canadian Supreme Court in R v Valente325 noted that that judicial independence 
and impartiality are closely related, but that they are separate and distinct requirements: 
“Specifically, impartiality refers to a state of mind or attitude of the tribunal in relation to the issues and 
the parties in a particular case. The word “independent”, however, connotes not only the state of mind or 
attitude in the actual exercise of the judicial functions, but a status or relationship with others, 
particularly to the Executive Branch of government, that rests on the objective conditions or 
guarantees.”326 
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) also held in Prosecutor v 
Kanyabashi that “judicial independence connotes freedom from external pressures and 
interference” while impartiality on the other hand is characterised by “objectivity in 
balancing the legitimate interests at play.”327 In the same vein, the European Court of Human 
Rights held in Findlay v United Kingdom328 that the two notions are closely linked and 
should be considered together as they are related. 
 
Notions of independence and impartiality of the judiciary are deeply rooted in procedural 
guarantees embodied in constitutions and statutes of different jurisdictions and international 
conventions. These guarantees include the appointment and selection of judges and security 
of tenure; checks and balances that filter out bias329, for instance, multi-judge panels330; and 
Xavier 2008 The Independence of the Namibian Judiciary 248. See also R v Valente [1985] SCR 673, 23 
CCC 3d 193 (Can. 1985) and Prosecutor v Kanyabashi ICTR-96-15-A, Appeal Chamber, 3 June 1999, 
Decision on the Defence Motion for the interlocutory appeal on the Jurisdiction of Trial Chamber I, Joint 
and Separate Opinions by Judge MacDonald and Judge Vohrah, para. 35. 
324  See Koslosky University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 2009-2010 226-227. See also 
Francois-Xavier 2008 The Independence of the Namibian Judiciary 248 noting that impartiality is wider than 
independence and that the court may be independent and yet be biased against one side. She also notes that 
in criminal cases however, it is difficult to have an independent and yet impartial tribunal.  
325  See R v Valente [1985] SCR 673, 23 CCC 3d 193 (Can. 1985).  
326  R v Valente 201-202. 
327  Prosecutor v Kanyabashi ICTR-96-15-A, Appeal Chamber, 3 June 1999, Decision on the Defence Motion 
for the interlocutory appeal on the Jurisdiction of Trial Chamber I, Joint and Separate Opinions by Judge 
MacDonald and Judge Vohrah, para. 35. 
328 Findlay v United Kingdom, Reports 1997 – I, 263 (1997) 24 EHRR 211 para 73, “The concepts of 
independence and objective impartiality are closely linked and the court will consider them together as they 
relate to the present case.” 
329  Multi-judge panels are believed to help filter out bias as a certain number of judges must agree on the 
decision and the rationale behind it as this prevents a single bias member from affecting the outcome of the 
case. The ICTY therefore serves as an instructive vehicle to filter bias as all trials are conducted by three 
judges and appeals by a bench of 5 judges. 
330  See T Meron “ Judicial Independence and Impartiality In International Criminal Tribunals” (ed) (2005) The 
American Journal of International Law 359 at 361 noting that internal mechanisms that prevent and or 
correct bias like multi-judge panels ensure the integrity of the judiciary and an independent and impartial 
tribunal. 
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 that law must have established the judicial organ. In Prosecutor v Kanyabashi,331 the defence 
challenged the jurisdiction of the ICTR, among others, on the contention that it violated the 
principle of jus de non evocando. This principle gives persons accused of political crimes in 
times of social unrest the right to be prosecuted by regular domestic criminal courts rather 
than by politically established ad hoc judicial organs, which may not provide impartial 
justice.332 In casu, the accused, Joseph Kanyabashi, was charged of genocide, complicity in 
genocide and violations of common articles of the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the 
Protection of Victims of War and Additional Protocol II, by the ICTR. The defence argued 
that the Tribunal was not impartial and independent since a political body, the Security 
Council, founded it. Moreover, that the Tribunal was impartial because it selectively 
prosecuted only persons from the Hutu ethnic group.333  
 
The Appeals Chamber held that the independence of the Tribunal was demonstrated by the 
fact that it was not bound by national rules of evidence. Further that the judges of the 
Tribunal exercise their duties independently and freely, were under oath to act honourably, 
faithfully and impartially, and were not accountable to the Security Council for their judicial 
functions.334 The Chamber also stated that article 12(1) of the ICTR Statute, which regulates 
the appointment of judges, requires that persons of high moral character, integrity and 
impartiality who possess adequate qualifications be appointed to the bench.335 
 
In order for a court to be seen to pursue justice in accordance with established rules and 
standards of a fair trial, the due process thesis must be interwoven in the proceedings as a 
whole.336 However, Cristian DeFrancia argues that instead of a strict application of due 
process standards, regard must be had to the predicates of due process that guide “the 
application of those rules in judicial interpretation”.337 Articles 14 and 6 of the International 
331  Prosecutor v Kanyabashi ICTR-96-15-A para. 35. 
332  See Prosecutor v Kanyabashi ICTR-96-15-A, Appeal Chamber para 31, stating that this principle derives 
from constitutional law in civil jurisdictions and its aim was to avoid creation of special courts designed to 
try political offences without guarantees of a fair trial.  
333  Prosecutor v Kanyabashi para 47. 
334  Prosecutor v Kanyabashi ICTR-96-15-A, Appeal Chamber para 41(stating that “the judges of the Tribunal 
exercise their judicial duties independently and freely and are under oath to act honorably, faithfully, 
impartially and conscientiously as stipulated in rule 14 of the Rules. Judges do not account to the Security 
Council for their judicial functions”). 
335  Prosecutor v Kanyabashi ICTR-96-15-A, Appeal Chamber para 42. 
336  See C DeFrancia “Due Process in International Criminal Courts: Why Procedure Matters” (2001) 87Virginia 
Law Review 1381 at 1383. 
337  See DeFrancia 2001Virginia Law Review 1383-1384. She notes that a criminal system may not strictly 
adhere to the set norms of procedural fairness. She therefore recommends that before an inquiry is made in 
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 Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the European Convention of Human 
Rights (ECHR), respectively enumerate the principles of due process. These are, inter alia, 
the right to a public hearing and subject to cross-examination; the right to counsel; 
presumption of innocence until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt; privilege against self-
incrimination and the right to adequate time to prepare one’s defence.338 These form the core 
of the due process standards recognised by international law. Therefore, where the accused 
was not afforded these procedural guarantees in a domestic trial, his case will be admissible 
before the ICC. 
 
Not only does article 17 of the Rome Statute require that the Court adhere to principles of due 
process, article 64 (2) of the Rome Statute also provides that the Trial Chamber has to ensure 
that the accused is afforded a fair and speedy trial. Where the accused is not afforded a fair 
and expeditious trial, for instance, if the proceedings are biased, the ICC will assert its 
complementary jurisdiction and prosecute. Although traditionally the due process thesis was 
designed to protect the rights of the accused, it is contended that the Rome Statute in this case 
envisages a situation where the proceedings are biased towards acquitting the accused, even 
when there are aggravating circumstances. This is apparent in the wording of article 17(1) 
read with article 17(2) (c). They envisage a situation where a State exercises jurisdiction over 
a matter when it is clearly not resolved to administer justice in good faith. Such a State will 
be deemed unwilling to prosecute genuinely if the proceedings are found to be inconsistent 
with principles of due process. 
 
It is noteworthy that the language of article 17(2) requires the Prosecutor to determine 
whether the proceedings are carried out in a manner that will make it hard to convict the 
accused339 despite the presence of incriminating evidence. Thus, the case will be prosecuted 
by the ICC if the proceedings are so biased that the State appears to have derailed from the 
to the extent to which the system has conformed to the due process guidelines, standards that guide those 
rules must be considered: rules of procedure and evidence and their interpretation. He opines that this will 
offset any bias, especially in situations where the interests of the accused and the prosecutor are in conflict.  
338  Rules 62, 63 and 78 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTR also require that the accused be 
afforded a fair trial and that principles of due process be adhered to.  See also article 20 of the ICTR Statute 
which entrenches the right of the accused to a fair trial, Statute of the International Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in 
Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).  
339 See KJ Heller “The Shadow Side of Complementarity: The Effect of Article 17 of the Rome Statute on 
National Due Process” (2006) 17 Criminal Law Forum 255 at 257 ( arguing that article 17 permits the ICC 
to find a State unwilling to genuinely prosecute “only if its legal proceedings are designed to make a 
defendant more difficult to convict”). 
79 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
 standard procedure in favour of the accused. This could be a case where domestic authorities 
fail to protect key witnesses from intimidation or downplay incriminating evidence. If this is a 
case, since there is procedural unfairness, the ICC will seize itself of the matter and prosecute. 
A recent similar situation took place in Sudan. The proceedings before the specialised courts 
of Sudan were in camera and the accused were routinely sentenced to death based on forced 
confessions.340 It follows therefore that procedural failings of national courts of Sudan 
rendered Sudan Unwilling to prosecute diligently since those proceedings clearly defied 
international principles of due process. 
 
3.2.4 The Double Jeopardy Rule 
Article 17(1) (c) also renders a case admissible where the suspect has been tried for the 
conduct which is the subject of the complaint before the ICC (ne bis in idem).341 This 
principle is reiterated by article 20 of the Rome Statute. It protects the accused against 
multiple prosecutions for the same offence. It is submitted that this rule also forms part of the 
due process guarantees as it protects the accused from being tried for the same conduct more 
than once. However, the double jeopardy rule only extends to genuine prosecutions. As such, 
if the accused was prosecuted by a domestic court but the proceedings are found to be 
insincere, for instance, a sham trial, the case will be admissible before the ICC. However, it is 
not clear what will happen where the domestic authorities have already tried the accused for 
the same conduct but have treated the crime in question as an ordinary crime. On the other 
hand, domestic authorities may charge an accused with a range of crimes listed in the statute, 
emanating from his general conduct and not the specific crime he has been charged with by 
the ICC.342  
Michael Newton opines that the use of the term “conduct” in the provision poses a danger of 
the ICC automatically declaring a State unwilling to prosecute if it fails to charge an accused 
of the same offense as that alleged by the ICC.343 For instance, in Prosecutor v Katanga344, 
340  See Heller 2006 Criminal Law Forum 256. 
341  Article 17 (1) (c).  See also article 20(3). This rule is sometimes referred to as the double jeopardy rule, if a 
person has been tried for conduct that is the subject of a complaint, the courts of law cannot try him for the 
same conduct again if he was convicted or acquitted. 
342  In Prosecutor v Lubanga, the accused had been in custody in the DR Congo for genocide and war crimes 
including murder, before the case was referred to the ICC. Upon challenging the ICC’s jurisdiction, the 
Prosecution argued that the conduct with which he was charged before the ICC as not the same as that of 
which he was under investigation in the DRC. Unfortunately, in the end the accused was charged with a less 
serious crime, conscripting child soldiers and escape the genocide and murder charges. In this case, the ICC 
prosecution was to the accused advantage and he was not held accountable for more serious crimes. 
343  See M Newton “The Complementarity Conundrum: Are We Watching Evolution or Evisceration?” (2010) 8 
Santa Clara Journal of International Law 115 at 149 (“…the hidden danger is that the ICC could 
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 the DR Congo was declared unwilling to prosecute him because he was never charged with 
the specific crimes alleged by the ICC in respect of the attack he orchestrated against the 
civilian population in Borogo, in the Ituri province of the country.345 Although the defence 
did not plead the ne bis in idem principle, this case would be a good example. However, the 
‘same person, same conduct’ test applied by the Trial Chamber, which requires that the same 
person must have been charged with specifically the same crimes as those alleged by the ICC 
in order for a case of inadmissibility to hold water, was applied. This line of reasoning is 
based on the assumption that local authorities did not allege the crimes emanating from the 
specific conduct that is the subject of an ICC investigation because they were unwilling to 
administer justice.   
 
Furthermore, as seen in the ICC’s decision in Prosecutor v Lubanga346, a case will still be 
admissible before the ICC even when the crimes alleged by the ICC are of a less magnitude 
than those alleged by domestic authorities347, because of a technical difference between the 
conduct alleged to be criminal in each case.348 The Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v Tadic349 
warned against a situation where atrocious crimes are treated as ordinary crimes in domestic 
Courts:  
“Otherwise, human nature being what it is, there would be a perennial danger of international crimes 
being characterized as “ordinary crimes”…or proceedings being designed to “shield the accused,” or 
cases not being diligently prosecuted…If not effectively countered…any of those stratagems might be 
used to defeat the very purpose of the creation of an international criminal jurisdiction, to the benefit of 
the very people whom it has been designed to prosecute”.350  
 
automatically decide that domestic officials who fail to allege the same charge that the Court deemed 
appropriate are "unwilling genuinely" to prosecute the perpetrator.”). 
344  Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-0 1/04-01/07-949 19. 
345  Prosecutor v. Katanga, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo In The Case of the Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the confirmation of charges, Case No. ICC-
01/04-01/07 (30 September 2008) para 20. 
346  Lubanga Arrest Warrant (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No ICC-01/04-01/06-8-US-Corr, 10 February 
2006) 31. 
347  Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, Art. 
58, ICC-01/04-01/06-8-US-Corr, 10/02/2006, para. 18, unsealed pursuant to Decision ICC-01/04-01/06-37 
dated 17/03/2006. 
348  See L Keller “The Practice of the International Criminal Court: Comments on ‘The Complementarity 
Conundrum” (2010) 8 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 199 at 214. She argues that ICC’s 
jurisprudence supports the contention that the Court has shifted from the textual approach of 
complementarity by adopting a rigid interpretation of the existence of national proceedings and the ‘same 
person, same conduct test’. 
349  See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic Case No. IT-94-I-I, (Aug-10, 1995) International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia: (Decision on the Establishment of the International Tribunal). 
350 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic Case No. IT-94-I-I, (Aug-10, 1995) International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia: (Decision on the Establishment of the International Tribunal). 
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 This notwithstanding, the ICC admitted the case against Lubanga who had already been 
charged in the DR Congo. The Court’s decision to prosecute Lubanga seems to betray this 
line of reasoning. As noted above, the accused was charged with far serious crimes (genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes) by his nation State but was nevertheless referred to the 
ICC and prosecuted for conscripting child soldiers. This makes one wonder whether this 
approach is due to an overzealous prosecutor who competes with domestic courts for 
jurisdiction, and foregoes the administration of justice for expediency. The approach also 
deviates from the spirit of the principle of complementarity that prioritizes domestic 
jurisdiction, unless the State fails to administer justice. These kind of situations are what seem 
to have betrayed the Court’s commitment to preserving sovereignty and upholding the ideals 
upon which complementarity was founded. 
 
3.3 Inability to Prosecute 
The ICC may also wrest specific cases from the jurisdiction of municipal courts if there is an 
inability to prosecute genuinely. Inability, unlike willingness, is an objective test. A State 
may be deemed unable to prosecute where it is unable to obtain the accused or secure witness 
and or necessary evidence or is unable to conduct proceedings. This test requires a factual as 
opposed to a mental element, which is the case with the unwillingness test. In order to 
determine inability in a given case, the ICC has to determine whether there is a ‘total or 
substantial collapse’ of the judicial system and that as a result, the State is “unable to obtain 
the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its 
proceedings”.351 Thus, given the nature of conflicts that African States experience, some 
States may be considered unable to prosecute because to political situations that make it 
‘impossible’ to hold trials due to lack of judicial personnel.  
 
The Appeals Chamber held in Prosecutor v Katanga352 that it must first be determined 
whether there have been proceedings at all in national courts. Further, that a case will be 
admissible before the ICC where there have been no investigatory or prosecutorial attempts, 
the case is admissible before the ICC for reason of inability. The decision therefore 
presupposes that lack of action means the State concerned is either unable or unwilling 
351  See article 17(3) of the Rome Statute. 
352  Prosecutor v. Katanga, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo In The Case of the Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the confirmation of charges, Case No. ICC-
01/04-01/07 (30 September 2008) para 20 
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 because it has not attempted to prosecute. The question of whether domestic authorities are 
unable or unwilling only becomes relevant after determining whether there were any 
adjudicative efforts involving that particular case.353  
 
Mohamed El Zeidy notes that the ICC may act to fill a gap in national judicial systems 
created by lack of proceedings.354 However, the fact that the State may be deemed unable to 
prosecute just because it is unable to apprehend the accused may set the bar too high for 
States.355 The fact that the State has not or cannot apprehend the accused does not necessary 
render the judicial system ineffective. In some cases, only a certain region of a State is 
crippled by the conflict and a substantial collapse in another region may not necessarily 
impede the functioning of other unaffected regions of a State’s judicial organs. The ICC will 
be seized with the matter even where the State concerned, though experiencing a substantial 
collapse of its judicial system in some parts, may still be able to finally arrest and prosecute 
the accused. Setting a prescription period within which a State may initiate proceedings 
before a State is deemed to have failed to prosecute genuinely would solve this problem. 
Then, the ICC would only assert its jurisdiction where the State has failed to secure a 
prosecution within the set time frames, instead of taking over because the State has failed to 
arrest the suspect since it may even be more difficult for the ICC to apprehend the same 
person for lack of resources.  
 
The use of ‘or’ in article 17 shows that the Rome Statute does not envision a situation where 
unwillingness and inability to prosecute coexist. A State may be found either unwilling or 
unable and not both. The Court’s jurisprudence also distinguishes between unwillingness and 
inability to prosecute in such a manner that implies that they cannot co-exist.356 On the other 
hand, where there is evidence of domestic process, the Court goes on to determine the 
genuineness of the proceedings to determine willingness or otherwise of the national courts 
involved to prosecute.357 Even where the ICC has found a State unwilling or unable to 
353  See M Benzing “The Complementarity Regime of the International Criminal Court: International Criminal 
Justice Between State sovereignty and the Fight Against Impunity” (2003) 7 Max Planck Yearbook of United 
Nations Law 591 at 601 (He notes that the fact that the state has not done anything yet crimes were being 
committed renders the case admissible before the ICC). 
354  See M El Zeidy “The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement International Criminal 
Law” (2001-2002) 23 Michigan Journal of International Law 869 at 903. 
355  See Lubanga Arrest Warrant (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No ICC-01/04-01/06-8-US-Corr, 10 February 
2006). 
356  See Prosecutor v Katanga 
357  See article 17 (1) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute. 
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 genuinely prosecute, the Prosecutor has to make sure that the case is of sufficient seriousness 
to warrant further action by the ICC.358 
 
3.4 The Gravity Threshold 
The Rome Statute only gives the ICC jurisdiction over cases that meet a certain threshold of 
seriousness. As the preamble states, the Court has a mandate to try grave breaches of 
international law. The gravity threshold delineates complementary jurisdiction – it sets a 
baseline of conduct that elevates ordinary crimes from the jurisdiction of national judiciaries 
to the complementary jurisdiction of the ICC. For a crime to meet the threshold, it must be 
serious and large scale so that it constitutes a threat to international peace and security. A 
case is therefore inadmissible before the ICC if it is not of sufficient gravity to warrant further 
action by the Court.359 In cases where a State has failed the “unwillingness” or inability” test, 
the Prosecutor must also determine the seriousness of the allegations before intervening and 
initiating prosecution.360  This is also in line with the practicality issue: due to budgetary and 
infrastructural constraints of the Court, it cannot possibly try every international crime case 
from across the world; hence, its jurisdiction is limited only to core crimes of international 
concern as defined by articles 5 to 8 of the Rome Statute.361   
 
The threshold requirement is one of the powerful constraints on the prosecutor’s powers as it 
prevents the prosecutor from seizing itself of every case, lest the ICC supplants domestic 
jurisdiction.362 Article 53 (1) (c) of the Rome Statute also limits the powers of the Prosecutor 
to protect States from an overzealous prosecutor. It requires the Prosecutor, before initiating 
an investigation, to consider the seriousness of the crime, interests of victims, and whether 
358  See article 17(1 (d) of the Rome Statute. 
359  See article 5 of the Rome Statute provides:  
“The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute with respect to the 
following crimes: 
(a) The crime of genocide; 
(b) Crimes against humanity; 
(c) War crimes; 
(d) The crime of aggression:  Article 6 uses the term “group” to define elements of the crime of 
genocide; this term connotes the idea of the acts listed therein as being committed against a large number 
of people. Article 7 also describes war crimes as “acts … committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against any civilian population”.  
360  See Article 17 (1) (d) of the Rome Statute.  
361  Articles 5 to 8 of the Rome Statute define the core crimes that fall under the Court’s jurisdiction: genocide, 
war crimes, crimes against humanity and aggression. 
362  See Newton 2010 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 134 (noting that the gravity threshold is a 
“subtle, yet potentially powerful, constraint on the Prosecutor's power vis a vis sovereign forums”). 
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 pursuing the case would serve the interests of justice.363 The gravity threshold has been under 
a lot of scrutiny, as article 17 requires the ICC to defer to national courts where the case “is 
not of sufficient gravity to warrant further action by the court.”364 Some scholars have even 
argued that the case must not only be serious enough for the ICC to intervene but also that 
there must be a reasonable basis that crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court have been 
committed and that it is in the interests of justice for the ICC to seize itself of the matter.365 
However, it is hard to see how the Court’s prosecution of the case against Lubanga was in the 
interests of justice when he stood trial before the ICC for crimes of a lesser magnitude than 
those he was charged with in the DR Congo.  
 
On the issue of the seriousness of the case, the Pre-trial Chamber I in Prosecutor v Lubanga 
held that the threshold approach must be applied in two scenarios: Firstly at the initial stage 
of investigation of a situation and once a situation is determined to be of sufficient gravity. 
Once a case arises out of the situation, the case must also meet the gravity standard set by the 
provision that proscribes the conduct alleged to be a crime. It went further to say that for the 
conduct in question to meet the criterion; it must be systematic or large scale; and social 
alarm that such conduct has caused in the world must also be considered. 366  If these factors 
are not present, then the case is not of the desired gravity and is inadmissible before the ICC. 
 
3.5 Flaws of the Complementarity Regime 
3.5.1 The Admissibility Criteria under Article 17 
The admissibility criterion under article 17 of Rome Statute is flawed because it does not 
clearly set out the clear guidelines for finding a State unwilling to prosecute. Although the 
Court’s jurisprudence attempts to fill in some of these gaps, the lacunae in article 17 
regarding the meaning of unjustified delay in bringing the perpetrator to justice still needs to 
be developed. The fact that a State may be found unwilling and acting in bad faith due to an 
unjustified delay in the proceedings, without clear and standard time frames leaves room for 
363  See article 53 (1) (c) of the Rome Statute. It provides that “[t]aking into account the gravity of the crime and 
the interests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not 
serve the interests of justice”. 
364  See article 17 (1) (d). See also R Murphy “Gravity Issues and the International Criminal Court” (2006) 17 
Criminal Law Forum 281 at 287. See also P Kirsch and JT Holmes “The Birth of the International Criminal 
Court: The 1998 Rome Conference” (1998) 3 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 18 for a general 
discussion of the negotiations at the Rome Conference that lead to the adoption of the gravity threshold. 
365  See Newton 2010 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 157-160.  
366  ICC-01/04/-01/06, Pre-trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the Case of the 
Prosecutor vs. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Under Seal Decision of the prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of 
Arrest, art 58, Annexure 1, 10 February 2006, para. 42. 
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 broad interpretations by different jurisdictions. In any legal system there is potential for 
delays despite the prosecutor’s willingness to prosecute timeously,367 especially if there is an 
on-going conflict. It is therefore imperative to arrive at a narrow definition of what 
constitutes unjustified delay in order to quell States fears that this provision may lead to 
arbitrary decision making regarding the willingness or otherwise of their judicial systems to 
prosecute genuinely international crimes. 368 The definitional inadequacy of article 17 in this 
regard renders the willingness test substantively deficient. 
 
Moreover, the regime of complementarity may also be considered vague to the extent that it 
fails to define a standard criminal policy for prosecution of core international crimes. The 
practice of national judicial organs has shown that a prosecutorial authority without a basic 
substantive blueprint is deficient to the point of being dysfunctional. Neither the Rome Statute 
nor the ICC’s Rules of Evidence define a criminal policy. However, the ICC may take lessons 
from domestic judiciaries and incorporate a standard prosecution template through judicial 
activism. The fact that there are no standardized guidelines for prosecution poses a real danger 
that of a  state may genuinely prosecuting in  accordance with its national laws being declared 
unwilling to prosecute genuinely even when the delay is not procedurally wrong within its 
legal system.  
 
In another vein, the unwillingness test forms the subjective part of the admissibility test since 
it requires genuineness. It is the very nature of the inquiry that makes it difficult to know 
when a state is unwilling without prosecutorial guidelines. As it stands, article 17 fails to 
define the standard of proof that must be met in order for the Prosecutor to find a particular 
State genuinely unwilling or unable to carry out its investigative or prosecutorial functions.369 
Developing countries may also be at a disadvantage of seeming unwilling to punish 
perpetrators due to lack of resources for speedy trials. It also fails to establish standard 
criterion for assessing unwillingness on the part of the State.370 The Appeals Chamber 
367  See D Scheffer “The International Criminal Court: The Challenge to Jurisdiction, Address at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Society of International Law Washington DC” (March 26 1999) 237. Available at 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/DavidSchefferAddressOnICC.pdf (accessed 27 August 2012). 
368  PA McKeon “An International Criminal Court: Balancing the Principle of Sovereignty Against the Demands 
of International Justice” (2009) 12 St John’s Journal of Legal Commentary 535. 
369  See A Cassese “The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections” (1999) 10 
EJIL 537. 
370  See D Scheffer “The International Criminal Court: The Challenge to Jurisdiction” Address at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Society of International Law, Washington DC” (1999) 237. Available at 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/DavidSchefferAddressOnICC.pdf (accessed 27 August 2012). 
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 decision in Prosecutor v Katanga implies that the genuineness of the proceedings is not as 
important as the existence of local proceedings, which must meet a certain threshold.371   This 
is confusing since article 17 requires that national proceedings be genuine and renders a case 
inadmissible where a state holds sham a trial. Li Jun Yang is also of the view that article 17 is 
ambiguous due to lack of a defined criminal policy.372  
 
Without basic guidelines regarding satisfactory local investigatory and prosecutorial 
activities, there is a risk that certain genuine ‘on-going domestic proceedings’ may be 
excluded.373 With the varied legal systems subject to the complementarity regime, it is 
necessary to have specific guidelines for investigations and prosecutions of the core crimes of 
international concern so that all State Parties follow the same baseline conduct required of 
them. It is submitted that incorporating basic investigatory and prosecutorial guidelines into 
the complementarity regime is congruent with the sovereignty-preserving aim of the drafters 
of article 17. The Rome Statute should therefore be amended to embrace the standard 
criminal policy thesis. Article 17 without clear guidelines as is, defeats its purpose - 
complementing and not supplanting domestic jurisdictions. 
 
The ne bis in idem rule in article 17(1) (c) is also framed in such a manner that risks the 
accused being tried twice for the same conduct, first by a national court and by the ICC. The 
term ‘conduct’ has been used instead of ‘crime’ or ‘offense’ as the case may be. This 
argument finds support in the Court’s use of the ‘same person, same conduct test’. This test 
requires that the accused be charged of significantly similar charges for a case to be 
inadmissible before the ICC. That is, the charges in question must not only be against the 
371  See Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui, Reasons for the Oral Decision on the Motion Challenging the 
Admissibility of the Case (Article 19 of the Statute) Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07 (June 16, 2009) (noting that 
“for assessing whether the State is indeed investigating, the genuineness of the investigation is not at issue; 
what is at issue is whether there are investigative steps”). 
372  See L Yang “Some Critical Remarks on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court” (2003) 2 
Chinese Journal of International Law 599 at 605. He notes that many states hold that if the delay (unjustified 
delay) complies with their legal system, it shall not amount to an unjustified delay. See also X Philippe “The 
Principles of Universal Jurisdiction and Complementarity: How do the Two Principles Intermesh?” (2006) 
88 International Review of the Red Cross 375 at 384, (arguing that owing to the ambiguity of the 
unwillingness criteria, “it can logically be assumed that the inherent differences between legal systems will 
influence the way in which the principle of complementarity will be implemented. It will therefore not be 
uniformly applied”).  
373  See JN Clark “Peace Justice and the International Criminal Court: Limitations and Possibilities” (2011) 9 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 521 at 537. She notes that without a standard criminal policy in the 
Rome Statute, “the high content of local practices may be excluded regardless of the legitimacy with which 
the practices are received, thereby obstructing the sense of local ownership of the process [prosecution of 
international crime]”. Emphasis added. 
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 same person but also, conduct that is the subject of the complaint before the local court and 
ICC must have arisen out of the same conduct. For instance, as shown above, in Prosecutor v 
Lubanga, the accused was tried by the ICC despite having been arrested and charged by the 
DR Congo prior to referral of his case to the ICC. This was merely because the crimes alleged 
by the DRC did not extend to the crimes perpetrated by the accused during the Borogo attack, 
which formed the basis of the ICC charges. 
  
The Rome Statute does little to guide State’s interpretation of the Statute and lack of a 
standard criminal policy renders the complementarity regime incomprehensive374, and the 
criterion for admissibility of cases is rather flawed.375 Moreover, the Trial Chamber’s decision 
in Prosecutor v Lubanga376 exports a third criterion into the two-tiered test in article 17, 
namely the ‘same person, same conduct’ test. It was held that an inquiry must be made 
whether both national and ICC proceedings pertain to the same person and have arisen out of 
the same conduct. The Chamber also held that the charges must be ‘significantly similar’ to 
those alleged by the ICC for a case to be inadmissible.  
 
3.5.2 African Perspectives on the Court’s Application of Complementarity  
The foregoing analysis necessitates a discussion of the fractious relationship between the 
African States, the AU and the ICC. This account will shed some light on how the African 
audience perceives complementarity and why. Some of these issues will require the Court to 
consider for purposes of strengthening its legitimacy. As noted in chapter one, African States 
showed formidable support for the Court during its early stages.377 Things however, took a 
different turn when the Court became operational. The ICC’s indictment of African heads of 
374  See Newton 2010 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 141. (“The Court does not follow any 
standardised procedures for deferring to domestic jurisdictions, so there is no authoritative precedent or 
template to indicate when a situation would better be handled domestically”). 
375  See M Melandri “The Relationship Between State Sovereignty and The Enforcement of International 
Criminal Law under the Rome Statute (1998): A Complex Interplay” (2009) 9 International Criminal Law 
Review 531 at 540 (he argues that so far the complementary provisions act as “an implicit restriction on state 
sovereignty….but it did not establish specific standards for prosecution”). 
376  See Lubanga Arrest Warrant (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No ICC-01/04-01/06-8-US-Corr, 10 February 
2006). See also the Appeals Chamber decision in Muthaura Appeal (ICC, Appeals Chamber, Case No ICC-
01/09-02/11-274, 30 August 2011) 39; Ruto Appeal (ICC, Appeals Chamber, Case No ICC-01/09-01/11-
307, 30 August 2011) 40, stating that ‘the national investigation must cover the same individual and 
substantially the same conduct as alleged in the proceedings before the Court’. 
377 See the discussion in chapter one, pages 2-4. See also A du Plessis and A Louw ‘The International Criminal 
Court that Africa Wants,’ Symposium on International Crime in Africa Programme (2009) International 
Security Studies 11 (noting that “the ICC’s creation was shaped and supported by African nations that played 
a pivotal role at the Rome conference at which the court’s  statute was drafted and adopted”). 
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 State and the Security Council’s indifference to AU’s pleas for deferral of some cases have 
severely strained the relationship between the Court and the AU and some African States.378 
This has culminated in some States, In particular, Kenya, threatening to withdraw its 
membership to the Rome Statute.379 Subsequent to Kenya’s passage of a motion in parliament 
to withdraw membership to the Rome Statute, the AU held the 15th Extraordinary Session of 
the Assembly of the African Union included among others, Decision on Africa’s Relations 
with the ICC.380 Most of the critics have called into question the manner in which the ICC has 
executed its complementarity mandate in the case under its investigation.  Some African State 
actors and political elite have criticised the ICC for its exclusive focus on African heads of 
State when crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction are being committed across the globe.381 A 
widely held view is that most judicial systems in Africa are weak, which makes them an easy 
target for the ICC.  
 
The perception that the Court administers selective justice by discriminately targeting African 
war criminals is based on allegations that similar crimes were committed in Colombia, 
Venezuela, Sri Lanka and Iraq.382 At face value, the ICC docket is exclusive to Africa, but 
there is evidence that the ICC Prosecutor has investigated the situations in Iraq and Georgia, 
but decided not to prosecute because they did not meet the gravity threshold.383 For instance, 
378 The AU adopted the Sirte Declaration after failed attempts to get the Security Council to defer the case 
against President al Bashir to Sudan under article 16 of the Rome Statute.  See Declaration on non-
cooperation with the ICC Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XIII) Assembly/AU/Dec.245(XIII) Rev.1 Page 2 
para 10 provides: “… in view of the fact that the request by the African Union has never been acted upon, 
the AU Member States shall not cooperate pursuant to the provisions of Article 98 of the Rome Statute of 
the ICC relating to immunities, for the arrest and surrender of President Omar El Bashir of The Sudan”. 
379 See “Kenya’s Threat to Withdraw from the ICC: What Will SA Do?” Daily Maverick 29 November 2013. 
Available at http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2013-10-08-kenyas-threat-to-withdraw-from-the-icc-
what-will-sa-do/#.Uphni9IW1FU (accessed 29 November 2013). The AU adopted a decision to call for 
deferment or postponement of the cases against the Kenyan vice-president and President Uhuru Kenyatta. 
See “Africa to Request Deferment of Indictments against Kenyan President and Vice President” Press 
Release No 177/2013 Addis Ababa (12 October 2013).  The ICC finally postponed the case against Kenyatta 
to February 2014. See “ICC Postpones Kenya President Kenyatta’s Trial Date” 13th Forum Ecomonique 
International Sur L’Afrique 29 November 2013. Available at http://www.panapress.com/iCC-postpones-
Kenya-President-Kenyatta-s-trial-date--15-885721-32-lang2-index.html (accessed 29 July 2013). 
380  See Decision on Africa’s Relations with the International Criminal Court Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1-2 
(Oct.2013). See also See “Africa to Request Deferment of Indictments against Kenyan President and Vice 
President” Press Release No 177/2013 Addis Ababa (12 October 2013).  The ICC finally postponed the case 
against Kenyatta to February 2014. 
381 See “Rwanda’s Kagame Says ICC Targeting Poor, African Countries” AFP 31 July 2008. See also C 
Murungu and J Biegon (eds) Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa (2011) 155. See M du Plessis The 
International Criminal Court that Africa Wants (2010) 13-14 for a general discussion.  
382 See A du Plessis and A Louw ‘The International Criminal Court that Africa Wants,’ Symposium on 
International Crime in Africa Programme (2009) International Security Studies 19-20.  
383 See du Plessis and Louw (2009) International Security Studies 28. 
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 in the case of Iraq, there were communications alleging that the several counts of aggression 
had been committed in the Iraqi war in 2003.  However, the Prosecutor was unable to institute 
proceedings because some crimes fell outside the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court and 
were not serious enough to warrant action by the Court.384 Some of the complaints related to 
crimes committed before the coming into force of the Rome Statute.385 Additionally, in the 
case of Iraq, the crime of aggression had not been properly defined when the OTP received 
these communications.386 Although the evidentiary basis of this criticism is weak, the ICC 
must extent its influence universally and investigate all crimes. The court should not apply 
double standards in terms of who to investigate. 
 
Closely linked to the issue of fairness is the concern that the ICC is a tool of neo-colonial 
policy by the West against weak African countries.387 African Countries, under the aegis of 
the AU, have adopted the “African Solutions to African Problems” policy to protect 
themselves from the neo-colonial onslaught. The Court has also been criticized for its failure 
to heed and address concerns of the AU. This has culminated in the establishment of the 
complementary jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice and this will be discussed in detail 
below. Moreover, the AU and other state actors within the continent place a higher premium 
on peaceful settlement of conflicts. It has also been argued in some quarters that the ICC 
destabilises and is insensitive to traditional conflict resolution avenues pursued in Africa. This 
was the argument advanced by, among others, the Acholi Religious Leaders’ Peace initiative, 
that the ICC should stop further investigations and prosecutions in northern Uganda as its 
involvement could deter protagonists from joining peace talks.388 This argument is based on 
the continuance of armed conflicts despite international intervention (by the UN in the past 
384  Some of the crimes complained of included, tax evasion, environmental damage, judicial corruption and 
these do not fall within the ambit of the ICC mandate. See du Plessis and Louw (2009) International 
Security Studies 29. 
385 Some of the cases complained of included the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The problem with this case is that 
Israel is not a party to the Rome Statute and Palestine is defined as not a State yet. See du Plessis and Louw 
(2009) International Security Studies 29. 
386  See du Plessis and Louw (2009) International Security Studies 29. 
387  See C Murungu and J Biegon (eds) Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa (2011) 155. 
388  See the Statement by Father Carlos Rodrigues of the Acholi Leaders in Dissent Magazine (2004) available at 
<http://www.dissent-magazine.org/articles/?article=336> (accessed 12 March 2012), (arguing that “nobody 
can convince the leaders of a rebel movement to come to the negotiation table and at the same time tell them 
that they will appear in courts to be prosecuted”). See also A du Plessis and A Louw ‘The ICC that Africa 
Wants,’ Symposium on International Crime in Africa Programme (2009) International Security Studies 1 at 
6. 
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 and recently by the ICC). Opponents of the ICC have argued that this is because the 
international system foregoes the restitution of peace for judicial expediency.389 
 
Some scholars have argued that the ICC may be used as a tool for political gain. Considering 
the hateful nature of most conflicts in Africa, where ethnicity takes centre stage and previous 
attempts by some African leaders to pursue their dictatorial neo-colonial regimes, this 
criticism is not without substance. It has been argued in some quarters that the referral 
procedure is prone to misuse by some dictators, since an ICC prosecution may be used as a 
viable weapon to get rid of the opposition. The Prosecutor’s criteria for selection of suspects 
in the situation in Uganda have raised a few questions in some quarters.390  Some scholars 
argue an ICC referral was used to settle political scores in Uganda as charges were only 
brought against the Lord Resistance Army and not President Museveni’s militia when there 
was evidence that they also committed heinous crimes during the conflict.391  
 
The absence of charges against the UPDF, the other party to the conflict, was seen as a sign of 
the Court’s lack of impartiality in selecting its cases as they were also alleged to have had a 
hand in the conflict.392 Furthermore, the timing of the referral seemed to be convenient for 
both the ICC and the Ugandan government.393 For the Ugandan government, referral to the 
ICC was seen as a political manoeuvre to get rid of the opposition as the referral 
asymmetrically focussed on the LRA.394 In addition, Ugandan government’s subsequent 
attempts to withdraw the referral also go to show that some State actors just pay lip service to 
389 M Newton “The Complementarity Conundrum: Are We Watching Evolution or Evisceration?” (2010) 8 
Santa Clara Journal of International Law 115 at 122 argues that emerging indicators in the practice of the 
Court have revealed hidden dangers of expediency. 
390 See ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Statement by the Chief Prosecutor on the Uganda Arrest Warrants (Oct. 
14, 2005).  See also N Waddell and P Clark (2008) African Affairs 1 at 22, noting that the prosecutor’s 
decision to investigate only members of the LRA “…has often been presumed to be the result of bias rather 
than as the consequence of the ICC’s application of its criteria for case selection”. 
391  See Souare 2009 Review of African Political Economy 377 (noting, “The whole story of referring the LRA 
to the ICC was a political strategy by the Ugandan government to achieve international criminalization of the 
group and to gain foreign support for its military operations against the rebels”). 
392  See J Sinclair "The International Criminal Court in Uganda" (2010) Undergraduate Transitional Justice 
Review: Vol. 1(5) 72 at 73. See also N Waddell and P Clark (2008) African Affairs 1 at 22, noting that the 
prosecutor’s decision to investigate only members of the LRA “…has often been presumed to be the result 
of bias rather than as the consequence of the ICC’s application of its criteria for case selection”. See also 
ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Statement by the Chief Prosecutor on the Uganda Arrest Warrants (Oct. 14, 
2005).  
393  See Souare 2009 Review of African Political Economy 377. 
394  See Souare 2009 Review of African Political Economy 377(noting, “the whole story of referring the LRA to 
the ICC was a political strategy by the Ugandan government to achieve international criminalization of the 
group and to gain foreign support for its military operations against the rebels”). 
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 accountability. On a policy and jurisprudential perspectives, the selective prosecution of the 
LRA top commanders or the ICC’s failure to investigate the extent of the ruling party’s 
responsibility in the conflict sets questionable precedents.  
 
Another example of a situation where an ICC referral was used to stifle competition is the 
referral of the situation in the Central African Republic. State leaders that have risen to power 
through revolutions, which were characterized but grave breaches of international law, refer 
cases to the ICC to get rid of the opposition.395 Because of these selective prosecutions, the 
ICC is perceived as a tool for regime change. In contrast, the Prosecutor has handles the 
situation in Mali in a principled and politically sensitive manner. Citing his article 53 duties as 
the basis for his selection of individuals to indict, the Prosecutor warned that he will 
investigate all parties to the conflict, not just the militia responsible for the crimes committed 
during the conflict. The prosecutor made it clear that the Malian Army will also be 
investigated for war crimes they committed during counter attacks.  
 
Some of the concerns above form the core of issue that the ICC will have to address to ensure 
its future viability. For instance, the ICC must be conscious of ethnic, cultural and political 
sensitivities of those involved in the conflict. This way it will foster a healthy cooperative 
relationship with States and encourage the relevant authorities to show greater zeal and ending 
impunity. The Court should also become more nuanced in its communication with Africa, 
heed, and address concerns raised by African actors. The Court should also encourage 
national prosecutions, as these will provide a long-term solution to its problems. In addition, 
in cases where regional bodies like the AU are involved, both the body and the Court have to 
exist in a constructive manner. The role of regional bodies within the complementarity regime 
received limited attention until recently when the AU vested the African Court of Justice with 
complementary jurisdiction to try Rome Statute crimes. 
 
3.6 The Role of Sub-regional Bodies: Are they also Complementary? 
Amid the controversies surrounding ICC’s actions within the African Continent, which 
intensified after the Court’s indictment of the Sudanese President al Bashir, the fledgling 
Court faces yet another challenge. After numerous unsuccessful attempts to persuade the UN 
395  For instance, Francaois Bozize rose to power through a coup d’etat but referred the situation in the Central 
African Republic to the Court and only the late President Ange-Felix Patasse and his supporters was 
investigated for the violence perpetrated in the country. 
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 Security Council to defer the case against al Bashir under article 16 of the Rome Statute, the 
African Union’s (AU) support for the ICC has waned.396 The AU passed the Sirte Resolution 
of non-cooperation with the ICC regarding the arrest and surrender of al Bashir in July 2009 
in Libya in response to the Security Council’s refusal to defer the case against Al Bashir.397  
The AU has since advocated for a regional response to Africa’s problems. This culminated in 
the African Union Commission, the AU secretariat,  appointing consultants to oversee the 
drafting of the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court  
Justice and Human Rights398 (hereinafter the AU Draft Protocol). The Protocol grants the 
African Court complementary criminal jurisdiction over serious international crimes: 
genocide; war crimes; crimes against humanity; human and drug trafficking; piracy; 
terrorism; corruption and unconstitutional changes of government.399 Paragraph 16 of the 
preamble to the AU Protocol provides: 
“…convinced that the present protocol will complement national, regional and continental bodies and 
institutions in preventing serious and massive violations of human and peoples’ rights, keeping with 
article 58 of the Charter and ensuring accountability wherever they occur…”400 
 
This is however not unprecedented in international law. Regional bodies have been part of 
international law enforcement since the emergence of international jurisdiction. These bodies 
are formed by continental units that are, among others, geographically proximate and have 
economic and political ties and similar cultural identities.401 These bodies include the African 
Union (AU); the European Union (EU); the Organization of American States (AOS); the 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM); NATO; Commonwealth of Independent States; Pacific 
Islands Forum; the Arab League; Association of South Asian Association for Regional 
396  See para 9 of the Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XIII) Assembly/AU/Dec.245(XIII) Rev.1 (it states that the 
African Union “DEEPLY REGRETS that the request by the African Union to the UN Security Council to 
defer the proceedings initiated against President Bashir of The Sudan in accordance with Article 16 of the 
Rome Statute of the ICC, has neither been heard nor acted upon, and in this regard, REITERATES ITS 
REQUEST to the UN Security Council”). 
397  See Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XIII) Assembly/AU/Dec.245(XIII) Rev.1 Page 2 para 10 provides: “… 
in view of the fact that the request by the African Union has never been acted upon, the AU Member States 
shall not cooperate pursuant to the provisions of Article 98 of the Rome Statute of the ICC relating to 
immunities, for the arrest and surrender of President Omar El Bashir of The Sudan”. 
398  Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights  Meeting of Government Experts and Ministers of Justice/Attorneys General on Legal Matters (7 to 
11 and 14 to 15 May 2012),  Addis Ababa, Ethiopia  Exp/Min/IV/Rev.7. 
399  See article 46H (1) of the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights, Exp/Min/IV/Rev.7. It provides: “The jurisdiction of the Court shall be 
complementary to that of National Courts and to the Courts of the Regional Economic Communities”. 
[Emphasis added].  
400  See para 16 of the preamble to the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African 
Court of Justice and Human Rights. 
401  See R Vayrynen “Regionalism: Old and New” (2003) 5 International Studies Review 25 at 26. 
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 Cooperation; and Mecusur. The concept of regionalism has at its centre, an agentive 
relationship through which tribunals, special commissions, human rights bodies, non-
governmental organizations and States relate in the national, regional and global context. 
These bodies technically create legal mechanisms and procedures that “complement” each 
other through judicial proceedings in the form of domestic criminal prosecutions, civil suits, 
truth commissions, ad hoc international tribunals, and other administrative proceedings such 
as UN Resolutions.  
 
Philosophically, the State-centred regional system advocates for domestic and regional 
enforcement of international law, as policy and practical issues, have in the past, hindered 
transnational enforcement of law.402 However, over the years, the State-centred regional 
system has proved problematic due to, among others, geopolitics. Regional politics have in 
the past, forestalled international criminal justice processes and led to large-scale impunity 
for atrocious international crimes.403 With the advent of ICC’s efforts to enforce 
accountability for human rights violations in Africa, the role of regional bodies is of 
particular interest. For purposes of this inquiry, this discussion will be centred on the AU 
relationship with the ICC. The African Union, which is seated in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 
comprises 54 African States. 
 
3.7 The African Union 
The African Union was established on 21 May 2001 through the Banjul Charter,404 thereby 
replacing the Organization of African Unity (OAU).405 In terms of article 3(f) of the 
Constitutive Act, the aim of the African Union is to “promote peace, security and stability on 
402  WW Burke-White “Regionalization of International Criminal Law Enforcement: A Preliminary Exploration” 
(2003) 38 Texas International Law Journal 729 at 730. He notes “Regional enforcement of international 
law, however, would be situated at a unique midpoint between the national state and the international 
system. Regionalization could, therefore, provide a hitherto unavailable means of balancing the benefits and 
dangers of both supranational and national enforcement. In terms of cost, legitimacy, political independence, 
and judicial reconstruction, regionalization may be a normatively preferable means of enforcing international 
criminal law”. 
403  See R Vayrynen “Regionalism: Old and New” (2003) 5 International Studies Review 25, (noting that “early 
post-Cold War expectations that regions and regional concerts would form the foundation for a new 
international order have proven untenable”). 
404  See the African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU 
Doc.CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force Oct. 21, 1986. 
405 The OAU, the predecessor of the AU  was established on 25 May 1963 through the Charter of the 
Organization of African Unity 
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 the Continent.” 406 Also, among the Union’s principles is the peaceful resolution of conflicts 
among States as the Assembly of States of the African Union sees it fit.407 The AU Peace and 
Security Council, which has the power to authorise support missions; impose sanctions; and 
take initiatives in response to potential and actual conflicts, implements these policies.408 
Since its creation, the AU has adopted a number of documents that establish internationally 
recognised norms at a regional level and put the continent at par with the rest of the 
international community. These include the AU Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption; The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance; AU Convention 
Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee problems in Africa; Convention for the Elimination 
of Mercenarism in Africa; and Protocol to the African Union Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.409  
 
Articles 4(h) of the Constitutive Act and 4 of the Protocol to the Peace and Security 
Council410 respectively give the AU the right to intervene in Member States where crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and the crime of genocide have been committed, for 
peacekeeping and conflict management purposes. The AU has thus far been involved in 
conflict management in several parts of Africa including the Sudan, the DR Congo, Somalia 
and Burundi. The Union also represents individual Member States globally and is a 
permanent observer at the United Nations General Assembly. Over and above military 
interventions, embargos and peacekeeping missions in conflict-engulfed Member States, the 
AU has taken a big leap towards the enforcement of international criminal law. The Union 
has pushed for the adoption of the Draft Protocol that gives the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights jurisdiction over international crimes, including those set out in article 5 of the 
Rome Statute.411 
 
406  See article 3(f) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union: adopted in 2000 at the Lome Summit (Togo), 
entered into force in 2001. The Union’s other objective is to “Encourage international cooperation, taking 
due account of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” and 
“promote peace, security, and stability on the continent”. 
407  See article 4(e) of the Constitutive Act of the AU. 
408  See Protocol Relating to the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union entered into force on 
26 December 2003. 
409  See AU Treaties available at: http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/treaties.htm 
410  See article 4 of Protocol Relating to the Peace  and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union entered into 
force on 26  December 2003 
411  See article 46H (1) of the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of 
Justice and Human  
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 These developments bring up an important question: whether article 17 envisages a situation 
where regional bodies/tribunals are seized of the matter over which the ICC has jurisdiction. 
The Rome Statute makes no mention of regional bodies’ involvement as far as prosecution of 
international crimes is concerned. Article 17 regulates the relationship between the ICC and 
national courts only and does not envisage a situation where other bodies, regional and sub-
regional would partake in matters concerning parties to the complementarity regime. The 
ICC’s attempts to enforce accountability for human rights violations in Africa have to some 
extent, ended up putting the fledging Court at the centre of regional politics.412 The Court is 
yet to deal with a situation where a regional body, like the AU, whose membership comprises 
of Member States to the Rome Statute, seeks to assert regional sovereignty and challenges the 
jurisdiction of the Court.  
 
As noted earlier, the African Union has become increasingly hostile towards the ICC since 
the Court began its work in Africa.  This negativity intensified after the indictment of the 
Sudanese president and the Security Council’s failure to act on the Union’s requests for a 
deferral of the Al Bashir case and the Kenyan cases under article 16 of the Rome Statute.413 
The Union has since preached a policy of non-cooperation with the ICC and consequently 
embarked on an ‘African Solutions to African Problems’ mission. At the 15th Extraordinary 
Session of the Assembly of States of the African Union in October 2013, the Assembly 
adopted a decision calling upon the UN Security Council to defer the cases against the 
incumbent heads of States: President al Bashir, the Kenyan President and vice President. 
Alternatively, the Union requested that the cases against the Kenyan Elite be postponed until 
such time when their terms in office end.414 The Assembly emphasised immunity of sitting 
heads of States from prosecution, and noted that the proceedings against heads of States will 
“distract and prevent them from fulfilling their constitutional responsibilities, including 
412  For instance, the AU’s Sirte Declaration of Non-cooperation with the ICC and the Union’s exercises to have 
the cases against the Kenyan President and vice President deferred or postponed until their term in office 
expires, may could undermine the Court’s efforts to end impunity in the continent. 
413  The AU reiterated the need to find ways of persuading the UN Security Council to defer these cases at the 
18th Ordinary Summit of the African Union, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 23-30 January, the AU 
Assembly adopted a decision (Assembly/AU/Dec. 397(XVIII)). The Council also emphasised that the 
receipt of Al Bashir by African Rome Statute Member States (the Republic of Malawi, like Djibouti, Chad 
and Kenya) and failure to surrender him to the ICC was in accordance with the Union’s decision on non-
cooperation with the ICC regarding the arrest and surrender of Al Bashir to the ICC. 
414 See Decision on Africa’s Relations with the International Criminal Court Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1-2 
(Oct.2013) para 10 (ii): “That the trials of President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto, 
who are the current serving leaders of the Republic of Kenya, should be suspended until they complete their 
terms of office”. 
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 national and regional security affairs”.415 These exercises represent negative regionalism and 
may undermine the long-term credibility of the ICC in Africa. An analysis of the Draft 
Protocol and the proposed creation of the criminal chamber of the African Court below will 
reveal some of the dangers of negative regionalism. 
 
3.7.1 Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court 
of Justice and Human Rights: The Proposed International Criminal Chamber of 
the African Court   
 
Following the referral of the situation in Sudan by the United Nations Security Council to the 
ICC in 2005 and the subsequent arrest warrants against incumbent President of Sudan,  al 
Bashir, the AU the AU adopted an “African solution to African problems” policy.416 This 
policy seeks to address the civil wars and other conflict situations emanating from the 
continent in ways that not only guarantee justice but also ensure long lasting peace within the 
continent. Since the Indictment and the failed attempts by the AU to reverse the Security 
Council’s referral of Sudan’s case to the ICC, the AU has since been “disengaged” from the 
ICC. The aftermath of the AU’s failed attempts to have charges against Bashir dropped has 
led to the establishment of the Criminal Section of the African Court of Justice. The merger 
between the African Court of Human Rights and the African Court of Justice, though the 
Draft Protocol was first suggested by the Group of Experts at the 12th and 13th Ordinary 
Session in 2009.417  The AU then commissioned the African Union Commission to work 
closely with the Commission of Human and People’s Rights to draft a protocol that would 
endow the merged court with complementary jurisdiction to try serious international crimes 
including crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes.418  
415  See Decision on Africa’s Relations with the International Criminal Court Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1-2 
(Oct.2013) para 4: (noting that the Assembly “REITERATES AU’s concern on the politicization and misuse 
of indictments against African leaders by ICC as well as at the unprecedented indictments of and 
proceedings against the sitting President and Deputy President of Kenya in light of the recent developments 
in that country.” The Chairman of the African Union however, stated that the intention of the AU is not to 
undermine the ICC but to get it to take Africa’s problems “seriously”. He noted that “on a number of 
occasions, we have dealt with the issue of the ICC and expressed our serious concern over the manner in 
which the ICC has been responding to Africa’s considerations”. 
416  See M Martin and B Burgen “The Proposed International Criminal Chamber Section of the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights: A Legal Analysis” (20 March 2013) 6 Available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2236040 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2236040 (Accessed 10 April 2012) 
(noting that parallel to its anti-ICC attitude, the AU has also been “seeking an ‘African solution to African 
problems’”). 
417 See AU Assembly’s Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), Assembly/AU/13(XIII), 13th Ordinary Session, 1-3 July 2009, Sirte, 
Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. 
418  See AU Assembly’s Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), para 5. 
97 
 
                                                            
  
The African Union’s Draft Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights was drafted and presented at the 12th African Union Annual Summit in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia.419 It was later adopted at the Meeting of Government Experts and Ministers of 
Justice/Attorneys in Ethiopia in May 2012. The Draft Protocol has brought about a lot of 
controversy about the motivation behind the proposed criminal chamber of the African Court 
of Justice and Human Rights.420  The Draft Protocol creates an International Criminal Law 
section of the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights and merges the African Court on 
Human and Peoples Rights and the Court of Justice of the African Union into one tribunal.421 
The international criminal law section of the African Court is divided into three chambers: 
the Pre-Trial Chamber, the Trial Chamber and the Appellate Chamber.422  
 
The African Court on Human and Peoples Rights was established on 25 January 2004 upon 
the entering into force of the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights.423 The mandate of the African Court is to complement the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples Rights and decide cases and disputes concerning the 
interpretation of the African Charter424 and Protocol and other human rights instrument 
ratified by Member States.425 The AU Draft Protocol, on the other hand, seeks to expand the 
jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights to serious 
419  See Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights  Meeting of Government Experts and Ministers of Justice/Attorneys General on Legal Matters (7 to 
11 and 14 to 15 May 2012),  Addis Ababa, Ethiopia  Exp/Min/IV/Rev.7. 
420  See M Du Plessis “A Case of Negative Regional Complementarity? Giving the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights Jurisdiction over International Crimes” Available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/a-case-of-
negative-regional-complementarity-giving-the-african-court-of-justice-and-human-rights-jurisdiction-over-
international-crimes/ (accessed 16 June 2013). 
421 See the preamble to the Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court 
Justice and Human Rights para 4 (“RECOGNIZING that the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights had merged the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights and the Court of 
Justice of the African Union into a single Court”). 
422  See article 16(1) and (2) of the AU Draft Protocol. 
423  See M Du Plessis “Implications of the AU Decision to Give the African Court Jurisdiction over International 
Crimes” 2012 (235) Institute of Security Studies Paper 2. Available at 
http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/32975/1/Paper235-AfricaCourt.pdf?1 (accessed 9 
September 2013). 
424  African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Adopted 27 June 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 
rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force 21 October 1986). 
425  See Article 2 of the Protocol on the African Court of Human and peoples’ Rights. See also M Du Plessis “ 
Implications of the AU Decision to Give the African Court Jurisdiction over International Crimes” (2012) 
235 Institute of Security Studies Paper 2 for a general discussion of the mandate of the African Court. 
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 international crimes.426 It endows the Court with complementary jurisdiction over genocide; 
war crimes; crimes against humanity; human and drug trafficking; piracy; terrorism; 
corruption and unconstitutional changes of government. Jurisdiction of the African Court is 
to be complementary to the African Union Member States’ national courts and of the courts 
of the Regional Economic Communities.427 
 
 What is also interesting about the Protocol is that the definitions of the crimes in the AU 
Draft Protocol incorporate all the elements of the crimes proscribed by the Rome Statute, 
verbatim.428 This means that that both the African Court and the ICC will have jurisdiction 
over the same cases. One of the key issues in relation to the complementarity regime is the 
inevitable clash of commitments and the possibility of Member States’ forum shopping. 
Vesting the African Court of Justice with complementary jurisdiction over the same crimes as 
the ICC, poses the risk of States that are members to both African Union and Rome Statute 
abdicating their Rome Statute duties by resorting to regional enforcement mechanism that 
corresponds with their national interests. In this arrangement, it is highly possible for a 
powerful member of State of another country to escape prosecution at the hands of fellow 
diplomats; this practice has roots that run back to impunity. 
 
3.7.2 Implications of Regional Bodies’ Involvement in ICC Matters 
A close analysis of the practical effects of regional bodies’ involvement in ICC matters is 
significant as they may disturb the synergy of cooperation and jurisdictional balance that is 
the fulcrum of the complementarity regime. It is contended that the involvement of regional 
bodies in ICC matters may be fraught with wide-ranging legal, political and practical issues. 
Involvement of regional bodies may make way for political, legal and economic implications, 
nationally, regionally and internationally. For instance, the possibility of Member States 
abrogating their duties under the Rome Statute, due to regional obligations.  
 
On the other hand, regional international law enforcement also has its advantages. Regional 
legal regimes are often more specific to the problem, politically, geographically and 
426  Over and above the African Human Rights Court’s protective mandate, the Court will have complementary, 
original and appellate jurisdiction over international crimes committed within the territory of AU Member 
States. 
427  See article 46 H (1) of the Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court 
Justice and Human Rights. 
428  See articles 6 to 8 of the Rome Statute and articles 28B, 28C, 28, D and 28M of the of the Draft Protocol on 
the Amendment to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.  
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 practically than international regimes and more general and independent than national 
regimes.429 This way, the regimes complement one another through their sub-systems 
especially when each body is acquainted with the ramifications of judicial procedures of 
another body. In theory, granting the AU complementary criminal jurisdiction over Rome 
Statute crimes would ensure accountability for these crimes as the two fora would 
supplement each other’s mutual lacks in bringing those responsible to justice. Nevertheless, 
disadvantages of sectionalism outweigh advantages. There may be a situation where each 
body, regional or global, applies only its standards, which may not be compatible with the 
other body’s standards, more so where they are treaty bodies and follow their substantive 
law.430 For instance, in the case of the AU and the ICC, in each of the founding documents, 
there is no mention of the other body’s role or procedural guidelines for Member States to 
proceed where there is a conflict of interests.  
 
Moreover, in the case of the AU and the ICC, the issue of jurisdictional hierarchy has not 
been resolved because neither regime makes a mention of another. It is surprising that the AU 
protocol makes no mention of the ICC but it is clear that article 17 does not envision 
complementarity of regional bodies. The question is whether the proposed criminal chamber 
will have primary jurisdiction over the crimes that committed within the continent. The AU 
recently adopted a decision to have African States that are members to the Rome Statute to 
first inform and seek the advice of the African Union before referring cases to the ICC.431  
Out of 54 AU Member States, 33 are ICC members and since the two fora will have 
jurisdiction on the same crimes.  This will create a situation of overlapping jurisdiction and a 
possible clash of commitments. Furthermore, the establishment of the criminal section of the 
African Court has crippling fiscal implications.432  
429  See G Hafner “Pros and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law” (2003-2004) 25 Michigan 
Journal of International Law 849 at 856. He however warns that although these regional regimes are 
complementary to national and international systems, the centralized system is prone to friction. This, he 
argues, is due to a “diversity of applicable regulations necessitates complex arguments about which 
regulation to apply, and may give rise to more conflicts than were solved by the creation of each individual 
legal regime”. 
430 Hafner 2003-2004 Michigan Journal of International Law 857 notes that this fragmentation of a legal system 
may lead to states’ forum shopping, and opting for a system that best corresponds with their national 
interests.  
431  See Decision on Africa’s Relations with the International Criminal Court Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1-2 
(Oct.2013) para 10 (viii): “That any AU Member State that wishes to refer a case to the ICC may inform and 
seek the advice of the African Union”.  
432  See M du Plessis “A Case of Negative Regional Complementarity? Giving the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights Jurisdiction over International Crimes”3, Available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/a-case-of-
negative-regional-complementarity-giving-the-african-court-of-justice-and-human-rights-jurisdiction-over-
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Another key issue is that enforcement mechanisms of one body may only settle the dispute 
within that system and not necessarily in the universal body. This fact could undermine the 
homogeneity of the system of law and lead to confusion as to which system takes precedence. 
This is also another challenge that faces Member States to the AU and the Rome Statute. 
Although the founding instruments, the AU Protocol and the Rome Statute, respectively, deal 
with more or less the same crimes, resolution of a conflict by the AU may not meet the 
standard of the Rome Statute.433 For instance, article 98(2) of the Rome Statute does not 
recognise amnesties. While the immunity of certain persons is believed to assist in peace 
negotiation and the peaceful settlement of disputes negotiations within the AU system, this 
area of law is obsolete.434 African States, under the aegis of the AU, have recently adopted a 
declaration reiterating the immunity of heads of States from prosecution at the 15th 
Extraordinary session of the Assembly of States of the African Union in Addis Ababa.435 
This will undermine the quest for accountability for core crimes of since perpetrators will 
resort to a forum that recognises their immunities. Amnesties are not suitable enforcement 
mechanisms since they forego justice for peace. This approach further contributes to 
impunity. Concisely, the creation of the criminal chamber of the African Court as well as the 
involvement of other regional criminal courts may be an unnecessary duplication of the 
ICC.436 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the complementarity regime and critically analysed the interplay 
between the ICC and national courts, bearing in mind the status of criminal justice systems in 
most African States. This was achieved through a careful scrutiny of article 17. It is generally 
international-crimes/ (Accessed 16 June 2013). (noting that “Indeed, the fiscal implications of vesting the 
court with criminal jurisdiction raise serious questions about the effectiveness, independence and 
impartiality of such a court 3 ”He opines that this project will not only be expensive for the AU but also for 
Member States as they will have to contribute to both tribunals.  
433  See B Nowrojee “Africa on its Own: Regional Intervention and Human Rights” (2004) Human Rights Watch 
World Report 1 at 4 (noting that regional interventions may ignore important components of post-conflict 
restructuring such as justice at the expense and undermine to establish suitable accountability mechanisms). 
434  B Nowrojee “Africa on its Own: Regional Intervention and Human Rights” (2004) 1 at 4 opines that 
although the  African Union is actively involved in conflict resolution and peace-keeping missions,  regional 
mechanisms it employs have proved marginal in human rights violations  
435  See Decision on Africa’s Relations with the International Criminal Court Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec para 9 
where the AU “REAFFIRMS the principles deriving from national laws and international customary law by 
which sitting Heads of State and other senior state officials are granted immunities during their tenure of 
office”.  
436 Burke-White 2003 Texas International Law Journal 731. 
101 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
 accepted that the drafters of the Rome Statute did try to strike a balance between the two 
competing interests: the need to preserve State sovereignty and the need to establish an 
independent and effective criminal justice system.437 However, a careful analysis of article 17 
of the Rome Statute and the Court’s jurisprudence has revealed the lacuna in article 17. The 
thesis therefore found that these textual deficiencies, coupled with the Court’s deviation from 
the textual approach to a stringent and purely technical interpretation of the admissibility 
criteria form the core of the strain between the Court and the AU.  
The regime was found to be deficient to the extent it fails to set out a standard criminal code 
for all States to follow for appropriate prosecution of Rome Statute crimes. Article 17 also 
fails to define time periods within which a State may be considered to be unwilling or unable 
to prosecute. It is important therefore that the Rome Statute sets a standardized approach on 
issues of jurisdiction because every State will rely on its usual criminal procedures, and this 
has roots that run back to the problem of impunity. In the same vein, the criteria’s vagueness 
as to what constitutes unjustified delay to prosecute presents another problem. This thesis 
cautions that ambiguity leaves room for politically sympathetic States to stall an ICC 
prosecution by initiating but not prosecuting timeously. In another extreme, the ICC’s 
interference in the judicial affairs of a State based on a decision that the State is unwilling 
may amount to an affront to that State’s sovereignty, as the delay may conform to that State’s 
criminal law and procedure. These findings call for inclusion of a standardized criminal 
policy with clearly defined periods for prosecution will help alleviate the interpretational 
hurdles of the admissibility criteria.   
There also seems to be a paradigm shift from the sovereignty preserving aim of the principle 
of complementarity to a system that makes it hard for States to prosecute in their own courts 
because the unwillingness criteria has become more strict through the importation of the 
“same person, same conduct” test. The thesis illustrated that through the test, the principle has 
experienced a terminological shift. It is in light of this that the thesis argues for a participatory 
dialogue between States and the Court in addressing the lacunae in article 17. The Court’s 
interpretation of a State Party referral as a form of unwillingness to prosecute nationally but as 
evidence of willingness to bring the perpetrator to justice is flawed. The fact that the ICC 
endorses referrals instead of encouraging States to prosecute nationally may lead to a situation 
where politically sympathetic States just refer cases to the ICC and stay on the sidelines while 
437  RB Philips “The International Criminal Court Statute: Jurisdiction and Admissibility Criminal Law Reform 
(1999) 10 the Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers 61-85 at 64. 
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 the Court feels the political and financial strain of an international criminal prosecution. This 
interpretation is too rigid and shows a trend away from a regime that prioritises national 
jurisdiction to a system that merely pays lip service to complementarity.438 
 
To that end, the chapter analysed perceptions of the principle of complementarity by the 
African audience and examined concerns raised in Africa regarding the Court’s execution of 
its complementary mandate in practice. Some of the concerns discussed above form the core 
of issue that the ICC will have to address to ensure its future viability. For instance, the ICC 
must be conscious of ethnic, cultural and political sensitivities of those involved in the 
conflict. This way it will foster a healthy cooperative relationship with States and encourage 
the relevant authorities to show greater zeal to end impunity. The Court should also encourage 
national prosecutions, as these will provide a long-term solution to its problems of non-
cooperation. It is suggested that the Court must follow a standardized procedure for deferring 
to domestic courts, and that the Statute provide clear guidelines detailing out when a situation 
could better be handled by States.  In addition, to assuage State fears that the Court 
discriminately investigates certain classes of offenders and ignores the contribution of the 
ruling government; it must extent its influence universally and investigate all crimes. The ICC 
should also creatively interpret the existing rules to address the deficiencies in article 17. 
Moreover, to repair the strained relationship between the Court and the AU, the Court has to 
become more nuanced in its communication with Africa, heed, and address concerns raised by 
African actors to avoid resentment and non-cooperation. The next chapter will discuss the role 
of positive complementarity and its application to State Party referrals and investigations 
initiated by the Prosecutor. This analysis will to help reverse the trajectory of State practice 
regarding this type of investigations and restore States’ confidence in the Rome Statute Justice 
System. 
438 See Keller 2010 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 214, (noting that “The ICC practice to date can be 
interpreted to support … [the] contention that the ICC is undermining complementarity via a rigid 
interpretation of State action on the same case. In particular, it seems problematic that states conducting 
wide-ranging investigations into war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide might be required to 
include the specific enumerated act that would be chosen by the Prosecutor and/or confirmed by the PTC.”). 
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 CHAPTER FOUR 
APPLYING POSITIVE COMPLEMENTARITY TO STATE PARTY REFERRALS 
AND THE PROSECUTOR’S PROPRIO MOTU INVESTIGATIONS 
“Where… there is a dernier cri, such as suggestions for the development of an international criminal law, 
it is advisable not to follow uncritically in the train of the enthusiastic protagonists of such an idea, but to 
pause and reflect on the meaning and value of it all”.439 
4.0 Introduction 
After critically analysing article 17’s complementarity regime and the ICC’s interpretation 
and application of complementarity in practice in the preceding chapter, the discussion in this 
chapter will be centred upon a collective approach to complementarity.440 This discussion is 
important because complementarity is an indispensable principle in the determination of how 
States could relate to the International Criminal Court. The chapter begins by analysing how 
application of positive complementarity to State Party Referrals and the ICC Prosecutor’s 
proprio motu investigations could be a useful development in resolving the tension between 
the ICC and African States. By so doing, it will investigate how complementarity could be 
applied to ensure regular functioning of the international criminal justice system at the 
municipal level. This is in conformity with the language, context, object and purpose of 
article 17.441 An illustrative discussion of the referral of the situation in Uganda will be 
undertaken. This is against the backdrop of the perennial concerns that have been raised over 
the ICC’s interpretation and application of the principle of complementarity in practice in 
State party referrals.442  
439  See G Schwarzenberger “The Problem of an International Criminal Law” (1950) 3 Current Legal Problems 
263.   
440  A collective approach in this context is a positivist view to the principle of complementarity as concept that 
carries the weight of the Rome Statute’s Justice System. It advocates a partnership between the ICC and 
Member States and envisions a situation where both the ICC and national judicial systems work hand-in-
hand, instead of against each other. This approach argues for a criminal justice system that is centralized 
within the municipal system, with the ICC playing a supervisory role and assisting national judiciaries in 
fighting impunity for the core crimes of international concern. The philosophy behind this is that national 
courts have a stronger nexus to the situation and can effectively deal and timeously prosecute. See Newton 
2010 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 164 (noting that “… a framework of positive 
complementarity and cooperative synergy is the only feasible way to ensure long term vitality for the ICC as 
an autonomous international institution”). 
441 The negotiating history of article 17 shows an inclination towards effective regular enforcement of 
international criminal law at the municipal level, with the ICC having political leverage to offset 
imcompetences therein. See W Burke-White “The International Criminal Court and National Courts in the 
Rome System of International Justice” (2008) 49 Harvard International Law Journal 49 at 54. 
442  Some scholars have argued that the ICC’s strict interpretation of complementarity has shifted from the letter 
of article 17. See Newton 2010 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 163. He opines that the 
interpretation of complementarity in practice has shifted from “a tone of cooperation and consultation” to 
one of competition for jurisdiction. See also Keller 2010 Santa Clara Journal of International Law  214 
(noting, “it seems problematic that states conducting wide-ranging investigations into war crimes, crimes 
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 The Pre-Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Katanga And Ngudjolo443 has interpreted a State 
Party Referral of a case to the ICC as indicia of a State’s unwillingness to prosecute 
nationally, but of its willingness to bring perpetrators to justice before the ICC. There is a 
worrying trend in State referrals; the very States that voluntarily refer their situations to the 
ICC challenge their admissibility before the Court at some later stage.444 Similarly, the 
jurisprudence of the Court proves that complementarity considerations have been more 
geared towards ICC prosecutions as opposed to national prosecutions. This chapter will 
therefore carry out a preliminary consideration and investigate how a collective approach to 
complementarity could help mediate the imperatives of international justice and sovereignty 
while alleviating the tension between the ICC and African States. To tie this up, the chapter 
will also draw lessons from the European law concept of subsidiarity as this principle is 
parallel to complementarity and unlike article 17, clearly sets out a standardized procedure 
for deferring to domestic courts. It will then scrutinize the Stocktaking Exercise adopted at 
the Review Conference on the International Criminal Court held in Kampala, Uganda. The 
Stocktaking Exercise advocated for positive complementarity and its analysis will positively 
enrich the discussion at hand. 
4.1 The Concept of Positive Complementarity 
At the ICC Chief Prosecutor’s swearing in ceremony in 2003, the then incumbent, Mr. Luis 
Moreno-Ocampo stated that lack of cases before the ICC, because of positive 
complementarity and not presence thereof, would be a measure of the Court’s success.445 
However, it has been argued in some quarters that ICC’s deferral of every case to national 
judiciaries would undermine the very existence of the Court.446 A stringent application of 
against humanity, and genocide might be required to include the specific enumerated act that would be 
chosen by the Prosecutor and/or confirmed by the PTC”). 
443  See Prosecutor v. Katanga And Ngudjolo, Reasons for the Oral Decision on the Motion Challenging the 
Admissibility of the Case (Article 19 of the Statute), ICC-01/04-01/07-1213-tENG, 16 June 2009 para 77. 
The Trial Chamber found that a state may be declared unwilling where it “chooses not to investigate or 
prosecute a person before its own courts, but has nevertheless every intention of seeing that justice is done”. 
444  There have been four State party referrals of cases to the ICC, from Uganda, the DR Congo, Cote d’lvore 
and the Central African Republic. The government of Uganda referred their situation to the ICC but later 
challenged the admissibility of the cases before the ICC claiming they are in a position and willing to 
prosecute the perpetrators nationally.  
445  See Statement Made at the Ceremony for the Solemn Undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC Mr. 
Luis Moreno-Ocampo (16 June 2003), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/otp/otp_ceremony.html. 2 (noting 
that “as a consequence of complementarity, the number of cases that reach the Court should not be a 
measure its efficiency. On the contrary, the absence of trials before this Court, as a consequence of the 
regular functioning of national institutions, would be a major success.” 
446  See B Broomhall International Justice and the International Criminal Court, Between Sovereignty and the 
Rule of Law (2004) 68 (noting that to have required the Court to defer to national courts at every step would 
have crippled the Court and “tarnished its legitimacy”. 
105 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
 complementarity, which views absence of cases before the ICC as evidence of the proper 
implementation of article 17 within national legal system, is against the letter of the principle 
of complementarity.447 Where a State is willing to prosecute genuinely, the ICC should only 
get involved to ensure that that the State in question does its best to prosecute to the extent 
required by the Rome Statute. The very impetus for the ICC was to offset national judicial 
incompetence to prosecute the most serious international crimes.448 Therefore, positive 
complementarity does not foreclose the jurisdiction of the Court where States fail to give 
provisions of the Rome Statute full weight and effect. 
 
At the 8th Session of the Assembly of States Parties in New York in March 2010, “positive 
complementarity” was defined as “all activities/actions whereby national jurisdictions are 
strengthened and enabled to conduct genuine national investigations and trials of crimes 
included in the Rome Statute…in capacity building, financial support and technical 
assistance…” without actively involving the Court.449 The paper drafted by the Bureau of the 
Assembly of States Parties, and appended to the Resolution on the Review Conference, 
emphasised that the role the Court should play in all this should be minimal due to Court’s 
irreducible budgetary constraints.450 This view differs from one by the OTP in 2003; the 
paper shifts the burden of helping build capacity of national courts from the Court to State 
parties and civil society.451 However, if the Court plays a supervisory role over national 
prosecutions, as opposed to being a “development agency” it could help national authorities 
show greater zeal in the prosecution of the Rome Statute’s crimes.  
From the foregoing, the term “positive complementarity” may be defined as a concept that 
seeks to give effect to the object and purpose of article 17, that the ICC exercise its 
jurisdiction only where states are either unwilling or incompetent to genuinely prosecute 
447  See J Holmes “Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC” in A Cassese et al (eds) The Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (2002) 667 (arguing that if states effectively exercise 
their jurisdiction, and prosecute the crimes listed in article 5 of the Rome Statute, the Court “will not be 
seized of any cases”. 
448  See J Holmes “Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC” in A Cassese et al (eds) The Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (2002) 667. He also quotes Ambassador Phillippe 
Kirsch stating that: “It is the essence of the principle of complementarity that if a national judicial system 
functions properly, there is no need for the ICC to assume jurisdiction”.   
449  See Review Conference Resolution ICC-ASP/8/Res.9, adopted at the 10th Plenary Meeting, 25 March 2010, 
Appendix para 16.  
450  See Appendix of the Review Conference Resolution ICC-ASP/8/Res.9 adopted at 10th plenary meeting, (25 
March 2010) “Taking Stock of the Principle of Complementarity: Bridging the Impunity Gap”.  Para 4 states 
that the ICC is not a development agency. 
451 See Statement Made at the Ceremony for the Solemn Undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC Mr. 
Luis Moreno-Ocampo (16 June 2003), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/otp/otp_ceremony.html  
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 those responsible.452 This concept is based on a “presumption in favour of municipal judicial 
action”453 unless there is a clear case of incompetence. It fundamentally requires that the ICC 
defer to national judiciaries while encouraging and facilitating national prosecutions of the 
core crimes. It is however, submitted that the Court must be diligent in executing its mandate 
and only assert its jurisdiction where there is a clear case of incompetence. Similarly, where 
states voluntarily defer cases to the ICC, the ICC has to satisfy itself that the case in question 
meets the criteria in article 17, that the State is indeed unwilling or unable to prosecute the 
core crimes nationally.  
4.1.1 The Establishment of a Healthy Cooperative Synergy between the ICC and States 
Moreover, as a pivotal guiding principle of the ICC justice system, a positive approach to the 
principle of complementarity would require the Court, in its quest to help states prosecute 
international crimes according to the letter of article 17. This is predicated on the Court’s 
mandate to enforce the rule of law where states fail to do so. The Court could use its 
supranational power, encourage and monitor national prosecutions to ensure accountability 
for grave breaches of international human rights law, rather than compete with national courts 
for jurisdiction.454 The Court may also need to be actively involved in certain special cases 
that require the expertise lacking within the prosecuting State through a division of labour 
where it becomes necessary. This approach will foster a dialogue between the ICC and states 
and while preserving State sovereignty, and ensure the effectiveness of the international 
criminal justice system.  
 
Once the State authorities feel in control of the judicial process, this will foster a healthy 
synergy between the Court and domestic judiciaries. This will help both forums implement 
452  See P Akhavan “The Lord’s Resistance Army Case: Uganda’s Submission of the First State Referral to the 
International Criminal Court” (2005)99 American Journal of International Law 403 at 413. He notes that on 
one hand, a negative interpretation of article 17 would assume that the role of the ICC is to replace national 
trials where states are found to be either unwilling or unable to prosecute. On the other hand, a positive 
interpretation would assume that article 17 limits the Court’s jurisdiction to those cases where there is a 
conflict of jurisdiction between the ICC and national courts. See also Burke-White 2008 Harvard 
International Law Journal 56, (noting that the positive approach to complementarity “utilizes the full range 
of legal and political levers of influence available to the Court to encourage and at times even assist national 
governments in prosecuting international crimes themselves”). 
453 See M Newton “The Quest for Constructive Complementarity” University of Vanderbilt Law School Public 
and Legal Theory Working Paper Number 10-16 (April 6, 2010). See also C Stahn and M El Zeidy (eds) 
International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice (2011) 14. 
454  See Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the ICC, Statement of the Prosecutor to the Diplomatic Corps (Feb. 
12, 2004), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/LOM_20040212_En.pdf, (accessed 10 July 
2013). He advocated for a positive approach to complementarity “rather than competing with national 
systems for jurisdiction, we will encourage national proceedings wherever possible”.  
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 and execute strategies that offset mutual inadequacies in either institution, the ICC will make 
sure perpetrators are punished and the States will cooperate. Considering the current state of 
affairs between the ICC and the African States, the AU 2009 declaration of non-cooperation, 
and the Union’s general hostility455 and African State Parties’ failure to apprehend the 
President of the Sudan, Al Bashir, it is necessary for the ICC to reconsider its approach to 
complementarity.456 Similarly, while other African countries like Botswana, South Africa, 
Chad and Benin pledged their commitment to the ICC’s request to apprehend Bashir, Kenya 
however, publicly invited him to the Darfur Crisis Conference held in March 2010. This 
policy does not suggest a complete deferral to all States, a notion that would undermine the 
very existence of a clearly indispensable institution. It encourages a participatory dialogue 
between the Court and States that will result in a harmonious relationship. It is however, 
regrettable that not all States will be politically willing or able to prosecute the crimes in 
articles 6 to 8. However, States that honour their international duty to prosecute and have a 
stronger nexus to the cases should be given a chance to prosecute. 
 
Essentially, this notion requires that national courts be given primacy over the crimes defined 
by the Rome Statute with an aim to ensure regular enforcement of international criminal law 
through a more resourceful system. Accordingly, complementarity is not to be merely applied 
as a procedural requirement before the ICC admits cases but as a concept, that encourages 
domestic prosecution and helps harness a constructive relationship between the ICC and 
States. In this fashion, complementarity will operate in such a way that ICC intervention will 
only be exceptional – only in cases where no proceedings have been conducted or a State has 
initiated an investigation but there is evidence of malice. This way, the ICC will not only be 
influential in the face of actual prosecutions before it. It could steer the national criminal 
justice system towards genuine investigatory and prosecutorial processes through its political 
leverage and power to pronounce on the incompetence thereof.457  
 
455 See Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XIII) Assembly/AU/Dec.245(XIII) Rev.1 Page 2 para 10 provides: “… 
in view of the fact that the request by the African Union has never been acted upon, the AU Member States 
shall not cooperate pursuant to the provisions of Article 98 of the Rome Statute of the ICC relating to 
immunities, for the arrest and surrender of President Omar El Bashir of The Sudan”. 
456  M Du Plessis The International Criminal Court that Africa Wants (2010) 17. 
457  See Burke-White 2008 Harvard International Law Journal 54 (noting that under a proactive 
complementarity policy “the ICC would cooperate with national governments and use political leverage to 
encourage states to undertake their own prosecutions of international crimes”). 
108 
 
                                                            
 Michael Newton supports this approach and suggests that in order to preserve the 
constructive “cooperative synergy” that complementarity seeks to establish, the principle 
should be viewed not as empowering the ICC to wrest specific cases from the jurisdiction of 
national courts but as restrictive one.458 He argues that the restrictive nature of the principle is 
borne by the operational language of article 17 that limits the Court’s jurisdiction to cases 
that do not meet the criteria therein.459 That is, complementarity should be used to encourage 
national prosecution of international crimes in willing and able states, or states that can, with 
little technical assistance, meet the prosecutorial requirements of the Rome Statute. This way, 
the Court will pronounce upon the judicial inadequacies of national courts and prosecute only 
after though factual inquiries and judicial findings have been made into the admissibility of a 
case. William Burke-White also advocates a similar policy termed “proactive 
complementarity”.460 He argues that in order to bridge the gap between the Court’s mandate 
and its limited resources, complementarity should engender a partnership between the Court 
and States, maintain a positive relationship of joint forces geared towards effective 
prosecution of the crimes that plague the international community.461  
 
In the same vein, this notion requires that the ICC stand on the sidelines and motivate States 
that have a closer connection to the case and are resourceful. The ICC is to use its political 
leverage as a last resort, where there is evidence of incompetency. This approach however 
will be viable in situations where the State in question is willing to administer the ends of 
justice. For instance, it would be difficult for the ICC Prosecutor to assist a state that does not 
recognise the Court’s authority. Considering the trajectory of State practice regarding State 
Party Referrals, where states have in the past self-referred cases to the ICC only to challenge 
their admissibility, adoption of the positive complementarity policy will help prevent a 
backlog of cases at the Hague through encouraging national prosecution of the core crimes 
and best serve the ends of justice. 
 
It is against this backdrop that it is argued that application of a policy of positive 
complementarity to state party referrals and the Prosecutor’s proprio motu investigations will 
help strengthen and promote the effectiveness of international criminal justice processes at 
458  See Newton 2010 University of Vanderbilt Law School Public and Legal Theory Working Paper 8. 
459  See Newton 2010 University of Vanderbilt Law School Public and Legal Theory Working Paper  8. 
460  Burke-White 2008 Harvard International Law Journal 54. 
461  See Burke-White 2008 Harvard International Law Journal 56. He advocates an IC C that uses its influence 
and power to encourage and empower states to carry out national prosecutions in their own courts. 
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 the national level. This could help lessen the tension between the Court and African states. 
Furthermore, the sad reality is that the ICC as a supranational judicial body has practical and 
fiscal limitations and can only handle a few cases. In the end, this approach seeks to enhance 
the Court’s limited resources and ensure accountability for genocide, war crimes, aggression 
and crimes against humanity, by encouraging a state that has a stronger link to the case in 
question to prosecute.  
 
4.2 Applying Positive Complementarity to State Party Referrals (Self-Referrals)  
The ICC’s complementary jurisdiction may be triggered by one of the three ways laid down 
in article 13 of the Statute. It provides that the Court has jurisdiction over a situation that has 
been referred to it by a State party (self-referrals);462 or where the United Nations Security 
Council has transmitted a request to the Court to investigate a situation, pursuant to Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter.463 Article 13 also gives the Prosecutor power to initiate an 
investigation proprio motu in a situation when he/she has reasonable belief that the core 
crimes proscribed by the Statute have been committed therein.464 In terms of article 14 of the 
Statute, a State Party may refer its situation to the Court for investigation and/or prosecution 
where there is evidence that a national of that State has committed crimes within the Court’s 
jurisdiction or the alleged crimes have been committed within that state’s territory.465 The 
wording of article 13(1) and 14(1) clearly indicate that the State may refer a situation as 
opposed to specific cases to the Court.  
 
Since the Court became operational, there have been three State Party referrals in terms of 
article 14 of the Statute. First, in December 2003, the Ugandan government referred the 
situation in Northern Uganda regarding atrocious crimes committed during an internal 
conflict between the Ugandan government and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) to the 
462  See article 15(1). It provides that a State Party may refer a situation in which the crimes under the Court’s 
jurisdiction have been committed, with all the necessary documentation proving that crimes within the ICC’s 
jurisdiction have been committed.  
463  Pursuant to its Chapter VII powers under the UN Charter, the United Nations Security Council may refer a 
situation to the Court where crimes set out by article 5 of the Statute have been committed. See article 13 (b) 
in this regard. The Security Council is the guardian of international peace and security and as such, has the 
power to refer any cases where crimes that threaten international security and order to the ICC for 
prosecution.  
464  See article 13, it gives the ICC Prosecutor the discretion to initiate investigations into situations where she 
has reasonable belief that crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court have been committed. 
465  See Article 14 of the Rome Statute. 
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 ICC.466 The Prosecutor formally opened an investigation into the matter in July 2004. 
Second, the Democratic Republic of Congo also referred the situation in the Ituri region of 
the country to the ICC in April 2004, because, among others, the authorities were unable to 
apprehend the named suspects.467 The Office of the Prosecutor initiated a formal 
investigation on 23 June 2004.468 Third, the government of the Central African Republic also 
referred the post-election violence situation in CAR to the ICC on 22 December 2004. The 
Prosecutor opened an investigation on May 22 2007, investigating, among others, the 
Congolese, Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo for crimes against humanity. It is interesting that these 
States cited failure to apprehend suspects as indicia of their inability to prosecute, yet in all 
sense it is practically more difficult for the ICC to apprehend such suspects. Even more 
disturbing is Uganda’s subsequent attempt to have the ICC defer its cases merely because 
they have located one of the Suspects. 
 
Even in cases of a self-referral, the Rome Statute requires the ICC Prosecutor to determine 
the admissibility of the ‘case’ before the Court prior to embarking on an investigation. This is 
in line with the complementarity principle that requires that before the ICC can exercise its 
complementary jurisdiction, the State concerned be shown to be unwilling or unable to 
prosecute locally. To further safeguard a State’s primary right to prosecute international 
crimes against an overweening prosecutor; article 18(2) requires the State concerned to 
respond with its investigation within a month where a State Party has referred a case to the 
Court. 469 Meanwhile, the State concerned is supposed to continue with its investigation 
unless the Prosecutor presents evidence that renders the State investigation significantly 
lacking.470 In a carefully balanced fashion, the Rome Statute emphasises the primacy of 
domestic jurisdiction over the core crimes and domestic judiciaries are regarded the default 
forum. This is evident in the language of article 18.  It requires that the ICC Prosecutor’s 
investigation be on hold while the domestic authorities continue with their investigation. This 
rule applies even in cases where the case has been referred to the ICC and the case meets the 
admissibility criterion. 
 
466  See generally P Akhavan “The Lord’s Resistance Army Case: Uganda’s Submission of the First State 
Referral to the International Criminal Court” (2005) 99 The American Journal of International Law 405-406. 
467  See B Olympia and S Sengeeta “Realising the Potential of the ICC: An African Experience” (2006) 6 
Human Rights Law Review 499 at 521. 
468  See Olympia and Sengeeta 2006 Human Rights Law Review 521. 
469  See article 18(2) of the Rome Statute. 
470  See Article 18(2). 
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 4.2.1 The State Party Referral Provision: Article 14 of the Rome Statute 
The question of when and how the ICC would exercise its jurisdiction was among the 
carefully negotiated provisions by States during the Rome Conference of Plenipotentiaries. 
As one of the three ways in which the Court’s jurisdiction may be triggered, a State Party 
referral has been a controversial subject of legal scholarship.471 Kress argues that the drafters 
of the Rome Statute did not envisage a State Party referral in the fashion it has unfolded in 
the cases of Uganda, the DR Congo and the Central African Republic, all of which were self-
referred to the ICC by the respective States.472 This argument emanates from the negotiating 
history of the provision and the much debated question whether a self-referral equates a 
waiver of complementarity.473  
 
An analysis of the drafting history of article 14 shows that it was based on the assumption 
that the territorial or nationality State, having a stronger nexus to the situation, would 
normally exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed within its territory. In line with State’s 
insistence upon giving the ICC jurisdiction only over exceptional cases, it was envisaged that 
a State Party’s voluntary surrender of its jurisdiction by way of a referral of the situation to 
the Court would be rare, if not improbable. However, State practice regarding referrals has 
taken on a different direction: so far the bulk of the ICC docket is made up of self-referred 
cases from the DR Congo, Uganda, the Central African Republic and Cote D’ Ivoire. While 
paragraph six of the preamble to the Rome Statute recognises and emphasises the duty of 
States to exercise their jurisdiction, it would seem that a state party referral was offered in the 
alternative. This way, a territorial State passively exercises its duty by ensuring that 
perpetrators of the core crimes are punished, be it by the Court or the State itself.   
471 C Kress “‘Self-Referrals’ and ‘Waivers of Complementarity’ Some Considerations in Law and Policy” 
(2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 944 at 945. He notes that the evolving practice of 
referrals of cases to the ICC by States that would otherwise be expected to exercise territorial jurisdiction 
over them differs from what was envisaged by drafters of the Rome Statute as it was reasonably expected 
that States would rather prosecute nationally than have the Court do so on their behalf. He says the Drafters 
thought the idea of a State Party referral would be “as rare as are state complaints under international human 
rights instruments”. See also W Burke-White and S Kaplan “Shaping the Contours of Domestic Justice, the 
International Criminal Court and an Admissibility Challenge in the Ugandan Situation” (2009) 7 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 257 at 259 (noting that “Such self-referrals were not generally contemplated 
during the drafting of the Statute”). 
472  See Kress 2004 Journal of International Criminal Justice 944. He notes that negotiators of the Rome Statute 
assumed that state party referrals would be rare exceptions: “as rare as are state complaints under 
international human rights instruments”.  
473  See Kress Journal of International Criminal Justice (2004) 945, (noting that “the evolving practice in 
question which…be referred to as one of self-referrals and, possibly, one of subsequent waivers of 
complementarity”). See also TA Muller and I Stegmiller “Self-Referrals on Trial - From Panacea to Patient” 
(2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1267-1294.  
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Another equally important question is whether, given the Court’s limited resources, it is 
tenable for a state that is “able” to conduct a prosecution to surrender voluntarily its case to 
the authority of the ICC pursuant to article 14.474 Article 14(1) of the Rome Statute provides: 
“A State Party may refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the Court appear to have been committed requesting the Prosecutor to investigate the situation for the 
purpose of determining whether one or more specific persons should be charged with the commission of 
such crimes.”475 
The referral of a situation to the ICC has often been called a “self-referral” because the 
territorial state on whose soil the crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction have been committed 
voluntarily referred the situation. The negotiators at the Rome Conference assumed State 
Party referrals would be a rare occurrence in the jurisprudence of the Court, and delegates did 
not envision a situation where the territorial state would hand its citizens to the authority of 
the ICC.476 However, the first three situations before the Court were self-referrals. These 
were pursuant to article 14 of the Rome Statute. 
 
Article 14(2) on the face of it, authorises a State Party to the Rome Statute to refer a situation 
to the ICC where the crimes listed in article 5 of the Statute have been committed. Although 
article 14 does not expressly provide for a territorial State referral of its situation to the ICC, 
the Court’s practice has mirrored a situation where the territorial state refers its cases to the 
Court. The general understating is also that a State Party referral is exercisable by a State 
with a direct link to the case in question, for instance, the territorial State. An interesting 
question is whether it is tenable, as a matter of law and policy, for a State to have the 
unrestrained freedom to refer a case to the ICC and later purport to withdraw its referral 
based on the primacy of domestic jurisdiction. Against the background of customary 
international law duty of States to prosecute, which is reiterated in paragraph six of the 
Preamble to the Statute, it is hard to reconcile this interpretation of article 14 with standard 
treaty practice.477 In terms of international legal policy, a State has to abide by its treaty 
obligations.478 It is for this reason that the author finds the referral provision poses a risk of 
474  This question is motivated by Uganda’s referral of its situation to the ICC and its subsequent attempted 
withdrawal of the referral. Closely linked to this is whether a state’s referral of a situation amounts to a 
waiver of complementarity. 
475  See article 14(1) of the Rome Statute. Article 13(a) also provides that the ICC will have jurisdiction where a 
situation has been referred to it by a state and crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction have been committed.  
476  See Kress 2004 Journal of International Criminal Justice 944. 
477  Treaty practice requires that a state satisfy its treaty obligations and not cite political reasons as excuses to 
abdicate its duties. 
478   See article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (entered into force on 27 January 1980) UN 
Doc. A/CONF. 39/27. International Legal Materials, (1969) 679-735 (hereafter cited as Vienna Convention 
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 States abdicating their duty to prosecute international crimes to the ICC for political 
convenience. 
 
4.2.2 Implications of a State Party Referral 
Considering State sensitivities when it comes to their internal affairs and the fact that the 
territorial state has the closest link to crimes committed within its territory, referral of a 
situation to the ICC raises complex legal issues. For instance, whether an unrestrained right 
of a state to refer cases to the ICC does not defeat the purpose of complementarity: that the 
ICC should only intervene in exceptional circumstances. In another vein, State party referrals 
of every case to the ICC will potentially undermine the expeditious trial of those accused of 
international crimes. Regarding the legality of a referral of a case by a State that has 
jurisdiction and a duty to prosecute, the then ICC Prosecutor stated that there are cases where 
referral of a situation to the Court is the appropriate course of action.479 For instance, where 
the State is engulfed and incapacitated by the conflict that a national prosecution would not 
serve the ends of justice. In this case, the Prosecutor noted that the State in question and the 
ICC would work together to share the burden. Furthermore, both the Court and the State 
work together to prosecute, however, the proceedings will be international.480 It follows 
therefore, that where the State’s judicial system is inoperative due to insurgencies, it may be 
desirable for a case to be handled by the ICC and not a local court, for reason of the 
unavailability or inadequacy of the judicial process in the State in question. However, even in 
such cases, the ICC has to be certain local proceedings will not yield the desired results and 
that only an ICC prosecution could supplement the incompetence of the State in question. 
 
While a self-referral may seem, on the face of it, to be a legal concern, it raises the question 
of its proper application. An unrestrained right of a state to refer a case to the  Court could in 
the long run only catch up with the Court’s limited resources and practicality problems. A 
state party referral may as well be influenced by the need on the part of the referring state to 
escape the political pressure or handling international cases and/or to escape fiscal 
on the Law of Treaties). It provides: “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith”. The third preambular paragraph of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties also emphasizes the principles of free consent and of good faith and the pacta sunt servanda rule.  
479  See Paper on Some Policy Issues before the Office of the Prosecutor ICC-OTP September 2003 para 5 
(noting: “There may be cases where inaction by States is the appropriate course of action. For example, the 
Court and a territorial State incapacitated by mass crimes may agree that a consensual division of labour is 
the most logical and effective approach”). 
480  See Paper on Some Policy Issues before the Office of the Prosecutor ICC-OTP September 2003 para 5. 
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 implications of prosecuting such cases. In the same vein, a state party referral is also prone to 
abuse by the government that seeks to “selectively” hold its opponents accountable while it is 
in itself responsible for certain crimes.481 For instance, in the Ugandan referral, there were 
concerns over the symmetry of the referral as it only covered mass atrocities committed by 
LRA leaders when there was supposedly evidence implicating the ruling government.482 
Although the Prosecutor has adopted an approach that ensures symmetry, by investigating not 
only the named suspects but also the whole situation,483 there is a real danger of the 
authorities downplaying evidence that could implicate them. 
 
Owing to State practice regarding self-referrals, it would be constructive for the ICC to apply 
the principle of complementarity to encourage national prosecution even where a state has 
referred a case citing inability. The least the Court can do in such cases is to assess the nature 
of the inability and work with States to help build judicial capacity of the state in question. If 
national prosecution is considered a viable option as opposed to an ICC prosecution, the State 
in question should be encouraged to prosecute. Also, since a national prosecution is regarded 
as the default prosecution hence the Statute’s emphasis that the jurisdiction of the ICC is only 
complementary; a State Party Referral should not be regarded as an estoppel to admissibility 
challenges.484 Instead, where a State voluntarily refers cases but later challenges its 
admissibility before the Court, claiming to be “able” and “willing” to prosecute, such a State 
should be given a chance to prosecute with the ICC exerting pressure to make sure the state 
prosecutes effectively as contemplated by the Statute. In this scenario, the Court will also 
have to determine the motivation behind the admissibility challenge and the legitimacy of the 
subsequent intention by the State to prosecute nationally. This will help the Court determine 
481  See Kress 2004 Journal of International Criminal Justice 946. Arguing that “there may be a temptation of 
the territorial state to proceed to what may be called a 'selective or asymmetrical self-referral' where the de 
jure government is itself party to an internal armed conflict”. 
482  See K Souare “The International Criminal Court and African Conflicts: The Case of Uganda” (2009) 36 
Review of African Political Economy 369 at 373, (noting that “The Ugandan government’s 
counterinsurgency has also been brutal toward Acholi, as the NRA and its successor, the Uganda People’s 
Defence Force (UPDF), have focused their use of force on destroying suspected rebel support among 
civilians”). 
483  See Letter by the Chief Prosecutor of 17 June 2004 addressed to the President of the ICC as attached to the 
decisions of the Presidency of ICC the Decision of the Presidency assigning the situation in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo to Pre-Trial Chamber I, 5 July 2004, ICC-01/04, and the Decision of the Presidency 
assigning the situation in Uganda to Pre-Trial Chamber II, 5 July 2004, ICC-02/04. 
484  See Newton 2010 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 161. He argues that there is no provision in the 
Rome Statute that strips a State that has referred a case to the ICC of its right to reclaim its pre-existing 
jurisdiction to prosecute the case nationally subsequent to the referral. He notes “complementarity creates a 
regime of primary domestic jurisdiction with supranational jurisdiction exercised on an exceptional basis”. 
115 
 
                                                            
 if the State in question can indeed investigate and prosecute the crimes to the extent required 
by the Rome Statute. 
 
The Ugandan government, as noted above, referred the situation in their country to the ICC 
for reason of inability to apprehend suspects.485 However, the government later challenged 
the admissibility of these cases before the ICC claiming they were not only “willing” to 
prosecute those responsible, but they were also in a position to hold genuine trials.486 This 
case will be used as a litmus test for positive complementarity in self-referrals, to investigate 
how the principle may be used to help empower states to commit to prosecution of 
international crimes without necessarily overriding their sovereignty or compromising 
international criminal justice system processes. The Ugandan case represents a first state 
party referral, interpretation and application of the principle of complementarity by the Court. 
 
4.2.3 The Situation in Uganda 
For purposes of putting the Ugandan referral into perspective, a short synopsis of the referral 
and events leading up to the government’s attempt to challenge the admissibility of the cases 
is necessary. A cursory view of the background of the conflict will also throw some light on 
the nature of the conflict and help determine whether Uganda was unable or unwilling to 
prosecute nationally. This will also help understand the motive behind the Ugandan 
government’s decision to refer the LRA case to the ICC. 
 
4.2.3.1 Background of the Conflict 
Before delving into how application of positive complementarity to the situation in Uganda 
would have spun things around, a brief historical overview of the conflict that has haunted the 
northern region country for more than two decades, is necessary. The history of Uganda has 
been characterised by a series of insurgencies since the 1980s.487 Some scholars suggest that 
the root cause of these conflicts is the division between the northern and southern part of the 
country.488 For instance, that the northern region which was mainly a recruitment base for the 
485  See section 4.2 in page 7 above. See also Akhavan (2005) 99The American Journal of International Law 
405-406 for a general discussion. 
486  See also Akhavan (2005) 99 The American Journal of International Law 406. 
487  See Souare 2009 Review of African Political Economy 372. He notes that there have been many rebellions in 
Uganda since the 1980s. 
488  See Souare 2009 Review of African Political Economy 373 (noting that the insurgencies were due in part to 
the perceived economic marginalization of the North who unfortunately had “a history of being only 
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 military, and which ruled the country after independence, was economically marginalised.489 
Yoweri Museveni, the then leader of the National Resistance Army (NRA) and the incumbent 
president of Uganda, became a President after the government of Milton Obote, a northern 
Ugandan, was overthrown in a 1986 coup.490 It has been argued that Northern Ugandans 
perpetrated the rebellions that followed thereafter in an attempt to win back power from the 
South.491  
 
The LRA insurgency is the most recent and protracted, and of interest to this thesis because it 
is the subject of an ICC referral. The LRA was born when Joseph Kony, its commander-in-
chief, succeeded his cousin, Alice Auma Lakwena, the leader of the Holy Spirit Movement 
(HSM) and self-proclaimed prophet, in 1988.492 Kony also claimed to have inherited Alice’s 
spiritual powers and asserted that insurgency was an attempt to spiritually cleanse the 
northern region of the country and rule it by the Lord’s 10 commandments.493 This conflict 
was characterised by gross violations of human rights, which included acts of wilful killing, 
torture, abductions and conscripting of children into the rebel army, and other inhumane acts 
such as amputation committed against the civilian population.494 Moreover, the crimes 
committed during the conflict were within the Court’s jurisdiction and they included large-
scale wilful killing of the civilian population; and the brutal severing of tongues, ears, lips 
and other limbs of the civilian population.495 It is noteworthy that these crimes fall under the 
rubric of the Rome Statute’s crimes against humanity and war crimes. This means that the 
Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the situation in Uganda if the Ugandan government 
failed to investigate or prosecute genuinely. However, the Court only has jurisdiction over 
peripherally included in the economic structures and processes of the country”. See also Akhavan (2005) 
99The American Journal of International Law 405-406. 
489  See A Omara-Otunnu “The Dynamics of Conflict in Uganda” in OW Furley (ed) Conflict in Africa (1995) 
223 at 226. 
490  See S Finnstrom “War of the Past and War in the Present: The Lord’s Resistance Movement/ Army in 
Uganda, Africa” (2006) 76 Journal of the International African Institute 200-220 for a general discussion of 
the revolutions that have for decades waged in Uganda. 
491  See KP Apuuli “Amnesty and International Law: The Case of the Lord’s Resistance Army Insurgents in 
Northern Uganda” (2005) 5 African Journal of Conflict Resolution 37. See also S Finnstrom 2006 Journal of 
the International African Institute 200-220. 
492  See Akhavan 2005 99 American Journal of International Law 407. 
493  See K Souare 2009 Review of African Political Economy 373. He notes “Kony proclaims himself a 
messianic prophet, declaring that he aims to overthrow the government in  Kampala and rule Uganda 
according to the Ten Commandment”. See also Waddell N and Clark P (eds) “War and Justice in Northern 
Uganda: An Assessment of the International Criminal Court’s Intervention. Courting Conflict? Justice, 
Peace and the ICC in Africa” (March 2008) African Affairs 1 at 21. 
494  N Waddell and P Clark 2008 African Affairs 21. 
495  See T Nkonge “Prosecution of International Crimes in Uganda: Prospects and Challenges: A case Study of 
Thomas Kwoyelo alias Latoni v Uganda” LLB Dissertation, (June 2012) Makerere University, Kampala, 3. 
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 crimes committed after Uganda became a party to the Rome Statute.496 Additionally, since 
the crimes were systematic and large-scale,497 the case was of the required seriousness to 
warrant action by the Court.498 Uganda was both the territorial and nationality state and had 
primary jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute those responsible for this atrocities. 
 
4.2.3.2 Efforts by the Ugandan Government to Investigate and Prosecute Nationally 
The LRA rebellion waged for more than two decades, evidence of the government’s failure to 
stop the rebellion and protect the civilian population. Although people from the Northern 
region of the Country perpetrated the LRA attacks, they were not only directed at the 
governmental authority of Museveni but also at the civilian population in a plan to spiritually 
cleanse the country. The UPDF’s counter-attacks against the LRA did not yield any results as 
the LRA supposedly had support from Sudan.499 In an attempt to stop the suffering, the 
government passed an Amnesty Bill in 1999 that was adopted on January 21, 2000.500 This 
Act called upon those who partook in the hostilities since 1986 to surrender arms and stop the 
conflict and promised that no consequence will come of their actions in the war.501 Although 
this Act sought to provide the LRA with an incentive to stop the attacks, they continued to 
wage war. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights also criticised 
Uganda’s decision as an encouragement of the impunity culture and as inconsistent with 
international norms to hold criminals accountable.502 
496  In terms of article 11(1) of the Rome Statute, the ICC lacks jurisdiction ratione temporis over the crimes 
committed before the Rome Statute’s entry into force. 
497  See M El Zeidy, “The Ugandan Government Triggers the First Test of the Complementarity Principle: An 
Assessment of the First State's Party Referral to the ICC” (2005) 5 International Criminal Law Review 83 at 
88 (noting that between 1995 and 1998 approximately “600 people were killed in Gulu district and Lamwo 
County close to the Sudanese border. An estimated number of more than 10,000 children from the northern 
region (Gulu-Kitgum-Apac-Lira-Adjumani-Arua and Moyo) between ages 6-15 have been abducted by the 
LRA since 1986.” 
498  See article 17(1) (d) of the Rome Statute. See also El Zeidy 2005 International Criminal Law Review 91 
(arguing that the crimes committed by the LRA constituted serious human rights violations and were 
committed on a massive scale and thus amounted to the war crimes and crimes against humanity). 
499  See Akhavan 2005 American Journal of International Law 409. He argues that the government could not 
thwart the LRA because they had support from Sudan as this undermined efforts to stop the conflict. 
500  See Akhavan 2005 American Journal of International Law 409. See also the Amnesty Act, 2000, at 
<http://www.c-r.org/accord/uganda/accord 1/downloads/2000Jan_The_Amnesty_ Act.doc> (accessed 27 
August 2013). 
501  Amnesty Act 2000 (Uganda). Available at  http://www.c-r.org/accord/uganda/accord 
1/downloads/2000Jan_The_Amnesty_ Act.doc> (accessed 11 September 2013). 
502  See UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Mission Undertaken by Her Office, Pursuant 
to Commission Resolution 2000/60, to Assess the Situation on the Ground with Regard to the Abduction of 
Chil- dren from Northern Uganda UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/86 (2001) paras. 12-13. Available at < 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/ (accessed 12 August 2013) (noting that "a blanket amnesty, particularly 
where war crimes and crimes against humanity have been committed, promotes a culture of impunity and is 
not in conformity with international standards and practice.”). 
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Essentially, Uganda’s attempt to grant immunity to those responsible for the crimes 
committed during the war did not only fall short end the conflict, but was also inconsistent 
with its duty to prosecute international crimes. In this context, it is worth noting that at this 
point Uganda had not ratified the Rome Statute and its attempt was not necessarily to secure 
international prosecution of the perpetrators but to stop the conflict as the Amnesty Act 
offered the perpetrators a clean slate should they cease-fire. As the atrocities continued 
unabated, despite counter-insurgency attempts and amnesty offers, the government ratified 
the Rome Statute on June 14, 2002.503 However, despite several diplomatic attempts to stop 
the bloodshed, the conflict resumed in 2005.504 Seeming to have exhausted all the viable 
options, excluding national prosecution that was feared would be potentially biased; ideas of 
referral of the ICC emerged.505 Akhavan argues that referral to the ICC was the only viable 
option at the time since the ICC had political leverage by way of international cooperation in 
order to gain access to the suspects in Sudan.506 
 
4.2.3.3 Referral to the Situation to the ICC and its Aftermath 
Having failed to put an end to the conflict, the Ugandan government referred the situation to 
the ICC in confidence, and the Prosecutor kept it secret for seven months.507 The referral 
called upon the ICC Prosecutor to investigate mass atrocities committed by the LRA in 
Northern Uganda, noting that the Ugandan government had failed to apprehend those 
responsible.508 After the government referred the on-going conflict to the ICC, an 
investigation was initiated and in October 2005, five unsealed arrest warrants were issued 
against LRA leaders:509 Joseph Kony; Vincent Otti; Okot Odhiambo; Dominic Ongwen and 
503  See ICC Press Release, ‘President of Uganda refers situation concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 
to the ICC’, ICC20040129-44-En, 29 February 2004 (accessed 27 August 2012). 
504  See “Uprooted and Forgotten – Impunity and Human Rights Abuses in Northern Uganda” (2005) 17 (12A) 
Human Rights Watch 1 at 2 Available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/uganda0905/uganda0905.pdf. 
(Accessed 9 October 2013) (Noting “…the failure of the Ugandan government to address the concerns of the 
people of northern Uganda has been especially troubling”). See also Akhavan 2005 American Journal of 
International Law 410. He notes that the 1999 Sudan-Uganda Non Intervention Agreement between Uganda 
and Sudan meant that Sudan was no longer justified in Law to continue aiding the LRA. However, Sudan 
continued to harbour them. 
505  See Akhavan 2005 American Journal of International Law 405 (noting that “the imprimatur of international 
criminal justice, sought through the referral to the ICC, was a means of thrusting this long-forgotten African 
war back onto the international stage”). 
506  See Akhavan 2005 American Journal of International Law 411. 
507  See ICC Press Release, ‘President of Uganda refers situation concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 
to the ICC’, ICC20040129-44-En, 29 February 2004 2004 (accessed 27 August 2012). 
508 K Souare 2009 Review of African Political Economy 374. 
509  See K Souare 2009 Review of African Political Economy 374. 
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 Raska Lukwiya.510 The charges against the named suspects were among others, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes, namely, sexual enslavement; mutilation, murder, rape, 
forced abduction.511 Kony himself was charged with 33 counts of crimes against humanity. 
The LRA continued to wage war even after the warrants of arrest had been issued.  
 
The Ugandan government continued its attempts to stop the conflict through a series of peace 
negotiations in Juba, Sudan in 2006.512 The Juba Peace Agreement’s agenda was cessation of 
the hostilities and presented a comprehensive solution to the conflict, which comprised a 
formal and informal accountability and reconciliation plan. The final 2007 Peace and 
Reconciliation Agreement between the Ugandan government and the LRA leadership 
specified the reconciliation and accountability framework: this included the establishment of 
the War Crimes Division of the High Court that would prosecute those who were most 
responsible for the crimes committed during the conflict.513 The agreement also provided for 
other non-penal justice mechanisms such as truth-telling commissions and other ceremonial 
transitional justice mechanisms for crimes of a lesser magnitude.514 However, a few days 
before the signing of the agreement the ICC Prosecutor delivered a public statement stating 
that the warrants against the LRA suspect would not be withdrawn.515 The prosecutor 
510  See "President of Uganda Refers Situation Concerning the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC", The 
Hague, 29 January 2004, available at, <http://www.icc-cpi.int/php/index.php> [hereinafter Ugandan 
Referral]. See also A Arief et al “International Criminal Court Cases in Africa: Status and Policy Issues” (7 
March 2011) Congressional Research Service 21. Available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34665.pdf 
(accessed 9 September 2013). 
511  See Arief A et al “International Criminal Court Cases in Africa: Status and Policy Issues” (7 March 2011) 
Congressional Research Service 21. Available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34665.pdf (accessed 9 
September 2013). 
512  See Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation Between the Lord’s Resistance 
Army/Movement and the Government of Uganda, 19 February 2008 [hereinafter February 2008 Agreement], 
available at 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/Annexure_to_agreement_on_Accountability_signed_today.pdf. See also 
KS Kasande “Centring Women’s Rights in Transitional Justice Processes in Northern Uganda: FIDA-
Uganda’s Experience” African Transitional Justice Research Network Workshop 1 at 4. Available at 
http://www.transitionaljustice.org.za/docs/2010workshop/3_Kasande.pdf (accessed 02 October 2013). 
513  See Clause 7 of the Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation of 2007. 
514  See W Burke-White and S Kaplan “Shaping the Contours of Domestic Justice, the International Criminal 
Court and an Admissibility Challenge in the Ugandan Situation” (2009) 7 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 257 at 258 (noting that the latest round of peace talks in June 2007 contemplated trying the LRA 
offenders in Uganda “with alternative sentences including the possible use of ceremonial traditional justice 
mechanisms”). 
515  See L. Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Address at Building a Future on 
Peace and Justice International Conference Nuremberg 25 June 2007 available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/4E466EDB-2B38-4BAF-AF5F-
005461711149/143825/LMO_nuremberg_20070625_English.pdf. 3-4 (Accessed 10 October 2013). (Stating 
that “As the Prosecutor of the ICC…my duty is to apply the law without political considerations…for each 
situation in which the ICC is exercising jurisdiction, we can hear voices challenging judicial decisions, their 
timing, their timeliness, asking the Prosecution to use its discretionary powers to adjust to the situations on 
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 emphatically stated that arrest warrants are decisions taken by the judges in accordance with 
the law, and they must be implemented without being swayed by state politics. The 
Prosecutor called upon states not to replace the ICC justice system with their peace initiatives 
but to commit to their Rome Statute obligations. If anything, the conflict resolution 
mechanisms should be complementary to the international criminal justice system already 
underway. Consequently, the LRA commander-in-chief refused to sign the agreement at the 
last minute, claiming that his decision was based on the government’s failure to persuade the 
ICC to withdraw the charges against him and his commanders.516  
 
Given that the Ugandan situation was the first case to be prosecuted by the fledgling court, 
and was also the first state party referral, it has been argued that it served as a test case for the 
young Court.517 This referral presented a good opportunity for the ICC to hear its first case 
and for States to demonstrate their commitment to the fight against human rights abuses 
within the continent. After the Prosecutor decided to investigate the Ugandan situation, he 
flatly stated that the Ugandan situation was admitted on the because of the gravity of the 
crimes committed by the LRA therein. The prosecutor also noted that all sections of the 
conflict were investigated and that the crimes committed by the UPDF were not of sufficient 
gravity to warrant further action by the Court.518  
 
4.2.3.4 Was Uganda “Unable” or “Unwilling” to Prosecute Genuinely? 
The referral and the Prosecutor’s selection of suspects have raised a few questions in some 
quarters. For instance, the absence of charges against the UPDF, the other party to the 
conflict, was seen as a sign of the Court’s lack of impartiality in selecting its cases as they 
the ground, to indict or withdraw indictments according to short term political goals. We also hear officials 
of States Parties calling for amnesties, the granting of immunities and other ways to avoid prosecutions, 
supposedly in the name of peace; we can hear voices portraying the ICC as an impediment to progressing 
further with Peace processes…Arrest warrants are decisions taken by the judges in accordance with the law, 
they must be implemented.” 
516  See K Kasande “Centring Women’s Rights in Transitional Justice Processes in Northern Uganda: FIDA-
Uganda’s Experience” African Transitional Justice Research Network Workshop 1 at 4. Available at 
http://www.transitionaljustice.org.za/docs/2010workshop/3_Kasande.pdf (accessed 02/10/2013). 
517  See Souare 2009 Review of African Political Economy 377. 
518  See also Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fourth Session 
of the Assembly of States Parties (Nov. 28,2005), at 2 ("In Uganda, we examined information concerning all 
groups that had committed crimes in the region. We selected our first case based on gravity. Between July 
2002 and June 2004, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) was allegedly responsible for at least 2200 killings 
and 3200 abductions in over 850 attacks. It was clear that we must start with the LRA."). “The criteria [sic] 
for selection of the first case was gravity. We analyzed the gravity of all crimes in Northern Uganda 
committed by the LRA and Ugandan forces. Crimes committed by the LRA were much more numerous and 
of much higher gravity than alleged crimes committed by the UPDF. We therefore started with an 
investigation of the LRA” 
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 were also alleged to have had a hand in the conflict.519 Furthermore, the timing of the referral 
seemed to be convenient for both the ICC and the Ugandan government.520 For the Ugandan 
government, referral to the ICC was seen as a political manoeuvre to get rid of the opposition 
as the referral asymmetrically focussed on the LRA.521 These criticisms and the Ugandan 
government’s subsequent attempts to withdraw the referral raise several questions. The first 
question that merits examination is whether Uganda was “unable” or “unwilling” to prosecute 
at the time of the referral. Secondly, does a State referral of a case to the ICC waive the right 
to challenge admissibility of the case before the ICC? Equally important is whether it is 
tenable for a State to refer to the ICC only to try to withdraw its referral at a subsequent stage. 
 
It must be noted at this point that Uganda is not only a State Party but also a territorial and 
nationality State. Additionally, that Uganda was found unable to prosecute genuinely at the 
preliminary review of the situation based on its failure to apprehend the suspects.522 For 
instance, although a party to the Rome Statute that clearly does not recognise amnesties,523 
the Ugandan government promised blanket immunity to those who were responsible in order 
to lure them to the negotiation of the peace agreement.524 Furthermore, no real domestic 
proceedings investigatory or otherwise were in motion against the named suspects before the 
referral. In any event, the traditional justice mechanisms that were in use in the country in 
tribal courts and truth commissions do not meet international standards.525 Over and above 
this, no admissibility challenge was brought at the situation phase, that is, prior to the 
519  See J Sinclair "The International Criminal Court in Uganda" (2010) Undergraduate Transitional Justice 
Review: Vol. 1(5) 72 at 73. See also Waddell N and Clark P (March 2008) African Affairs 1 at 22, noting 
that the prosecutor’s decision to investigate only members of the LRA “…has often been presumed to be the 
result of bias rather than as the consequence of the ICC’s application of its criteria for case selection”. See 
also ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Statement by the Chief Prosecutor on the Uganda Arrest Warrants (Oct. 
14, 2005).  
520  See Souare 2009 Review of African Political Economy 377. 
521  See Souare 2009 Review of African Political Economy 377(noting that “the whole story of referring the LRA 
to the ICC was a political strategy by the Ugandan government to achieve international criminalization of the 
group and to gain foreign support for its military operations against the rebels”). 
522  Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of Arrest Under Art. 58 Kony, Otti, Lukwiya, 
Odhiambo and Ongwen (ICC-02/04-01/05) Pre-Trial Chamber II 8 July 2005 at para. 37. 
523  See article 98 of the Rome Statute. 
524  See N Waddell and P Clark  (March 2008) African Affairs 23, noting that the Ugandan government  
proposed ways in which members of the LRA responsible for atrocities could be reintegrated into society, 
including thorough the mato oput ceremony and amnesty.” However, the ICC emphasized that Uganda, as a 
party to the Rome Statute, had duties, and that whatever peace agreement it entered into should in no way 
undermine those duties. 
525  N Waddell and P Clark (March 2008) African Affairs 23. 
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 identification of suspects.526 In essence, the Ugandan situation was admissible before the ICC 
in terms of article 17.  
 
Although Uganda exercised its right under article 14 of the Rome Statute, the referral and 
reasons thereof, and the government’s subsequent interest to prosecute nationally, beg the 
question of why a referral to the ICC was regarded as an option then. Uganda had a better 
chance of locating and apprehending the suspects as compared to the ICC that has to depend 
on States’ cooperation to apprehend suspects. However, the fact that the referral was 
motivated by Uganda’s failure to secure physically custody of the named suspects who were 
suspected to be hiding in Congo seems by far the most plausible. This is interesting given 
States’ reluctance to endorse the proposal of voluntary relinquishment of jurisdiction to the 
ICC during the evolving stages of the principle of complementarity.527  
 
An analysis of the evolution of the principle of complementarity in the preceding chapters 
shows States’ concerns over establishing a Court with too much power hence the insistence 
upon the Court’s jurisdiction being merely complementary to domestic jurisdictions. 
Specifically, the question of states voluntarily referring cases to the ICC was raised during 
the 1995 Ad hoc Committee.528 The question of a State Party referral being tantamount to a 
waiver of complementarity was discussed in passing, but a footnote with a proviso to the 
effect that voluntary relinquishment of jurisdiction by a State should not prejudice the 
admissibility criterion, was inserted.529 The question of waiver was criticised for being 
inconsistent with the spirit of complementarity as the aim was to establish a complementary 
Court that would “in no way undermine the effectiveness of national justice systems” and 
526  See T Allen “Ritual (Ab)use? Problems with Traditional Justice in Northern Uganda: Courting Conflict? 
Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa (March 2008) African Affairs.  Among others, the ceremony of 
‘stepping on the egg’, the Nyono Tong Gweno,  and the Mato Oput  were often used, where people confessed 
and some drank a bitter root, some of which were not necessarily legal.  
527  See section 2 in chapter 2 above. 
528  See Report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, G.A. 50th 
Sess. Supp. No. 22 A/50/22 1995 para. 47. 
529  See Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Draft 
Statute & Draft Final Act (A/Conf.183/2/Add.1 1998) art. 15. The issue of voluntary referral of cases to the 
ICC was inserted as a footnote and left for further discussion and most of the drafts had the proviso: "The 
present text of article ... is without prejudice to the question whether complementarity-related admissibility 
requirements of this article may be waived by the State or States concerned.” However, it was never resolved 
in subsequent meetings. 
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 only intervene in special cases.530 Article 14 on the other hand, allows a state party to refer a 
situation over which it has jurisdiction to the ICC without any restriction.  
 
Furthermore, the Pre-Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v Lubanga stated that the self-referral of a 
situation to the Court is consistent with the spirit of article 17 of the Statute in that the Court 
does not replace but complement national courts where they are found unwilling or unable to 
genuinely prosecute the most serious crimes of international concern.531 However, the Court 
did not address the issue of whether the referring state may later challenge the admissibility 
of such a case when it is willing and able to prosecute. It appears from the Court’s 
jurisprudence that once a State adopts the referral procedure, it is interpreted as the 
unwillingness or inability to prosecute. Therefore, a subsequent challenge of admissibility by 
the same State will not be entertained. This approach finds support in article 18 of the Statute 
that limits the State’s right to challenge admissibility of “cases” at the situation phase.532 For 
instance, the Ugandan government did not challenge the admissibility of its cases at this 
stage, and therefore lost this right. Nevertheless, Uganda could have found a reprieve in 
Article 18 (3), which requires the Prosecutor to defer to national judiciaries where there has 
been a substantial change of events, regarding the state’s unwillingness or inability to 
prosecute.533 In this regard, the Ugandan government will need to present evidence of its 
judicial and legal reforms and the location of the suspects to prove their willingness and 
ability to prosecute them nationally.  
 
530  See Report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, G.A. 50th 
Sess. Supp. No. 22 A/50/22 1995 para. 47-48. 
531  See Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants 
of Arrest, Article 58 (ICC-01/04-01/07), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 10 February 2006, p. 16, par. 36. 
532  Article 18 (1) read with article 18(7), makes a distinction between a “situation” and a “case”. The article 
gives a State a right to challenge admissibility of a “situation” in the initial stages of an investigation, that is, 
before the suspects have been identified. States are expected to furnish evidence that they are investigating 
the “situation” within one month of the Prosecutor’s notice. Once suspects have been identified, the 
“situation’ is regarded as a “case” and any admissibility challenges may be brought under article 19. See 
article 18(7) of the Statute.  See also the Pre-Trial Chamber II’s decision in the Situation in the Republic of 
Kenya (Decision pursuant to Article 15 of the ICC Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the 
Situation in the Republic of Kenya) (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Case No ICC-01/09-19 31 March 2010) 
[50]. It stated that “[a]dmissibility at the situation phase should be assessed against certain criteria defining a 
‘potential case’ such as: (i) the groups of persons involved that are likely to be the focus of an investigation 
for the purpose of shaping the future case(s); and (ii) the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court allegedly 
committed during the incidents that are likely to be the focus of an investigation for the purpose of shaping 
the future case(s).” 
533  See article 18(3) of the Rome Statute: “The Prosecutor's deferral to a State's investigation shall be open to 
review by the Prosecutor six months after the date of deferral or at any time when there has been a 
significant change of circumstances based on the State's unwillingness or inability genuinely to carry out the 
investigation.” 
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 Although no admissibility challenges were brought before the Court after the referral, the 
Ugandan government agreed to prosecute the indictees within its national courts in a Peace 
Agreement in 2006. The Peace agreement although never finalised, contemplated 
establishment of the War Crimes Division of the High Court for domestic prosecution of 
those who bore the most responsibility for the crimes committed during the conflict. These 
included the top LRA leaders that had been indicted by the ICC. Despite this, the government 
at the time initiated no investigatory or prosecutorial steps. However, when Uganda’s 
intention to prosecute international crimes nationally became apparent, through the 
establishment of an international crimes division of the High Court of Uganda, the ICC 
initiated proceedings to examine the admissibility of the Ugandan cases.534 In these 
circumstances, the most important question is, how can the principle of complementarity be 
applied in cases like this one to help assist states prosecute nationally, considering the 
caseload the Court is currently handling is already too much?  
 
4.2.3.5 Positive Complementarity in the Ugandan Referral: Is a Deferral to Uganda in 
the Interests of Justice? 
Since the intention to prosecute the LRA suspects nationally was made public in 2007, the 
Ugandan government has thus far made a few institutional and legal changes. Applying the 
policy of positive complementarity, the ICC would need to defer the cases to Uganda. 
However, this should only be done after the Court has made inquiries as to the ability and 
willingness of Uganda to hold genuine trials and if these will conform to the Rome Statute. It 
is essential for the ICC to rule out any political motivations behind a withdrawal of a State 
Party referral. When a State expresses an interest in asserting its jurisdiction even after 
referring the case to the ICC, the Court has to consider whether deferring to the State in 
question would be in the interests of justice.535 It is imperative that the ICC ensures that the 
534  See W Burke-White and S Kaplan “Shaping the Contours of Domestic Justice: The International Criminal 
Court and an Admissibility Challenge in the Uganda Situation” (2009) 7 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice) 257 at 258. See in particular, Decision-initiating proceedings under Art. 19, requesting observations 
and appointing counsel for the Defence, Kony, Otti, Lukwiya, Odhiambo and Ongwen (ICC-02/04-01/05), 
Pre-Trial Chamber II, 21 October 2008 8-9. The President of Uganda also stated that “because he (Kony) 
was not under our jurisdiction, we sought the assistance of the ICC. If he (Kony) signs the peace agreement 
and returns to our jurisdiction, it becomes our responsibility not any other party’s, including the ICC” in The 
NewVision: “We can save Kony - President Museveni” 12 March 2008. 
535  It has often been argued that that the Ugandan referral was asymmetrical as it only identified suspects from 
the LRA when there was evidence implicating the ruling government. See Souare 2009 Review of African 
Political Economy 373 (noting that “The Ugandan government’s counterinsurgency has also been brutal 
toward Acholi, as the NRA and its successor, the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF), have focused 
their use of force on destroying suspected rebel support among civilians”).  
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 national accountability mechanisms put in place constitute a viable and credible option to an 
ICC prosecution as intervention by the Court is to ensure accountability. At this stage, the 
Court will not be a bystander but will actively participate in the proceedings as a supervisory 
judicial body.  
 
The Court must also make sure that the State’s decision to prosecute is genuine and not 
motivated by the desire to shield the perpetrators. The Court once again has to put the State’s 
legal system under scrutiny to establish whether the state is “able” or in a position to 
prosecute genuinely.536 The State in question must not only have incorporated the Rome 
Statute into its legal system, its legal system must explicitly deal with the crime in question, 
that is, it must incorporate the ICC’s body of law so that it meets the required standards for 
prosecution of the core crimes.537 This argument flows from the ICC Prosecutors report to the 
Security Council concerning the situation in Darfur.538 He stated that he had studied the 
Sudanese laws and procedure relating to the Sudanese justice system of administration of 
criminal justice and traditional dispute resolution systems and believed that these were not 
adequate to address the crimes arising out of the situation.539  
 
This argument also finds support in the Appeals Chamber’s decision to reject the Prosecutor’s 
request to defer the Bagaragaza case540 to the Republic of Norway, pursuant to the ICTR’s 
Completion Strategy.541 The ICC may take lessons from the ICTR’s Completion Strategy 
536  See AY Sheng “Analysing the ICC Complementarity Principle Through a Federal Courts’ Lens” (2006) 
1249 Bepress Legal Series 1 at 7-8. Available at http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1249/ (accessed 12 
September 2012) (noting that the Court and States must “engage in a system of trial and error until States 
eventually mould their national laws” and their criminal justice system until they conform to the ICC body 
of law). 
537  See Statement by Ms. Patricia O’Brien Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, The Legal Counsel  
Seminar on International Criminal Justice: The Role of the International Criminal Court Trusteeship 
Council Chamber, New York (19 May 2009) 7 available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ola/media/info_from_lc/seminar_int_criminal_justice.pdf (Accessed 10 October 2013) 
538  See First Report of the Prosecutor of the international Criminal Court, Mr Luis Moreno Ocampo To the 
Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), 29 June 2005 3-4. 
539  See First Report of the Prosecutor of the international Criminal Court, Mr Luis Moreno Ocampo To the 
Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), 29 June 2005 3-4, see W Burke-White “Implementing a 
policy of positive complementarity in the Rome System of Justice” Criminal Law Forum (2008) 19 59-85 at 
59. 
540  Prosecutor v Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR-2005-86-R11bis, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion to Refer to 
refer to the Kingdom of Norway (May 19, 2006). 
541  This was in accordance with the amendment of Rule 11 (bis) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, which 
gave the Tribunal the authority to transfer low or mid-level cases that are already before the Tribunal back to 
the national courts for investigation and/or prosecution. See  International Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory 
of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 Rules of Procedure and Evidence Extraordinary Plenary Session (30 
may 2006) IT/32/REV. 38 8. 
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 procedure to ensure effective and expeditious trial of perpetrators of the most serious crimes 
of international concern. As noted earlier in chapter 2 section 2.3.3, the Bagaragaza’s case 
concerned an accused that was charged with genocide and in the alternative, conspiracy to 
commit genocide. Norway’s body of criminal law did not adequately address the crimes in 
question; alternatively, the accused would be charged under the homicide act. Accordingly, 
the request was dismissed because Norway was regarded in the circumstances, as “unable” to 
treat genocide as a serious international crime.542 Similarly, the Court has to ensure that the 
core crimes are not treated as ordinary crimes within the state’s legal system. It has been 
argued that for a State to be able to regain its jurisdiction to prosecute a case, a comprehensive 
and credible accountability mechanism must be in place for such a State to be able to 
prosecute the crimes the alleged offenders have been charged with by the ICC.543 The State 
should demonstrate more than mere political intent to seize itself of prosecution. 
 
4.2.3.6 Uganda’s International Criminal Court Act No 11 of 2010 
To enable its courts to adjudicate the Rome Statute crimes, Uganda incorporated the 
provisions of the Rome Statute into its legal system through the enactment of the International 
Criminal Court Act No 11 of 2010.544 The preamble of the Act provides that the purpose of 
the Act is to give effect to the Rome Statute and implement the obligations assumed 
thereunder. The Preamble goes on to point that the Act seeks to cater for offences under 
Ugandan law that are also listed by the Statute. Most importantly, the preamble provides that 
the Act aims “to enable Ugandan courts to try, convict and sentence persons who have 
committed the crimes referred to in the Statute.” Article 3(1) of the International criminal 
court Act defines a “crime” or an “international crime” as including genocide, crimes against 
humanity, aggression and war crimes and as crimes over which the ICC would have 
jurisdiction under article 5 of the Rome Statute.  
 
542  See G Norris “Closer to Justice: Transferring Cases from the International Criminal Court (2010) 10 
Minnesota Journal of International Law 204 at 211. 
543  See Statement by Ms. Patricia O’Brien Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, The Legal Counsel  
Seminar on International Criminal Justice: The Role of the International Criminal Court Trusteeship 
Council Chamber, New York (19 May 2009) 7 available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ola/media/info_from_lc/seminar_int_criminal_justice.pdf (Accessed 10/10/2013) 
(noting that “a mere political intent or even enacting a requisite piece of legislation that  establishes a 
“special accountability mechanism” to investigate and  prosecute those international crimes at the national 
level is unlikely to  suffice”). 
544  See the International Criminal Court Act No 11 of 2010, entered into force on 25 June 2010. 
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 Moreover, section 25 of the Act addresses the issue of immunities. It provides that “[t]he 
existence of any immunity or procedural rule attaching to the official capacity of a person is 
not a ground for refusing a request or postponing execution of a request for surrender or 
assistance made by the ICC.” This provision does not only do away with immunity against 
prosecution, it also binds Uganda to cooperate with the ICC for arrest and surrender of any 
person, despite immunities attaching to their capacity. Thus, by virtue of this Act, the promise 
of immunities to the LRA indictees would not apply if they were to be prosecuted in Uganda. 
Similarly, Uganda would be required to apprehend them and surrender them to the ICC for 
prosecution. This provision strengthens Uganda’s position as far as the “ability to prosecute 
genuinely” is concerned. The fact that Uganda authorities have located some of the LRA 
leaders removes the element of inability as was shown in their letter of referral.545  
 
The Act constitutes an important development in the Ugandan case as Uganda has a dualist 
legal system where treaties do not have force unless they are incorporated domestically by an 
Act of parliament.546 It shows the government’s willingness to punish those responsible for 
the most serious crimes of international concern. This however raises the issue of impartiality 
as there are allegations of selective referral,547 the ICC would have to watch the proceedings 
closely to ensure that the judiciary is not only independent but also impartial to guarantee fair 
trials. Another interesting development in the situation of Uganda is the establishment of the 
International Crimes division of the High court, which is tasked with trying those accused of 
the crimes listed under article 5 of the Rome Statute.548 As far as the implementation of the 
Rome Statute in the Ugandan legal system is concerned, and the establishment of a special 
Chamber to deal with the crimes in article 5 of the Statute, Uganda may be regarded as not 
only willing but as able to prosecute its indicted nationals in its courts.  
545  See “We can save Kony - President Museveni” The NewVision 12 March 2008 that they referred the 
situation to the ICC because the whereabouts of the suspects were unknown. He added that if the 
perpetrators signed the peace agreement and returned to Uganda, their prosecution would be Uganda’s 
responsibility not any other State’s, including the ICC. 
546  See section 2 of the Ratification of treaties Act. It requires that a treaty be incorporated into the State’s body 
of law through a ratification of the same by the Cabinet and that the parliament pass a resolution to that 
effect. 
547 See Waddell and Clark 2008 African Affairs 1 at 22, noting that the prosecutor’s decision to investigate only 
members of the LRA “…has often been presumed to be the result of bias rather than as the consequence of 
the ICC’s application of its criteria for case selection”. See also du Plessis and Louw (2009) International 
Security Studies 20.  
548  See section 3 of the Legal Notice High Court (International Crimes Division) Practice Direction No. 10 of 
2011, entered into force 0n May, 31, 2011. This changes the War Crimes Division of the High court of 
Uganda, established in 2008, to the International Crimes Division. The purpose of this is to give the High 
Court jurisdiction not only over war crimes but over all international crimes listed by the Statute. 
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To this end, the ICC needs to defer the cases to Uganda, encourage genuine national 
proceedings yet remain vigilant to ensure the effective prosecution of these cases. If the Court 
offers technical advice, assistance when and where it is required; and implements anti-
impunity structures, the Ugandan nationals can be prosecuted in Uganda, a fact which will 
not only be practical but also in conformity with the purpose of the article 17 that national 
courts be the primary prosecutorial agents. The Court’s decision to defer to Uganda, will not 
only ensure the expedient trial of those responsible, it will also preserve the sovereignty of 
Uganda. It will also ensure the effective prosecution, as Uganda, feeling in control of 
prosecution of its nationals, will cooperate fully with the Court.  
 
Furthermore, under the ICC’s watchful eye, the prosecutors will show greater zeal in the 
proceedings, which in turn will ensure that they conform to international standards, than if the 
Court, distanced itself from the prosecution. This approach to complementarity in self-
referrals, where the ICC helps in national capacity building, and does not compete with State 
jurisdiction, where their judicial incompetence is curable will foster a healthy partnership 
between the ICC and States. A positive approach to complementarity will therefore ensure 
that the Court does not oust a functional judicial system. In addition, giving states latitude to 
prosecute these crimes nationally will not compromise international criminal justice 
procedures that would otherwise be employed by the Court but prove unsuccessful because 
the States concerned do not cooperate with the Court.  
 
4.3 Positive Complementarity in the Prosecutor’s Proprio Motu Investigations 
Proprio motu investigations are investigations that have been initiated by the Prosecutor of 
his initiative, following receipt of information concerning the commission of crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the Court. These investigations differ from State Party referrals or the 
Security Council referrals as an additional criterion is applied before the Prosecutor is 
allowed to proceed with an investigation. Articles 53 and 54 of the Rome Statute govern the 
Prosecutor’s investigations. The Prosecutor is required to investigate the credibility of the 
information he received informing him about crimes committed within the Courts jurisdiction 
before formally opening investigations.549 Furthermore, the Prosecutor has to apply for 
549  See article 54 (1) (a) : “In order to establish the truth, extend the investigation to cover all facts and evidence 
relevant to an assessment of whether there is criminal responsibility under this Statute, and, in doing so, 
investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally”. 
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 authorisation to initiate an investigation from the Pre-Trial Chamber.550 For a proprio motu 
investigation to be authorised, the case has to be admissible under article 17 of the Rome 
Statute. Most importantly, the case has to be of sufficient gravity for the Prosecutor to 
intervene, and it must be in the interests of justice that the case be investigated by the 
prosecutor and not by State authorities.551 
 
Owing to the Court’s limited resources, it is equally important to investigate ways in which 
the complementarity principle may be implemented in cases where the ICC Prosecutor 
initiates proprio motu investigations.552 Where the Prosecutor is satisfied that crimes within 
the Court’s jurisdiction have been committed, it is important for him/her to bring this to the 
attention of domestic authorities so that they could both work in harmony. It is suggested that 
implementing complementarity with an aim to ensure prosecution of those responsible, by 
helping strengthen judicial efforts domestically seems a more viable option than exhausting 
the Court’s already depleted resources. As has been noted, no State has thus far prosecuted 
the Rome Statute crimes within its domestic courts, all 20 cases are before the ICC. All the 
cases before the Court have been referred either by the territorial states themselves, or by the 
UN Security Council or the ICC Prosecutor, of his own volition, has initiated investigations. 
 
The drafters of article 17 did not envision this practice of the Court and the number of cases it 
is handling since it became operational. The ICC was not in law and principle, meant to be 
the dominant adjudicator of the most serious crimes of international concern, but to 
supplement inability or unwillingness to prosecute in national judiciaries.553 Considering the 
load the Court already has, it is imperative to investigate situations in which it is necessary to 
prosecute nationally. After all, as noted in the preceding chapters, domestic courts are the 
forum conveniens for prosecuting these core crimes. With proper supervisory measures in 
place, the ICC can ensure that these crimes are punished through regular national 
enforcement, or where such are not operational, a threat of prosecution by the Court itself can 
help steer national authorities in the right direction. However, it is understood that there are 
550  See Article 54 (2) (b). 
551  See article 53(1) © of the Rome Statute. 
552  Pursuant to article 15 and article 13(c) of the Rome Statute, the ICC prosecutor may of his own initiative 
decide to investigate a situation if there is reasonable believe that crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court 
have been committed. 
553  This is apparent in the letter of article 17 – it prioritizes domestic jurisdiction, with the ICC being the Court 
of last resort. 
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 cases where the Court itself will have to assert its jurisdiction and prosecute, as it plays the 
role of complementary adjudicator where states fail to prosecute genuinely. 
 
The Rome Statute has in place a system of checks and balances to limit the powers of the 
Prosecutor. This does not only protect States against an overweening prosecutor but also 
safeguards the independence of the Court. By virtue of articles 13(c) and 15 of the Rome 
Statute, the ICC Prosecutor has the power to initiate an investigation proprio motu, where 
s/he has received information from credible sources that crimes within the Court‘s 
jurisdiction have been committed.554 However, article 15 requires that the Prosecutor analyse 
the seriousness of and submit, evidence that proves that crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court have been committed.555 Additionally, since national judiciaries are the default forum 
for prosecuting these crimes in terms of the complementarity principle, it follows that the 
Pre-Trial Chamber will require the Prosecutor to submit proof that he has initiated 
investigation into the situation because the State in question is either unwilling or unable to 
prosecute.556 Article 15(4) accordingly provides: 
“If the Pre-Trial Chamber, upon examination of the request and the supporting material, considers that 
there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, and that the case appears to fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Court, it shall authorize the commencement of the investigation, without prejudice to 
subsequent determinations by the Court with regard to the jurisdiction and admissibility of a case.”557 
In line with the principle of complementarity, it is clear from the afore-going that the Pre-trial 
Chamber will consider, among others, the admissibility of the case before the Court before 
the Prosecutor is given the green light to prosecute. This means the prosecutor has to submit, 
together with proof that the case is of the requisite gravity to warrant action by the Court, 
evidence that renders the concerned State either unwilling or unable to prosecute the crimes 
in question genuinely. 
 
4.3.1 The Role of the Office of the Prosecutor and the Principle of Objectivity  
Articles 53 and 54 of the Rome Statute both require the Prosecutor be objective in his 
assessment of information in his possession, indicating that crimes within the Court’s 
jurisdiction have been committed. The information has to be from credible sources and there 
554  Article 13(c) establishes the Court’s jurisdiction over situations where the prosecutor has initiated 
investigations into situations on his own in accordance with article 15.  
555  See article 15(3) provides: “The Prosecutor shall analyze the seriousness of the information received. For 
this purpose, he or she may seek additional information from States, organs of the United Nations, 
intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations, or other reliable sources that he or she deems 
appropriate, and may receive written or oral testimony at the seat of the Court.” 
556  See article 15(4) of the Rome Statute. 
557  See article 15(4). 
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 should be a reasonable basis for the Prosecutor to initiate an investigation.558 This means that 
the prosecutor has to be objective at the initial stages of an investigation and during the 
investigation respectively. In all these stages, the Rome Statute emphasises the need for the 
Prosecutor to be objective and only continue with an investigation where there is a reasonable 
basis for such. Both articles also require the Prosecutor to investigate only where the 
investigation is in the interests of justice, and the crimes committed are serious enough to 
require the Court’s intervention. It can be deduced from articles 53 and 54 that the Rome 
Statute emphasises the complementary role of the Court, that it should only intervene in 
exceptional cases and if need be, such intervention must be in the interests of justice. This 
would be in cases where the State in question has failed to discharge its duties and the 
Court’s intervention would be to ensure accountability of those responsible. Both article 53 
and 54 seek to ensure that selection of cases by the Prosecutor is based on both an objective 
and an impartial analysis of all the facts. 559 
 
4.3.2 Article 53 of the Rome Statute: Initiation of an Investigation 
Over and above the requirements in article 18 of the Statute, article 53(1) read with article 54 
(1) (b) require the prosecutor to ensure that the case is not only admissible under article 17 of 
the Statute but that it is serious enough to require the Court’s attention.560 The prosecutor is 
also required to make sure that the evidence available to him provides “a reasonable basis to 
believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed”.561 
Article 53 (1) (b) read with article 18, reflects the spirit of complementarity in that both 
articles favour the primacy of national judiciaries. They require the Prosecutor to inquire 
whether the case is admissible under article 17 before he starts an investigation with the 
intention to prosecute. The article essentially requires the Prosecutor to objectively look at the 
whole situation, consider the victims562 and then decide whether it will be in the interests of 
justice to prosecute before the ICC and not nationally.  
558  See article 53(1) (a).  
559 See Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the ICC, Informal meeting of Legal Advisors to 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, New York, (24 October 2005) 6. 
560  See Article 53(1) (c) requires the prosecutor to consider the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims 
and that ensure that “there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation [by the State 
that has jurisdiction in the matter] would not serve the interests of justice. '' [Emphasis added]. 
561  See article 53(1) (c) of the Rome Statute. 
562  See article 54(1) (b) provides that the prosecutor must “take appropriate measures to ensure the effective 
investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, and in doing so, respect the 
interests and personal circumstances of victims and witnesses, including age, gender as defined in article 7, 
paragraph 3, and health, and take into account the nature of the crime, in particular where it involves sexual 
violence, gender violence or violence against children”. 
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In order for the prosecutor to be objective, he/she has to apply reason in his/her investigation 
and only decide to continue with an investigation where there is reasonable belief that 
prosecuting the case before the ICC is the only viable option. Article 53(1) (c) also requires 
the prosecutor to assess the gravity of the case and investigate whether an investigation would 
be in the interests of justice. However, where the Prosecutor has decided that there is no 
reasonable basis for continuing with an investigation, because either the case is not of the 
required magnitude, and/or investigation is not in the interests of justice; he is required to 
inform the Pre-Trial Chamber of his findings.  
 
Additionally, Rule 92 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence requires the Court to “notify 
victims of the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation pursuant to Article 53”.563 
Article 53(2) lists instances that may influence the Prosecutor’s decision not to investigate a 
situation, for instance, where the case is inadmissible under article 17, either because it is 
being investigated by a state that has jurisdiction or because it has been investigated and there 
was no reasonable basis to go to trial.564  
 
Moreover, the Prosecutor may also decide not to investigate where the information in his 
possession is not sufficient for the issuance of an arrest warrant or summons.565 In terms of 
article 58, summons or arrest warrants may only be issued where there is a reasonable basis 
to believe that the crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction have been committed. If the 
evidence before the Prosecutor cannot secure either of the two, then it means the information 
before the prosecutor is not sufficient to require investigation by the Court. The decision not 
to investigate could also be due to the fact that an investigation will not be in the interests of 
justice, taking into account the interests of the victims, the age of the perpetrator and the role 
she/he played in the commission of the crime.566  
 
Although article 53 does not significantly clarify what “interests of justice” entails, taking 
into account the object and purpose of the Rome Statute, it may be interpreted to mean 
563  See Rule 92 0f the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. See also R Murphy “Gravity Issues and the 
International Criminal Court” (2006) 17 International Criminal Forum 281 at 283. 
564  See article 53(2) (b) of the Rome Statute. 
565  See article 53(2)(a), where evidence before the Prosecutor is not sufficient for an issuance of summons or a 
warrant of arrest in terms of article 58, there is no reasonable basis for the Prosecutor to investigate the 
situation.  
566  See article 53(2) (c) of the Rome Statute 
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 putting an end to impunity.567 Taking this into account, interests of justice in the context of 
article 53 entail punishing those who bear the greatest responsibility for war crimes, 
genocide, aggression and crime against humanity where States have failed to do so. It follows 
therefore that it is in the interests of justice that the prosecutor investigate the Rome Statute 
crimes where States fail to do so. This will also assuage victims’ feelings by holding 
accountable those responsible for the crimes.  
 
Thus, where investigations by the prosecutor are already underway because no domestic 
proceedings were initiated at the time of the investigation, it may not be in the interests of 
justice to continue with such an investigation since the State that has jurisdiction is 
subsequently keen to prosecute nationally. Moreover, all people who have been affected by 
the conflict, particularly victims, will more likely participate actively in the proceedings if 
they are local. Article 54(1) (a) requires the Prosecutor to make judicial inquiries and factual 
findings into the admissibility of cases before the Court and criminal culpability of the 
alleged offenders. This also ensures that the Prosecutor only intervene in exceptional cases, 
thereby protecting State’s from an overzealous Prosecutor. 
 
4.3.3 The Situation in Kenya  
Since the Court began its operations in 2003, the ICC Prosecutor has only initiated one 
investigation. The prosecutor, of his own initiative, submitted his application to investigate 
the 2007 post- election violence, into the crimes committed in the Kenyan. After the post-
election conflict, the government of Kenya established the Commission of Inquiry on Post-
Election Violence (The Waki Commission)568, to investigate key players in the violence and 
make recommendations on how to deal with those responsible. The Waki Commission 
submitted its report to the government in which it identified 20 suspects and witnesses and 
recommended the establishment of a hybrid tribunal to deal with those responsible.569 The 
same reports were also sent to the ICC Prosecutor. The Kenyan government was given one 
567  See Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice (September 2007) 4. Available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/772C95C9-F54D-4321-BF09-73422BB23528/143640/ICCOTPInterestsOfJustice.pdf 
(accessed 10 October 2013) (noting that “the  interpretation  of  the  concept  of  “interests  of  justice”  
should  be  guided  by  
the ordinary meaning of the words in the light of their context and the objects and purpose of the Statute,”an 
approach which is consistent with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). 
568  See S Brown and C Sriram “The Big Fish Won't Fry Themselves: Criminal Accountability for Post-Election 
Violence in Kenya” (2012) 111African Affairs 244 at 245. 
569  See the Waki Commission, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence 474, it 
recommended the setting up of the Special Tribunal for Kenya and gave the Kenyan authorities 105 days to 
consider the matter, after which time the report would be submitted to the ICC. 
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 year to implement the recommendations in the Waki Commission report but nothing 
happened. It is because of the Kenyan governments’ inaction that Pre-Trial Chamber, at a 
preliminary hearing, authorised the Prosecutor to investigate the crimes committed during the 
2007 conflict.570  
 
Upon finding evidence of large scale crimes against humanity and war crimes, in which over 
a thousand civilians were killed and thousands displaced, summons to appear before the ICC 
were issued against six high ranking Kenyan officials.571 The summons detailed the alleged 
crimes with which the suspects were charged. The three suspects, William Ruto, then a 
Member of Parliament and currently Kenya’s Deputy President; Henry Kosgey, then Minister 
of Industrialisation and Joshua Arap Sang, a radio journalist, were called to answer charges of 
crimes against humanity, murder; persecution; and forcible transfer they allegedly perpetrated 
against the Orange Democratic Movement’s opposition at the Prime Minister Raila Odinga’s 
camp.572 Additionally, charges of crimes against humanity, viz., murder, rape, forcible 
transfer, persecution and other inhumane acts committed against ODM supporters were 
brought against Francis Muthaura, former chairperson of the National Security Advisory 
Committee; Deputy Prime Minister and now President Uhuru Kenyatta; and former 
commissioner of Police, Mohamed Hussein Ali.573 
 
4.3.4 Issuance of Summons against Suspects  
After the issuance of summons, Kenyan political elite threatened withdrawal from ICC. Upon 
realising that withdrawal of their membership would not bar prosecution for the crimes 
committed while Kenya was a State Party, they changed tact. In 2011, the government of 
Kenya sought to challenge the admissibility of the cases against the six officials.574 The 
570 See Situation in the Republic of Kenya (Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 
Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya)  Case No. ICC-01/09-19 (31 
March 2010). See also the Waki Commission, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election 
Violence 473. 
571  See Arief A et al “International Criminal Court Cases in Africa: Status and Policy Issues” (7 March 2011) 
Congressional Research Service 21. Available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34665.pdf (accessed 9 
September 2013). 
572 See K Brown “Recent developments in international Criminal Law with regional Perspectives: the 
International Criminal Court” African Center for Legal Excellence, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2084997 6 (Accessed 24 August 2013). 
573  See K Brown “Recent developments in international Criminal Law with regional Perspectives: the 
International Criminal Court” African Center for Legal Excellence, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2084997 1 at 6 (accessed 24 August 2013).  
574  See Prosecutor v Muthaura (Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the 
Admissibility of the Case pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute) (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Case No 
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 government strongly argued that after certain legal and judicial developments in the country, 
which included a new constitution, they were in a position and willing to prosecute the 
indicted suspects nationally and that proceedings to that effect were already underway in 
Kenya.575 They also added that preliminary investigatory steps in Kenya were in motion to 
prepare for the prosecution of those responsible.576 On top of this, the government referred to 
recent legal and judicial developments, the promulgation of the Constitution in 2010 and the 
establishment of the International Crimes Division of the High Court to prove its willingness 
and ability to prosecute genuinely. The Promulgation of the Constitution was indeed an 
interesting development as it automatically incorporates all treaties that Kenya has ratified 
into its body of law. As noted in section 3.2.2 in the previous chapter, the government of 
Kenya undertook to complete the cases by September 2011 and keep the ICC abreast with the 
developments.577  
 
On the face of it, the admissibility challenges seem to be in good faith and given the legal and 
judicial developments in Kenya, this would, constitute a watertight case for a deferral to 
Kenya. However, the Pre-trial Chamber II dismissed the application, stating that there were 
no actual ongoing proceedings in Kenya in respect of the six suspects before the ICC. 
Technically, since no actual proceedings were initiated in Kenya against the suspects when 
the ICC Prosecutor commenced his own investigation, the Pre-trial Chamber was right in 
dismissing the admissibility challenge based on article 19(2)(b) of the Rome Statute.578 
Although Kenya had locus standi in judicio, as both a territorial and nationality state, there 
was no concrete evidence of ongoing proceedings against the indictees.579 Although the Trial 
ICC-01/09-02/11-96, 30 May 2011)  and Prosecutor v Ruto (Decision on the Application by the Government 
of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute) (ICC, Pre-
Trial Chamber II, Case No ICC-01/09-02/11-101, 30 May 2011)  respectively. 
575  See chapter 3 section 3.2.2. Kenyan authorities challenged the admissibility of cases before the ICC against 
Kenyan officials on 31 March 2011, pursuant to article 19(2) (b), arguing that proceedings against them were 
already under way in Kenyan Courts. 
576  See Prosecutor v Muthaura (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Case No ICC-01/09-02/11-96, 30 May 2011) 40 
and Prosecutor v Ruto (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Case No ICC-01/09-02/11-101, 30 May 2011) 41 
respectively.  
577  See Chapter 3, section 3.2.2. See also Ruto Admissibility Challenge (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Case No 
ICC-01/09-01/11-19, 31 March 2011) 13. 
578  See article 19(2) (b), it provides that the Court may make an inquiry into the admissibility of a case in 
accordance with article 17 of the Statute where a State which has jurisdiction over a case, on the ground that 
it is investigating or prosecuting the case or has investigated or prosecuted wishes to challenge the 
admissibility of the case before the Court. 
579  See the Chambers comments on evidence of inactivity in Muthaura Pre-Trial (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 
Case No ICC-01/09-02/11-96, 30 May 2011) 59; Ruto Pre-Trial (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Case No ICC-
01/09-02/11-101, 30 May 2011) 63-64. Pre-Trial Chamber II noted that the fact that the Kenyan government 
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 Chamber II commended Kenya on its willingness to prosecute nationally, it held that the 
state’s intention to prosecute in the future was not good enough to challenge the admissibility 
of cases.580 This was also in line with article 17(1) (a) which renders a case inadmissible 
before the Court if it has been or is being investigated by a State that has jurisdiction over it.  
 
However, if the Pre-Trial Chamber, given the legal reforms and judicial restructuring Kenya 
had gone through, considered the admissibility challenge in a positive light, it would have 
been more prudent for the cases to be deferred to Kenya to free up the ICC to focus on other 
cases. During the admissibility challenge, the Kenyan authorities had set a completion date of 
September 2011. Based on this, the Court could have, if it decided to defer to Kenya, 
overseen and supervised the trials in Kenyan Courts up to a prescribed completion date. This 
would not only ensure speedy trials but would also provide the prosecutorial body with a rich 
source of evidence as the trial would take place in the courts of a State that has a stronger 
nexus to the conflict. Moreover, with access to the witnesses and resources, the victim would 
get to see justice served and feel part of the whole process. This could also engender a 
healthy relationship between the Court and States, as the Court would not be seen as a threat 
to sovereignty, but as a partner in crime prosecution, working together with states, to ensure 
accountability for the most serious human rights violation.  
 
As noted above, once States feel they are in control of their legal process, with the threat of 
an ICC prosecution hanging over their heads should they prove incompetent; they are likely 
to show greater zeal to prosecute genuinely those responsible. In both self-referrals and the 
prosecutor’s own investigation, the Court could learn a thing or two from the well-established 
principle of subsidiarity. Since the ICC already endorses the idea of States referring cases to 
the Court, if and when they do not wish to prosecute, which is basically a corollary to the 
subsidiarity principle,581 the Court could, in assessing the desirability of its prosecution, 
consider additional factors, constitutive of the subsidiarity principle, as will be shown below. 
 
 
failed to submit reports to prove the existence of on-going investigations into the cases already before the 
Court is not convincing that there may be on going proceedings. 
580  See the Chambers comments on evidence of inactivity in Muthaura Pre-Trial (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 
Case No ICC-01/09-02/11-96, 30 May 2011) 59; Ruto Pre-Trial (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Case No ICC-
01/09-02/11-101, 30 May 2011) 63-64. 
581  See El Zeidy 2005 International Criminal Law Review 221. He notes that in the case of the ICC the State 
will choose to either prosecute nationally or ‘extradite’ or defer to the Court. 
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 4.4 The Subsidiarity Principle: Lessons from Bystander States 
The principle of subsidiarity applies in cases where more than one State has jurisdiction over 
the same case. This principle features in the controversial customary international law 
concept of universal jurisdiction. In line with the principle of complementarity, the ICC 
Prosecutor, before initiating proceedings proprio motu, could encourage national 
proceedings, as is required by the subsidiarity rule that the State that has a closer link to the 
cases be offered an opportunity to prosecute.582 This approach was supported by the joint 
separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal in the Arrest Warrant 
Case.583 The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction 2001584 lay down the criteria for 
a State, other than the territorial or national State, that wishes to prosecute to avoid conflict of 
jurisdiction. For instance, on an “aggregate balance”, it has to consider the likelihood of good 
faith and the effectiveness of prosecution in the nationality or territorial State where it wishes 
to prosecute.585 Closely linked to this, is the requirement of fairness and impartiality of the 
proceedings in the interested State.  
 
Similarly, the principle of complementarity requires that the prosecutor defer to national 
courts unless there is potential for bias within the domestic Courts. However, 
complementarity, in its strict sense, does not expressly oblige the prosecutor encourage 
national proceedings upon identifying crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. 
Complementarity favours primacy of national judiciaries but once the prosecutor identifies a 
situation in which the Court has a jurisdiction; article 17 does not place a duty on him/her to 
encourage states to prosecute. Poels warns that a State that has taken upon itself to prosecute 
may be prone to political pressure and bias in its determination of the desirability of 
prosecuting the perpetrators in question in the territorial State courts.586 Often it has been 
argued that, the ICC has been blinded by competition in admissibility considerations to the 
582  See Principle 8 of the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction (2001) reprinted in Macedo S (ed.) 
Universal Jurisdiction, (2004) 23. 
583  See ICJ, Arrest Warrant, Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal para.54, 
noting that (‘‘A State contemplating bringing criminal charges based on universal jurisdiction must first 
offer to the national State of the prospective accused person the opportunity itself to act upon the charges 
concerned’’). 
584  Principle 8 of the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction (2001) reprinted in Macedo S (ed.) 
Universal Jurisdiction, (2004) 23. 
585  See Principle 8 of the Princeton (2001) reprinted in Macedo (2004) 23 para. F. 
586  A Poels ‘‘Universal Jurisdiction in Absentia’’ (2005) 23Netherlands Quarterly on Human Rights 65 at 83. 
(arguing that priority should be given to the interested state, ‘‘as the subsequent commencement of 
investigations and prosecutions by the other State on the basis of the territoriality or personality principle 
will probably be concurrent with political pressure and judicial bias’’).  
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 point where it runs the risk of ousting functional judicial regimes.587 Legal scholars like 
Newton and Keller have cautioned that if the Court deviates from the textual predicates of 
complementarity, from prioritising national prosecution, to competing with States, this will 
compromise the Court’s future viability.588  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
In light of the foregoing, the thesis argues that adopting a policy of positive complementarity 
will help solve the crisis that has befallen the ICC in Africa. Owing to the limited resources 
of the Court, national courts are best placed to effectively deal with international crimes 
within their local systems. Therefore, it is imperative that the ICC invokes the 
complementarity principle, not as a vehicle to supersede jurisdiction of good willing states on 
technicalities, but to help encourage States and point out their judicial inadequacies. This 
participatory dialogue between States and the ICC will help establish a healthy environment 
for combating international crimes. Likewise, the effectiveness of the international legal 
system depends largely on cooperation of States. Therefore, the Court and States must work 
together and not against each other to secure regular enforcement of international criminal 
law. It is submitted that this will be made possible largely, by a positive approach to the 
principle that prioritises national jurisdiction; and leaves the Court the power to step in where 
the former proves inadequate.  
 
587  M Newton 2010 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 214. 
588 See Keller 2010 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 214 (arguing that “The ICC practice to date can 
be interpreted to support … [the] contention that the ICC is undermining complementarity via a rigid 
interpretation of State action on the same case. In particular, it seems problematic that states conducting 
wide-ranging investigations into war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide might be required to 
include the specific enumerated act that would be chosen by the Prosecutor and/or confirmed by the PTC”). 
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 CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Summary 
This thesis set out to define the principle of complementarity and investigate how it regulates 
the relationship between the ICC and Member States as provided for under article 17 of the 
Rome Statute. It noted that the principle gives national courts prosecutorial prerogatives over 
the most serious crimes of international concern: genocide, war crimes, aggression and crime 
against humanity. The nature of the relationship is such that the Court only intervenes where 
States fail adjudicate these grave breaches of international law within their domestic legal 
systems. Theoretically, complementarity seems to have delicately balanced two competing 
interests that have crippled international criminal justice processes since World War I. 
Untested, the principle strikes a “delicate” balance between sovereignty of States and a 
credible international criminal system, however, the jurisprudence of the Court has proven 
otherwise. Textual deficiencies in article 17, the Court’s interpretation and application of the 
principle in practice have raised an array of issues that have injured the relationship between 
the ICC and States.589  from concerns that the Court is arbitrarily applying complementarity 
to target weak States and that it is used by the West to “colonize” Africa. As a result, 
confidence in this revolutionary institution seems to have waned, especially in Africa.590 This 
is in part, due to the tension inherent in the Statute, between State interests and treaty 
obligations. 
 
Chapter one argued that the flaws within the complementarity regime form the core of the 
tension between the ICC and the African Union. The research proceeded from two 
assumptions. The first assumption is that by expanding the ability of States to deal with 
international crimes nationally, the tension that is currently developing between States and 
the Court may be relieved. This is because the efficacy of the complementarity regime and of 
international law enforcement in general depends largely on cooperation of Member States. 
For instance, States have resources such as the police force to locate and apprehend suspects 
589  See S Odero “Politics of International Criminal Justice, the International Criminal Court’s Arrest Warrant 
for Al Bashir and the African Union’s Neo-colonial Conspirator Thesis” in C Murungu and J Biegon (eds.) 
Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa (2011)  145 at 156. 
590  The Arab League’s Foreign Ministers at their meeting in Cairo on July 19, 2008 argued that the ICC 
undermines state’s sovereignty and is a mechanism of neo-colonial policy used by the west against free and 
weak countries in response to ICC’s involvement in Sudan. They called the ICC’s move a dangerous 
precedent which undermines Sudan’s sovereignty. The African Continent has been known for its formidable 
support since the negotiation history of the Statute. The first signatory of the Rome Statute, Senegal, came 
from Africa. Also, more than a third that 60% of African countries are members to the Rome Statute. 
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 and collect evidence; tasks which are made easier by the locality of the proceedings. The 
second assumption is that the flaws and shortcomings of the regime would be effectively 
addressed to pave way for a functional international criminal justice system. Closely linked to 
the first assumption, the thesis observed that the credibility of the regime depends on a 
positive approach to the principle of complementarity, one that encourages national 
prosecution. Although the system may be dogged by problems common to domestic judicial 
systems, the thesis argued that putting a monitoring system in place would exert pressure on 
domestic prosecutors and encourage them to show greater zeal in ending impunity. 
 
Chapter two examined the principle of complementarity from a contextual perspective, by 
exploring its origin, historical, philosophical, legal and practical development before its 
culmination into the Rome Statute. It was found that the principle is based on international 
legal principles such as the absolute duty of States to prosecute international crimes 
nationally, the pacta sunt servanda, which requires States to observe their treaty obligations 
without reservation. Moreover, the development of complementarity shows a tentative 
consensus as article 17 represents a “refined” model to the ones that preceded it. The thesis 
found that this development captured four major closely interrelated models: optional 
complementarity; the Nuremberg “occasional” complementarity; the International Law 
Committee complementarity model and the Rome Statute model.591 Moreover, their analysis 
showed a stark pattern between the models, regarding the manner in which they seek to 
regulate the relationship between international and national courts. The ultimate Rome 
Statute model embodied in article 17 mirrors these features. 
A comparison of these models and the philosophical, political and legal issues that underpin 
each revealed that the principle’s underlying premise is the primacy of domestic judiciaries: 
with the international tribunals being courts of last resort. Also apparent in the earlier models 
is States’ insistence on giving the tribunals of each era limited and defined authority, to 
protect their sovereignty. Since its inception in international criminal law, complementarity 
reflects a paradigm shift from the sovereignty preserving models to the Rome Statute’s 
carefully crafted model that preserves both sovereignty of States and the credibility of 
international criminal justice system. This is evidenced by the modalities through which each 
591  See chapter 2 section 2.1, 1. See also M El Zeidy The Principle of Complementarity: Origin, Development 
and Practice (2008) 6-7. He opines that the four major complementarity models have emerged since the 
Peace Treaties up to the Rome Statute: optional complementarity; the Nuremberg Discretionary 
complementarity; the International Law Committee complementarity model and the Rome Statute model. 
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 model was applied as influenced by the political, historical, philosophical, practical and legal 
circumstances of their time. The Rome Statute model relies on domestic courts to administer 
the ends of international criminal justice, with the Court only stepping in to supplement lack 
of justice. Although this arrangement seeks to preserve sovereignty of States, classical notions 
of unconstrained sovereignty no longer apply in international relations. Philosophically, 
complementarity puts the administration of justice in the hands of those with a closer link to 
the case and ensures that the process is legitimate through the admissibility test in article 17 of 
the Rome Statute.592 To this end, the thesis has concluded that the development of 
complementarity was phased and that these developments have refined the principle, so that 
the Rome Statute model represents a “delicate balance” between the concept of sovereignty of 
States and a credible international criminal system, a balance that has unfortunately been 
disturbed in practice.  
The thesis went on to critically analyse article 17 of the Rome Statute in the third chapter. A 
careful scrutiny of the interplay between the ICC and national courts, from the letter of article 
17 and the Court’s jurisprudence, was undertaken. The tension that has surfaced in practice 
between the Court and African States, it was observed, emanates from the inherent conflict in 
the Statute. It was discovered that the tension is due to not only the lacuna in article 17 but 
also the Court’s deviation from the textual approach therein, to a stringent and purely 
technical interpretation of the admissibility criterion. The thesis observed that 
complementarity has experienced a terminological shift in practice due to the Court’s 
deviation from the two-tiered admissibility test under article 17 in practice, and the  
importation of the strict judge-made  “same person, same conduct” test into the unwillingness 
criteria. Article 17 was also found to be deficient as it fails to set out a standard criminal code 
for all States to follow for appropriate prosecution of Rome Statute crimes.  
Chapter three further elucidated the pragmatic shift in the Court’s interpretation and 
application of complementarity in State Party referrals. It is argued therefore that the fact that 
the ICC endorses referrals without restraint instead of encouraging States to prosecute 
nationally may undermine its credibility. The Court appears to have radically shifted from the 
basic complementary jurisdiction predicates that require deference to national courts, and has 
assumed a competitive role for jurisdiction. The thesis also noted the dependence of the 
592  See M Newton “The Complementarity Conundrum: Are We Watching Evolution or Evisceration?”  Santa 
Clara Journal of International Law (2010) 8 141 (noting that complementarity “reflects the reality that 
justice must be rooted in the perceptions and perspectives of the domestic population that hosts the victims 
of the crimes to represent an authentic and inherent virtue”). 
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 complementarity regime on Member States’ cooperation and the dangers posed by 
jurisdictional conflicts. For instance, it was observed that the establishment by the African 
Union, of complementary international criminal jurisdiction for the same crimes proscribed 
by the Rome Statute might undermine the International Criminal Court’s relevance in Africa 
in light of the recent anti-ICC resolutions adopted by the AU.593 
The discussion in chapter four focused on a positivist approach to the principle of 
complementarity. The chapter advocated for a policy of complementarity whose main 
objective is to assist States in the best way possible to prosecute international crimes within 
their courts. This, it was noted, will help ensure regular function of the international criminal 
justice system at the municipal level. While observing that not all States will be willing or 
able to genuinely prosecute, the chapter observed a certain trend in State party referrals where 
States voluntarily refer cases to the Court, only to challenge their admissibility later, and 
cautioned against complacency. Considering the budgetary and infrastructural constraints the 
Court faces, it was also found that the efficient prosecution of the most serious crimes of 
international concern stands a better chance in domestic courts.  
5.2 Lessons and Conclusions 
5.2.1 The Evolving Nature of Complementarity 
One of the most important lessons in this thesis is that national courts are the best hope for an 
expeditious international criminal justice system. However, since complacent States 
sometimes hide behind the veil of State sovereignty, the Rome Statute has designed a system 
of checks and balances designed to strike a balance between sovereignty and the quest to end 
impunity for the most serious crimes of international concern.594 This has at its centre, the 
principle of complementarity. The discussion in chapter two illustrated the evolving nature of 
the principle of complementarity as it evolved to the all-encompassing Rome Statute model. It 
was observed that the earlier models were more inclined towards protecting sovereignty 
because the primary concern of States was loss of sovereignty through arbitrary decision-
593  See the African Union’s Sirte Resolution of non-cooperation with the ICC regarding the arrest and surrender 
of al Bashir in July 2009 in Libya in response to the Security Council’s refusal to defer the case against Al 
Bashir in Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XIII) Assembly/AU/Dec.245(XIII) Rev.1 Page 2 para 10 provides: “… 
in view of the fact that the request by the African Union has never been acted upon, the AU Member States 
shall not cooperate pursuant to the provisions of Article 98 of the Rome Statute of the ICC relating to 
immunities, for the arrest and surrender of President Omar El Bashir of The Sudan.” 
594  See O Triffterer 2ed. Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Law: Observer’s Notes, 
Article by Article (2008) 41. 
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 making by the international tribunals.595 Complementarity as envisaged by article 17 of the 
Rome Statute gives States leeway to prosecute international crimes within their courts. The 
evolution of complementarity has tentatively modified the underlying precepts of the doctrine 
of sovereignty of States so that classical notions of sovereignty need to be modified. Maogoto 
and Kindiki argue that State sovereignty is no longer seen as a political ideology but more of a 
duty on sovereign nation States to honour their international duties and protect their 
citizenry.596 The duty to exercise criminal jurisdiction over international crimes is also an act 
of sovereignty, which is preserved by the principle of complementarity, since it prioritizes 
domestic jurisdiction. These developments are important because the underlying premise for 
complementarity and the philosophy behind this foundational principle is to place the 
administration of justice in the hands of the domestic population closely linked to the cases.597 
Therefore, complementarity has developed so that it does not only give States leeway to 
prosecute international crimes but also acts as an implicit threat that they will lose their 
sovereign rights if and when the ICC intervenes, in the event of their failing to prosecute 
nationally. This carrot and stick mechanism safeguards against complacency, and ensures that 
perpetrators of the worst atrocities do not go unpunished. 
5.2.2 Regionalism: Implications of the African Court of Justice’ Complementary 
Jurisdiction 
In chapter three, the thesis demonstrated the advantages of regionalising the enforcement of 
international law. However, the thesis cautioned against legal fragmentation, a development 
that could undermine the work of international judicial bodies. This phenomenon was 
analysed in light of the African Union’s recent establishment of the African Court of Justice 
and Human Rights with complementary jurisdiction to try the crimes in the Rome Statute.598 
While the issue of regionalisation of international law enforcement is not unprecedented, the 
thesis acknowledges that the politically and legally bold move by the AU, amid the 
controversies surrounding ICC’s involvement in Africa, may have far-reaching ramifications 
595 See chapter 2 section 2.4.2 for a comparison of the earlier models with the Rome Statute model of 
complementarity. 
596  See JN Maogoto and K Kindiki “A People Betrayed – The Darfur Crisis and International Law: Rethinking 
the Westphalian Sovereignty in the 21st Century” (2007) 2 available at 
http://works.bepress.com/jackson_maogoto/40 (last accessed 27 July 2012). 
597  See Newton 2010 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 141. 
598  The African Union’s Draft Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights was 
drafted and presented at the 12th African Union Annual Summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It was later 
adopted at the Meeting of Government Experts and Ministers of Justice/Attorneys in Ethiopia in May 2012 
and it gives the merged African Court of Justice and Human Rights powers to prosecute among others, 
genocide, war crimes. Crimes against humanity and aggression should an Au Member State with jurisdiction 
fail to prosecute them. 
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 for the Court. This argument is based on the recent AU’s anti-ICC campaigns that preceded 
the adoption of the Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights, which endows the African Court with 
complementary jurisdiction.599 African States, under the aegis of the African Union, have 
adopted several reactionary anti-ICC exercises to voice their displeasure with the Court over 
its involvement in Africa. Some African countries such as Mali, Chad, and Kenya have thus 
far abdicated their duty to cooperate with the ICC by failing on numerous occasions to 
apprehend President al Bashir.  
 
Most recently, the government of Kenya has lobbied for support for withdrawal from the ICC 
after failed attempts to challenge the Court’s jurisdiction and prosecute the cases against 
Kenyan officials nationally.600 The Kenyan parliament also passed a motion for withdrawal 
from the ICC just before the commencement of the trials against the vice president William 
Ruto and the president, Uhuru Kenyatta.601 The African Union is also pushing for deferment 
or postponement of the trials against Ruto and Kenyatta, as well as Bashir’s, under article 16 
of the Rome Statute. These issues were discussed at the 15th Extraordinary Session of the 
Assembly of States of the African Union on ICC held in Addis Ababa from October 11 to 12th 
2013.602 The thesis cautions that this kind of “negative” regionalism, in light of the strained 
AU-ICC relationship, may undermine the relevance of the Court in Africa. The issue of the 
African Court’s complementary jurisdiction can potentially taint the relationship between 
African States, the AU, the ICC and the Security Council since the AU Protocol does not 
resolve the question of which court would have primacy. Overall, the AU’s resolve to create 
this arm of the African Court will most likely complicate matters for Member States to both 
institutions. 
599  Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights  Meeting of Government Experts and Ministers of Justice/Attorneys General on Legal Matters (7 to 
11 and 14 to 15 May 2012),  Addis Ababa, Ethiopia  Exp/Min/IV/Rev.7. 
600  See “Kenya’s Threat to Withdraw from the ICC: What Will SA Do?” Daily Maverick 29 November 2013. 
Available at http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2013-10-08-kenyas-threat-to-withdraw-from-the-icc-
what-will-sa-do/#.Uphni9IW1FU (accessed 29 November 2013). 
601  See “Kenya’s Threat to Withdraw from the ICC: What Will SA Do?” Daily Maverick 29 November 2013. 
Available at http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2013-10-08-kenyas-threat-to-withdraw-from-the-icc-
what-will-sa-do/#.Uphni9IW1FU (accessed 29 November 2013). The ICC has postponed Kenyatta‘s trial to 
February 2014 after the President publicly announced that he would not cooperate if they were tried at the 
same time. See “ICC Postpones Kenya President Kenyatta’s Trial Date” 13 Forum Ecomonique 
International Sur L’Afrique 29 November 2013. Available at http://www.panapress.com/iCC-postpones-
Kenya-President-Kenyatta-s-trial-date--15-885721-32-lang2-index.html (accessed 29 July 2013). 
602  The issues discussed at the Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union included among 
others, Decision on Africa’s Relations with the ICC. See Decision on Africa’s Relations with the 
International Criminal Court Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1-2 (Oct.2013). 
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 5.2.3 The Threshold of On-going National Proceedings 
Useful insights were made into the principle of complementarity in the discussion on the 
referral of the situation in Uganda and the Prosecutor’s investigation of the situation in Kenya. 
The cases of Uganda and Kenya provided useful examples of cases where States intend to or 
actually refer cases to the ICC only to challenge their admissibility at a subsequent stage. In 
both cases, the ICC intervened years after the conflicts had begun, when there were still no 
domestic efforts to prosecute those responsible. The analysis of the Appeal’s Chamber 
decision in the Prosecutor v. Ruto, Kosgey & Sang603 revealed that an abstract investigation 
or a mere undertaking to prosecute does not meet the criterion in article 17 (1) (a) that “the 
case is being investigate” by a State that has jurisdiction.604 The Appeals Chamber stated that 
in the absence of concrete evidence that the Kenyan government is indeed investigating the 
cases, its claim that it is investigating or the prospect of opening investigations in future is 
insufficient. The two countries’ political complacency, in the face of the atrocities, raises 
serious questions regarding the genuineness of their intent to prosecute. It is in light of this 
lesson that the thesis suggests that if a State wishes to prosecute nationally, it should in all 
seriousness, take concrete steps towards prosecuting and not wait until the ICC invokes its 
complementary jurisdiction.  
 
Most importantly, to give effect to their right to primary jurisdiction, States should seek to 
incorporate the Rome Statute into their own legal systems and amend their legislation so that 
it is in conformity with the Rome Statute. For instance, the fact that Uganda’s Amnesty laws 
are still in force in Uganda, yet the Rome Statute does not recognise immunities, contradicts 
Uganda’s intention to prosecute nationally. Moreover, the fact that Uganda preferred 
alternative measures of dispute resolution to prosecution may be understood as an attempt to 
evade the Court and accountability for the atrocities. It brings Uganda’s “ability” or 
“willingness” to prosecute genuinely into question. It is argued therefore that, before States 
refer cases to the Court, they should at least make efforts to prosecute nationally as it is not 
legally tenable to refer cases to the Court only to challenge their admissibility at a later stage. 
The thesis suggests that this could be achieved through participatory dialogue in which States 
603  Prosecutor v. Ruto, Kosgey & Sang, (Judgment on the Appeal of the Republic of Kenya Against the 
Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011) Entitled “Decision on the Application by the Government 
of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2) (b) of the Statute Case No. 
ICC-01/09-01/11 OA (30 August 2011). 
604  See section 3.2.2 page 62 above for a general discussion. See also the Chambers comments on evidence of 
inactivity in Muthaura Pre-Trial (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Case No ICC-01/09-02/11-96, 30 May 2011) 
para 59. 
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 work with the Court to identify and remedy whatever challenges hinder their progress. 
Additionally, States need to show respect and commitment to the complementarity process, if 
a State has referred the situation to the Court, with the intention that the suspects implicated 
therein be held accountable, they cannot be heard to challenge the validity of the proceedings 
before the Court. It is not tenable for States to refer cases and subsequently attempt to 
withdraw their referrals; it would simply reduce the complementarity process to a regime 
subject to whims of Member States. On the other hand, where a State communicates its 
intention to refer a situation to the Court, the ICC prosecutor has to make inquiries and 
engage in a participatory dialogue with the State in question, to find out if the incompetence 
that has motivated the referral cannot be ‘cured’. This will ensure that States appreciate the 
consequences of renouncing their jurisdiction by way of a referral to the Court and also help 
the Court bridge the impunity gap in appropriate cases.  
 
5. 3 Specific Conclusions 
From the foregoing, the thesis drew the following specific conclusions: 
1. That the principle of complementarity, as an organising principle, is thus far the only 
hope for resolving the controversies surrounding the work of the ICC in Africa, which 
have manifested in jurisdictional conflicts between the Court and States since it 
delineates jurisdictional responsibilities. 
2. The relationship between the ICC and States may be corroded in part by flaws of the 
complementarity regime relating to the lacunae in the scope of article 17 and its 
interpretation and application in practice. This is because the chapeau of Article 17 
leaves open certain questions regarding unwillingness. This is evident from the 
article’s failure to provide clear guidelines, evidenced by lack of a standard 
prosecutorial policy and definition of the ambiguous phrase “unjustified delay” leaves 
the regime significantly deficient. 
3. The Court’s interpretation and application of complementarity in practice has shifted 
from prioritising domestic prosecution of international crimes to prosecutions by the 
Court itself, an approach that is self-defeating and threatens to undermine the Court's 
integrity in the long run. The Court’s interpretation of the “same person, same 
conduct” in practice is more stringent and as such makes it difficult for States to 
satisfy. The Court's future viability depends on, among others, a healthy relationship 
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 between the ICC and States, cooperation and commitment to the fight against 
impunity for the core crimes. 
4. The establishment of a section of the African Court with complementary jurisdiction 
to try, among others, the Rome Statute crimes, comes at a point when support for the 
ICC has waned in Africa. Although this is not unprecedented, it does little to repair 
the fragile ICC-Africa relationship. This bold move by the AU threatens to derail and 
impede the fledgling Court’s efforts to fight impunity within the continent. Legal 
fragmentation in this sense is a growing concern in international criminal law. 
5. The adoption of a positive approach to complementarity is imperative to ensure the 
proper functioning of the Rome Statute’s criminal justice system and this may be 
achieved through encouraging and helping States prosecute nationally. The ICC, like 
other international judicial bodies, lacks the necessary enforcement mechanisms for a 
criminal justice system to be wholly effective. The Court therefore has to work hand 
in hand with States to make up for this. 
5.4 Recommendations                  
In light of the foregoing conclusions, the thesis makes recommendations aimed at alleviating 
the existing and growing tension between the ICC and States. These recommendations 
advocate for adoption of a policy of positive complementarity to ensure effective prosecution 
of the Rome Statute crimes within domestic courts, without compromising international 
justice processes.  
 
5.4.1 Reiterating States’ Duty to Prosecute International Crimes: Tightening the Rules 
of the Game 
The thesis has established that it is trite in customary international law that States have a duty 
to prosecute and punish international crimes. The Rome Statute reiterates this concept 
through the principle of complementarity that gives States first priority in prosecuting the 
core crimes listed by article 5 of the Statute. It is important that the complementarity regime 
established by article 17 encourage States to commit to their duty to prosecute international 
crimes. Analysis of jurisprudence of the Court in State Party referrals showed that States 
might hide behind their right to refer situations to the ICC so as to avoid the political and 
financial costs of prosecution. Although the Statute allows State party referrals of situations 
to the Court without restraint, there must be a mechanism in place to ensure States only refer 
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 cases to the Court in exceptional circumstances, where a State is indeed not in a position to 
prosecute. Most importantly, the Court should encourage States to implement the provisions 
of the Rome Statute within their legal systems so that they are in a position to prosecute 
satisfactorily the Rome Statute crimes. The Court has to handle referrals in such a manner 
that excludes the possibility of States just referring cases to avoid the financial burden or for 
political gain. The Court has to satisfy itself that necessary measures were taken at the 
national level to try those responsible before the decision to refer the situation was made. By 
ensuring that the referral is motivated not by a will to abdicate the duty to prosecute but a 
willingness by an ‘unable’ State to have those responsible punished, the Court would be 
implementing a policy of positive complementarity. 
5.4.2 Developing the Text of Article 17: The Need to Establish a Standard Criminal 
Policy   
Article 17 was an attempt to secure the independence of the ICC, by limiting its jurisdiction, 
and preserving sovereignty powers of States, through prioritization of domestic jurisdiction. 
However, the thesis discovered that this delicate balance has been disturbed in practice, the 
relationship between African States and the ICC regarding these issues is unsettling.605  As 
noted in chapter three above, the crux of this problem, among others, emanates from the 
textual deficiencies of the provisions that delineate jurisdictional powers between the Court 
and domestic courts.606 The Rome Statute does not have basic standard prosecutorial 
guidelines to help guide States as to acceptable investigatory or trial proceedings. The Statute 
has to set a ‘baseline’ of conduct that a State has to conform to for it to act in accordance with 
the ICC’s constitution of acceptable proceedings. Being a supranational institution, the ICC 
justice system comprises of differing prosecutorial policies of each of the Member States. It 
is important therefore that the Rome Statute sets a standardized approach on issues of 
prosecution because with very differing legal systems, each State will rely on its usual 
criminal procedures, and this has roots that run back to the problem of impunity. There is also 
a risk of the core crimes being treated as ordinary crimes. 
 
Furthermore, it is imperative for any prosecutorial authority to have a uniform criminal policy 
particularly if it comprises varied domestic judicial systems from across the world. The issue 
605  The ICC has been criticized for its prioritization of African states and for breaching the complementary 
principle in practice in Darfur where President Al Bashir, an incumbent head of state of a Non-Member 
Sudan, was indicted pursuant to the United Nations Security Council referral in 2005. 
606  These deficiencies are clearly outlined in chapter 3 section 3.5 26-29 above. 
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 of establishing a uniform criminal policy may seem an arduous task given the local 
peculiarities emanating from each domestic State, however, the ICC could come up with 
basic internationally recognised prosecutorial guidelines. A defined standard policy will put 
all judicial bodies on an equal standing, a sham trial in one domestic court would be a sham 
trial in another if it fails to follow the ICC's uniform blueprint of genuine proceedings. 
Furthermore, this thesis discovered a loophole in Article 17 of the Rome Statute, as it does 
not define what constitutes an unjustified delay to bring the perpetrator to justice. This leaves 
the interpretation of unjustified delay open to broad interpretations as the very differing legal 
systems may interpret unjust delay quite differently depending on their substantive laws. It is 
therefore recommended that a standard prescription period be included within the 
admissibility criterion. The Court should also address these deficiencies by creatively 
interpreting the existing rules and filling in the gaps to avoid these controversies. This way, if 
a State will not have initiated investigations within that period, it will be a clear case of an 
unreasonably long delay to initiate proceedings 
 
Moreover, there seems to be a paradigm shift from the sovereignty preserving aim of the 
principle of complementarity to a system that makes it hard for States to prosecute in their 
own courts. The importation of the “same person, same conduct” renders the criteria for 
unwillingness too technical and could exclude the jurisdiction of good willing States.607 
Situations like the Lubanga decision, where the accused was prosecuted by the ICC for 
conscripting child soldiers, and escaped prosecution for a more serious crime like genocide, 
for which he was charged by the DR Congo have to be avoided.608 Instead of giving the Court 
power to intervene based on a specific set of facts that was overlooked by national Courts, to 
the detriment of a more serious allegation, article 17 may be developed to let the Court 
607  See Newton 2010 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 142 (noting that “(t)he Court has already 
demonstrated a trend away from a purely textualist approach in interpreting the admissibility criteria found 
in Article 17, which from some perspectives could be seen as validation of the larger criticisms of the ICC 
itself”). 
608  See Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the 
Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of the 
Statute of 3 October 2006 ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4) (14 December 2006). The accused was arrested on 
charges of genocide and crimes against humanity in the DR Congo, a case which was referred to the ICC by 
the government. Lubanga challenged its admissibility before the ICC arguing he had already been charged 
with those crimes in DR Congo. The Appeals Chamber held that the conduct he was charged of did not 
cover the crimes he committed in Borogo, which formed the crux of the ICC charges and dismissed his 
claim. This was the case despite the fact that there was evidence of far more serious crimes than those he 
committed in Borogo and he was not held accountable for these because then, his claim of the ne bis in idem 
rule would stand. Although he has been found guilty and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment by the ICC, he 
escaped conviction for other more serious crimes like genocide. 
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 intervene by way of supplementing the evidence already within the domestic court’s 
possession. The ICC should address these deficiencies by creatively interpreting the existing 
rules and filling in the gaps to avoid these controversies. 
 
Furthermore, the Court must follow a standardised procedure for deferring to domestic 
courts. There must be clear guidelines to show when a situation could better be handled by 
states because in some instances it may appear that the Court favours political expediency 
that may even compromise the administration of justice. So far, the jurisprudence of the ICC 
has made it clear that before a determination of unwillingness or inability to prosecute is 
made, existent of actual national proceedings and whether those proceedings involved the 
subject before the ICC must first be determined. The State should also be required to furnish 
evidence showing significant domestic proceedings into a matter, not just allege the existence 
of such evidence.  
 
5.4.3 National Capacity Building 
The eight situations under investigation by the ICC have come through various avenues. 
These include two referrals by a Security Council Resolution (Libya and Sudan); five State 
party referrals (Uganda, the DR Congo, the Central African Republic, Mali and Cote 
D’Ivore) and one investigated by the prosecutor of his own volition, the Situation in Kenya. 
Although an array of issues arose from these cases, the thesis discovered that each of the 
States were either unwilling or unable to prosecute. Considering the concerned States’ efforts 
to amend their legal systems and challenge admissibility of their cases before the ICC, 
adoption of a policy of positive complementarity is necessary. The thesis therefore suggests 
the OTP, pursuant to the powers of the Prosecutor in article 53(1) of the Rome Statute, has a 
powerful and influential position to help States strengthen the capacity of their judicial 
systems. The complementarity regime should be developed to accommodate State’s 
sensitivities by encouraging domestic prosecution. In recommending the adoption of national 
capacity building mechanisms, the thesis strengthens its previous acknowledgement of the 
significance of developing the text of article 17. This could assuage state’s fears that the ICC 
is merely paying lip service to complementarity and arbitrarily superseding national 
jurisdiction.  
 
The regime should also be geared towards assisting States to commit to their duty to 
prosecute, through a monitoring system. Instead of seeming to arbitrarily superseding the 
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 jurisdiction of willing and able States on technicalities, the OTP should encourage national 
prosecution and closely monitor the proceedings to make sure that those who are responsible 
are held accountable. Another key element is the development of anti-impunity measures 
within the national legal framework in order to ensure effective investigations and 
prosecutions: investigations of crimes timeously, follow-ups on complaints, interviewing of 
witnesses and suspects and conducting forensic analysis. It is therefore essential for the ICC 
to encourage the effective implementation of the Rome Statute nationally. Enactment and/or 
development of existing progressive legislation should become a priority, as this will put 
national legal systems in line with the Rome Statute, thereby enabling States to exercise their 
jurisdiction.  
 
Closely linked to the enactment of implementing legislation is the need to establish a training 
programme geared towards efficient investigations, interviewing of suspects and victims, and 
conducting international criminal proceedings. The specific training of investigators, 
prosecutors, human rights activists, victims, witnesses and panellists will facilitate transfer of 
legal expertise. Encouraging incorporation of the ICC’s Legal Tools into national systems 
can also help empower national actors. This application gives ready access to a plethora of 
international criminal justice resources.609 This way, the training process could be achieved 
cost-effectively, while increasing the capacity of national legal by exposing them to effective 
methodologies for prosecuting international crimes. 
 
A healthy partnership of cooperation and consultation between the ICC and Member States 
where both the ICC and national judicial systems work hand-in-hand, instead of against each 
other, will solve anti-cooperation issues that have dogged the ICC since the indictment of al 
Bashir in 2009. The international criminal justice system will be centralized within the 
municipal system, with the ICC playing a supervisory role and assisting national judiciaries in 
fighting impunity for the core crimes of international concern. The philosophy behind this is 
that national courts have a stronger nexus to the situation and can effectively deal and 
609  The ICC’s Legal Tools is an online programme that offers a wide range of legal materials and references that 
are aimed at developing international criminal justice processes for the core crimes. It comprises the Legal 
tools Database and Website (http://www.legal-tools.org); the Case Matrix application (offers guidelines for 
organising evidence for the Rome Statute crimes); and digests on international criminal law and procedure 
and laws of evidence. The search engine gives access to decisions, indictments of international judicial 
bodies including the ICC, treaties and other relevant decisions. See M Bergsmo et al “Complementarity 
After Kampala: Capacity Building and the ICC’s Legal Tools” (2010) 2 Goettingen Journal of International 
Law 791 at 804-806 for a comprehensive account. 
152 
 
                                                            
 timeously prosecute. This way, the Court will be help assist States conduct satisfactory 
proceedings through technical assistance and supervision. This will not only give the State in 
question a sense of ownership of the process but will also make sure the victims and people 
closely linked to the case feel part of the process. 
 
5.5 Concluding Remarks 
African States and the AU have proven to be lacking in their attempts to ensure accountability 
for international crimes committed during insurgencies within the continent for decades, 
despite their insistence that the current ICC investigations are merely anti-African. In all the 
situations before the Court, there is no coherent evidence that the States concerned took steps 
to prosecute nationally. As complementarity is still evolving, the Court has engaged in a 
“system of trial and error” in an attempt to bridge the gaps between the textual flaws of 
complementarity and its practical implications. However, the hostile attitude by the AU is 
nothing short of unconstructive. In any event, the Union’s  attempts to undermine the 
relevance of the Court in the continent by adding complementary jurisdiction on the African 
Court of Justice, will likely make matters worse for the Court and victims of the core crimes. 
This move will not only divert the already insufficient funds from other urgent regional 
matters but also leaves members to both the Rome Statute and the AU in an unnecessarily 
difficult situation, regarding the primacy of each system. On the other hand, the ICC should 
take a more nuanced approach to complementarity to help effectively solve the problems 
faced by States in prosecuting the Rome Statute crimes. Additionally, the dialogue between 
the Court, States and regional bodies such as the AU must improve so that all parties are 
actively involved. This will create a common understanding of the evolving dynamics of 
complementarity and clarify what is expected of each party. 
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